&217(176 6(&7,21,63$&(6+877/(6$)(7<(1+$1&(0(176 29(59,(: 5(7851,1*7+(63$&(6+877/(72)/,*+7 ,03529(0(176,17(&+(;&(//(1&(&20081,&$7,216'(&,6,210$,1* 1$6$(1*,1((5,1*$1'6$)(7<&(17(5 63$&(6+877/(352&(66,1*,03529(0(176 5(&2*1,=,1*(/,0,1$7,1*&5,7,&$/6+877/('(%5,66285&(6 35(3$5,1*7+((;7(51$/7$1 62/,'52&(7%2267(502',),&$7,21 ,'(17,)<,1*,163(&7,1*$1'5(3$,5,1*736'(%5,6'$0$*(,1)/,*+7 ,03529,1*,0$*(5<'$7$&2//(&7,21)2563$&(6+877/( /$81&+$1'/$1',1* (1+$1&('6+877/(%$6('&$0(5$9,(:6 ,1)/,*+7,163(&7,21$1'5(3$,5 &217,1*(1&<6+877/(&5(:6833257 &6&6 ²6$)(+$9(1 &6&6 &$,%5(&200(1'$7,216 6(&7,21,,7+(6760,66,21 6760,66,2129(59,(: 67$7,215(6833/<6+877/(,163(&7,21+,*+/,*+7',6&29(5<·60,66,21 7,0(/,1(29(59,(: 0,66,212%-(&7,9(6 /$81&+$1'/$1',1* 0,66,21352),/( ',6&29(5<&5(:²676 (<0,66,213(56211(/ 5(1'(=9286$1''2&,1* 63$&(:$/6 3$</2$'29(59,(: 5$))$(//208/7,385326(/2*,67,&602'8/( (;7(51$/672:$*(3/$7)250 0$7(5,$/6,17(51$7,21$/63$&(67$7,21(;3(5,0(17 0,66( (;3(5,0(176 '726$1''626 6+877/(5()(5(1&('$7$ $&521<06$1'$%%5(9,$7,216 0(',$$66,67$1&( 0(',$&217$&76 38%/,&$))$,56&217$&76 “This cause of exploration and discovery is not an option we choose; it is a desire written in the human heart…” – President George W. Bush, Feb. 4, 2003 5(7851,1*7+(63$&(6+877/(72)/,*+7 NASA will return Space dark, grey substance called Reinforced Shuttles to flight with a Carbon-Carbon, part of the Shuttle's heat- mission on the Shuttle shielding Thermal Protection System. The Discovery this spring. The damage allowed superheated air to crew of seven is charged with penetrate the wing’s interior and to weaken a busy to-do list, including testing new the structure, eventually causing Columbia's safety techniques and delivering much- breakup 40 miles above central Texas, 16 needed supplies to the International Space minutes before landing. Station. Discovery’s launch is targeted for May 15 with a launch window that extends Even before the CAIB final report laid out 15 to June 3, 2005. recommendations to be completed before Space Shuttle missions could resume, the But Return to Flight is more than a single agency began the process of returning the mission. It launches a new era of human Shuttle to safe flight by forming a team to exploration that’s far-reaching but focused, plan for Return to Flight. The resulting ambitious but affordable. Return to Flight document – reviewed and updated as those illustrates NASA’s ability to learn from recommendations are addressed – is called mistakes and its determination to prevent NASA's Implementation for Space Shuttle new ones. And it pays tribute to a crew of Return to Flight and Beyond. seven brave astronauts on the Space Shuttle Columbia, who two years ago gave their NASA did not stop by addressing only the lives in the pursuit of the knowledge that 15 recommendations specified to be comes from exploration. implemented prior to flying the Space Shuttle again. Another 14 recommendations Following the Columbia accident on from the Board are being implemented as February 1, 2003, the independent Columbia well by NASA. Accident Investigation Board conducted a thorough, seven-month inquiry. The CAIB Additionally, the agency has gone above and issued its findings and recommendations in beyond the CAIB recommendations with a August 2003, in a comprehensive report. list of 15 corrective actions known as “Raising the Bar” to make the Space Shuttle The board determined that the physical safer than it has ever been. cause of the accident was a breach in the Shuttle’s left-wing leading edge caused by a These initiatives combined mean NASA is piece of insulating foam that fell off the addressing 44 issues leading to Return to External Tank during the climb to orbit. Flight. This foam block, weighing approximately 1½ pounds and about the size of a suitcase, struck a portion of the wing covered in a 29(59,(: An independent group was rededicated to making formed by the NASA human space flight as safe Administrator to evaluate as possible. NASA’s how NASA is addressing strategies for safely the CAIB recommend- resuming Shuttle flights dations. This Return to are detailed in this section Flight Task Group is covering Space Shuttle conducting an independent Return to Flight safety assessment of NASA’s enhancements. It serves as implementation of those a guide to how NASA – its recommendations as they government and contractor relate to the safety and workforce – has eliminated operational readiness of the potential for debris that Space Shuttle Discovery’s could damage the Space upcoming mission, Shuttle. It also details how designated STS-114. the agency plans to identify, inspect and repair With long-range planning damage in flight, if needed, in the form of the Vision while improving technical for Space Exploration excellence, internal announced in January communications and 2004, the agency is begin- decision-making. And – in ning a new chapter in its the very unlikely event that history. It is recommitting it's needed – the agency is itself to excellence in all providing a plan for aspects of its programs by keeping a Space Shuttle strengthening its culture crew safe until a rescue and improving technical mission could be launched. capabilities. NASA is committed to Space Shuttle Columbia returning the Space Shuttle and its seven-person crew to flight -- safely -- to fulfill are never far from the its mission in the Vision for hearts and minds of those Space Exploration. 29(59,(: ,03529(0(176,17(&+1,&$/(;&(//(1&( &20081,&$7,216$1''(&,6,210$,1* Two groups play a major role 63$&()/,*+7/($'(56+,3&281&,/ in the decisions associated with NASA’s Return to Flight The Space Flight Leadership Council (SFLC) effort: NASA’s Space Flight is the group in charge of the agency's Return Leadership Council and the to Flight efforts. Established before the Space independent Return to Flight Task Group. Shuttle Columbia accident, the SFLC is regularly briefed on the overall activities and In parallel with Return to Flight activities progress associated with Return to Flight. after the Columbia accident, a team was When the Space Shuttle Program defines a formed to review the Columbia Accident course of action addressing a CAIB Investigation Board’s report and recommendation or other major program recommendations to determine applicability issues, the next step is to brief the SFLC across the agency. This agency-wide group during periodic meetings. The SFLC is fully was led by Al Diaz, Associate Administrator briefed and approves, if necessary, the actions for Science and culminated in its team report: to be taken. Additionally, the SFLC assess "A Renewed Commitment to Excellence.” overall cost, schedule and policy issues. Additionally, the agency established the The members are: NASA Engineering and Safety Center, which focuses more attention and resources on • Walter H. Cantrell (co-chair) – Dep. engineering excellence throughout the Chief Engineer for Independent agency. Though based at the NASA Langley Technical Authority Research Center, Hampton, Va., this group • William Readdy (co-chair) – Associate has membership based at agency field Administrator for Space Operations centers that are integrated and involved with engineering reviews, challenges and • Bryan O’Connor – Associate decisions throughout the agency. Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance While hardware changes were ongoing, • internal management and organizational James Kennedy – Kennedy Space structures were reviewed and updated as Center Director appropriate. The Space Shuttle Program • Jefferson D. Howell – Johnson Space Mission Management Team was one of those Center Director scrutinized the most following the Columbia • accident and has undergone a complete David King – Marshall Space Flight review and restructure under the leadership Center Director of Deputy Shuttle Program Manager Wayne • Thomas Donaldson – Stennis Space Hale, who will chair its meetings each day Center Director throughout a Shuttle flight. • Michael Kostelnik – Dep. Associate More detail on each of the above Administrator for International Space organizations is below and available on the Station and Space Shuttle Programs Internet at www.nasa.gov and other sites. 7(&+&200,03529(0(176 5(785172)/,*+77$6*5283 The Task Group draws on the expertise of its 67$))25'&29(< members and other sources to provide its assessment to the Administrator and has During the investigation following the held meetings and made site visits, as Columbia accident, the NASA Administrator necessary, to accomplish its fact-finding. determined it was in the public interest to establish the Return to Flight Task Group. Functioning solely as an advisory body, the Co-chaired by former astronauts Tom Stafford Task Group established three panels in areas and Richard Covey, the group is conducting related to its work. The panels report their an independent assessment of NASA’s actions findings and recommendations to the full to implement the recommendations of the Task Group during periodic plenary sessions. Columbia Accident Investigation Board In order to reflect a balance of views, the (CAIB), as they relate to the safety and Task Group consists of non-NASA operational readiness of STS-114. As necessary employees and one NASA non-voting, ex to their activities, the Task Group consults officio member: the Deputy Associate with former members of the CAIB.