CHAPTER XV LIHONS THEnight after the great battle of August 8th was-as the afternoon had been on the Australian f ront-almost entirely peaceful. The German troops who towards evening had been observed ahead now gave no sign of their presence; the British batteries fired little and the German ones were silent. Shortly before dusk a very big gun somewhere in the Gernian back area tore at intervals immense showers of brown earth from the fields beside the crowded Roman road near Warfusee, close enough, on one occasion, to destroy a couple of teams and their drivers. In the old Aniiens line where, since early afternoon, the tired outposts had no longer the spectacle of British car or cavalry patrols to engage their interest, a single horseman rode up to a group of the 59th Battalion. Only when he stood over them did they realize that he was German. He swiped at an Australian with his sword, wounded him under the arm, and galloped away.l But the real business of this night was not fighting but fortifying : engineers and infantry dug and wired the Red Line and parts of the final objective and the 1st Brigade took position behind the flank of the 4th, to guard the river crossings at CCrisy. Next morning almost the whole battle-front remained sur- prisingly tranquil until nearly noon. True, the Australian and Canadian artillery from their new positions fired registering shots; but even on the front of I11 Corps, where an effort to reach the previous day's objectives must obviously soon be made, the silence was little broken. Yet at some level of the chain of command in all three corps there had, since day-break, reigned an activity which, comparatively unhurried at its 1 He was probably a scout of the rd Sqn , 1st Uhlan Re@ from whxh three patrols were sent out by the 107th hi". to locate their enem; at MCricourt, the Roman road, and Harbonnikres. 617 618 ’THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [8th-gth Aug., 1918 source, as the hour grew later and action approached the front, became increasingly urgent. At some time before midnight on August 8th General Rawlinson had informed his three corps commanders that the advance of his aid Debeney’s armies would continue nest day, the British objective being the line Roye-Chaulnes-Bray-Der- nancourt. The Fourth Army’s main thrust would he made on the Canadian front (still between the Amiens-Roye road and Amiens-Chaulnes railway). Here the cavalry was to “gain the objectives of the Canadian Corps” and “facilitate the advance of the French 1st Army.” On the other flank, north of the Somme, “particular attention” was to be paid by I11 Corps to the establishment of a strong position. The task of the Australian Corps depended on the action of its neighbours. On the right it would this day swing up the southern half of its line to Lihons, a ruined village on the far side of the one considerable hill within reach, whose rounded summit rose four miles south-east of Harbonnieres and screening Chaulnes a mile and a half beyond. On the left the Australians would not advance until 111 Corps reached the edge of Bray; the left half of the Australian Corps would then thrust to Chuignolles. The hour for the main operation was to be fixed by General Currie (Canadian Corps) and that for the advance north of the Somme by General Butler (I11 Corps), each of them as soon as possible informing General Monash. Already, at noon on the Sth, Rlonash had warned the divisional commanders concerned that any advance next day would probably be on the southern flank. The 2nd and 3rd Divisions, then behind the original first objective, must be ready to move but were unlikely to be called on before 5 a.m. The left division (4th) would probably make no advance,2 but the Ist, which he ordered up to Hamel and Aubigny, must be ready for battle at short notice. Late on the night of the 8th he sent to his divisional commanders an outlined plan for the advance of his right. This would be done in the three stages shown in the marginal map. As the corps sector continually widened (its northern boundary, the Somme. running east and the southern one, the Chaulnes railway, east-south-east ) , the 1st Division *He had added that it must be prepared to hold the line for two days and to protect its own left. 8th-9th Aug., 19181 LIHONS 619 would be inserted through the 5th Division’s right, to attack with a widening front. In the first stage the left of the 5th would make a flank for it; but what troops would form the left in the later stages depended on whether the second stage began on August 9th -in any case the 2nd Division would eventually come through, relieving the 5th. The 4th Divi- sion might “be re- quired to advance its extreme right flank,” but other- wise the front of at- tack would not ex- tend north of the F Roman road. Mon- ash hoped that the 3rd would soon re- lieve the 4th, leaving Ist, 2nd, and 3rd in line, 4th and 5th in reserve. In each stage “a strong body of tanks” would assist, “in order to minimise casualties. The artillery support,” Monash added, “will be considerable.” This warning order was followed in the small hours of the 9th by a second3 stating that the attack would be carried out that day, though how far would depend on the progress of the Canadians. In the second stage the 2nd Division would be responsible for the left. The hour for the operation was still unknown, but it is not anticipated that the attack will be launched before IO a.m. Troops to be prepared to move to a starting line at very short notice from 7 a.m. The 1st Division was allotted 14 tanks (of 2nd Tank Bat- talion, near Wiencourt) ; the 5th 7 tanks (of 8th Tank Battalion, at Warfusee); the 2nd 15 tanks (of 15th Tank Battalion- Mark V*-north of Warf~sCe).~The field artillery-four 8The two were headed Battle Instructions Series B. Nos. I and a respectively 4Monash had in reserve 5 tanks (15th Tank Bn ), the 13th Tank Bn. had become Army reserve. 620 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Sth-9th Aug., 1918 brigades to each division’s sectors-was to be in position to open fire by IO a.m. hgonash’s first warning order apparently reached the divisions just before midnight. and the second some hours later. But the headquarters of his three divisions now in reserve (Ist, end, and 3rd) were not, as in trench-warfare, connected with every brigade and battalion by a telephone system as regular as that of peace time. The 1st Division’s headquarters had come to Villers-Bretonneux on the afternoon of the 8th and the two brigades (2nd and 3rd) had marched into their bivouacs two or three miles away, around Aubigny and ?,$S!$ Hamel, shortly before 2 dusk and before mid- [i night respectively. GC--<-,,, Maj .-General G 1 a s - gow had to send his b,,k messages by despatch ,,,~1 rider, and it was 3.30 L..w~~~~~ a.m. when Brig.-Genl. Heane of the 2nd Brigade in Corbie received a warning order,6 and 7.20 when the order arrived to march. He too had to send despatch riders to battalions several miles away. He could only tell them to march to a rendezvous near Harbonnikres and that further instructions would be given to thein on the march. He and Brig.-Genl. Bennett (3rd Brigade) were hurried by car to Glasgow’s headquarters at 8 ani. to receive the full orders. Meanwhile at 8.45 the battalions of the 2nd Brigade began their ten miles’ march, moviiig independently across country with wide distances between successive platoons. About I a 111. the Canadian commander, General Currie, had fixed the hour for starting the attack at IO o’clock. But at 7 30 the 2nd Canadian Division, next to the Australians, realis- ing that its 6th Brigade, which had reached the Amiens line ~~ 6 This artil‘ery would be disposed as follows Left Sccfor (4fh DIT) Ccnfre Scrtor (5th Diu) Ridit Scrtor (1st Dio \ 4 Div. Arty. (IO and II 5 DIV Arty. (13 and 14 I Div. Arty. (1 and a Bdes ) Bdes ) Bdcs.) IZ Army Bde, AFA. 6 Airily Bde. AF.A. 189 Army Bde, RFA. 16 Ariny Bde.. R H A. 23 Army Bde , R F.A. 298 Army Bde, R FA. a This was prohalily a combination of hlonash’s two instructions; Glasgow ordered the 2nd Bde. to be prepared to move at 6 a.m., and the 3rd at 8. 9th Aug., 19181 LIHONS 62 1 after dark, was now faced by a considerable German force along its whole front, had hurriedly to order its support brigade, the 5th, to carry out the right half of the attack. Next, at 8.5. the 1st Canadian Division telephoned to the and that it could not be ready before 11. This information was passed to General Glasgow, and the hour for the attack was changed to 11. Since 7 o’clock, when they learned that the 1st Aus- tralian Division was not where they had expected it to be, in the forward area, the staff of the 6th Canadian Brigade had feared that their troops might have to attack with an open flank.