Not Just “Harper‟s Rules”: The Problem with Responsible Government as Critical Morality by Michael Edward Smith B.A., University of Western Ontario, 2008 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of Political Science Michael Edward Smith, 2010 University of Victoria All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author. ii Supervisory Committee Not Just “Harper‟s Rules”: The Problem with Responsible Government as Critical Morality by Michael Edward Smith B.A., University of Western Ontario, 2008 Supervisory Committee Dr. Dennis Pilon, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria Supervisor Dr. Herman Bakvis, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria Departmental Member iii Abstract Supervisory Committee Dr. Dennis Pilon, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria Supervisor Dr. Herman Bakvis, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria Departmental Member The Canadian constitutional crisis of 2008 triggered a renewed interest in the structure and workings of Canada‟s institutions of government. Particular controversy was generated by Prime Minister Stephen Harper‟s assertion that only the political party with the most seats in the House of Commons has the right to form a government and that it is illegitimate for the opposition parties to form a coalition with a legislative majority. Peter Russell terms these contentions “Harper‟s New Rules”, and is one of a large group of scholars who deride the rules as being undemocratic and in violation of the traditional practice of parliamentary democracy and responsible government (which holds that the House of Commons is the final arbiter on the viability of potential governments). This thesis investigates the quick rejection of Harper‟s Rules and determines that their attempt to enforce a critical moral standard on Harper is problematic because for a constitutional convention to be binding on political actors, it requires a consensus on how a convention promotes constitutional principle−− a consensus that does not exist about how a party receives a mandate to govern. Throughout Canada‟s history with minority government transitions, there has been a subtle discourse that implies many political actors have operated under the norm that the largest party in the House of Commons does indeed have a right to form the government. As well, many of the claims that are made about the democratic origin and purpose of the structure of responsible government are difficult to substantiate and can be challenged. The resulting disagreement makes it difficult to declare a constitutional interpretation to be wrong, given the malleable character of conventions, and that these constitutional disputes can generate into crisis and be exploited for partisan gain. This is the situation the federal party system may soon find itself in, as likely future minority governments will continuously bring the opposing conceptions of a mandate into conflict. This thesis concludes that determining constitutional conventions based on how they defend principle is a hazardous approach because political actors can always frame their actions in the rhetoric of democratic legitimacy, and if the actor can avoid serious political repercussions or find support in the public, then the interpretation becomes viable. iv Table of Contents Supervisory Committee .................................................................................................................. ii Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................... v Chapter One .................................................................................................................................... 1 The Crisis of 2008 and the Loss of Consensus ........................................................................... 3 Harper‟s Rules: New Understandings of the Supremacy of the Electorate ................................ 9 Scholarly Reaction and the Difficulty in Rejecting Interpretations .......................................... 11 Developing the Argument ......................................................................................................... 25 Chapter Two.................................................................................................................................. 28 What Are Constitutional Conventions? .................................................................................... 28 How do Constitutional Conventions Originate? ....................................................................... 32 How do Conventions Bind and Change? .................................................................................. 38 “Fundamentals” and the Loss of Consensus ............................................................................. 43 Canada‟s Unresolved Constitutional Debates ........................................................................... 45 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 56 Chapter Three................................................................................................................................ 58 Canada‟s (unofficial) 1st Minority Government ....................................................................... 61 Mackenzie King, Meighen, and “the Crisis” ............................................................................ 62 Diefenbaker and Pearson .......................................................................................................... 72 The Trudeau Years .................................................................................................................... 78 The Current Era......................................................................................................................... 81 Analysis..................................................................................................................................... 82 Chapter Four ................................................................................................................................. 88 The Federal Party System ......................................................................................................... 90 The Tools of Parliament: Who has the Right? .......................................................................... 97 Political Parties and Public Support ........................................................................................ 106 Codification: A Solution? ....................................................................................................... 109 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 113 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 115 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 119 v Acknowledgments This project is far different from the one I thought I would be writing when I arrived at the University of Victoria, and I am certain it has turned out better than my earlier ideas would have. For that, I must thank my supervisor, Dr. Dennis Pilon. His advice helped channel my foolish desire to revolutionize the study of institutions into something stronger and more focused. The time and effort he has put in to make sure this project has been completed on time is constantly appreciated. I would like to thank the other members of my committee, Dr. Herman Bakvis and Dr. Andrew Heard, for agreeing to give their own time to read and offer their take on my work, and the department‟s graduate secretary Kimberly Anderson for assisting with a variety of needs over the past year. I would also like to thank my peers in the M.A. program, with whom over the past year I have had the pleasure of becoming friends with. Their insight and passion have taught me much and helped to refine my own ideas. For that I am grateful. Finally, I would like to thank Erin Haggett, who provided me for free the excellent editing service she makes a career out of. She put up with my constant discussion of the thesis, and has earned the sushi dinner that is her reward. However, I take full and sole responsibility for any errors that may remain. Chapter One “Harper’s Rules” and the Crisis of 2008 The constitutional crisis of 2008 triggered a renewed interest, in both academic circles and the general public, in the structure and workings of Canada‟s institutions of government. At the time, many Canadians were uncertain of the proper way the system should function, and this undoubtedly increased the sense of crisis and polarization. In the wake of the events, it has been argued by some scholars that Canadian democracy will be strengthened by educating citizens on the norms and conventions of our system, thereby enabling them to recognize unconstitutional