NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS “DIRTY BOMB” ATTACK: ASSESSING NEW YORK CITY’S LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS FROM A FIRST RESPONDER’S PERSPECTIVE by John Sudnik March 2006 Thesis Advisor: Christopher Bellavita Second Reader: Ellen Gordon Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED March 2006 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: “Dirty Bomb” Attack: Assessing New York City’s 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Level Of Preparedness From A First Responder’s Perspective 6. AUTHOR(S) John Sudnik 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Past history and recent intelligence have shown that New York City (NYC), a critical node of the U.S. economy, is clearly in the terrorist’s crosshairs. In order to reduce the probability, lessen the risk, and minimize the consequences of a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD), or “dirty bomb,” attack, NYC’s first responders must be adequately prepared for its seemingly inevitable occurrence. This particular type of attack on NYC has the potential to create immense panic and confusion on behalf of the general public. Adding to the complexity of the problem is the notion that, since 9/11, the expected actions taken by employees in NYC high-rise office buildings in response to shelter-in-place instructions can be extremely difficult to predict. Therefore, a proposed public awareness campaign and a shelter-in-place plan are two cost-effective and easily implemented terrorism preparedness programs that would build the confidence and increase the capability of the citizenry. Since an RDD incident would likely result in a major inter-agency emergency operation, the unification of command, control, and coordination among NYC’s first responder community is an essential element to its overall success. Hence, an informed and collaborative response by both public and private sector entities could potentially reduce casualties and save lives. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF Preparedness; FDNY; New York City; Dirty Bomb; First Responders; RDD; Shelter-in-place; PAGES Incident Management; Public Awareness; Vulnerability. 119 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. “DIRTY BOMB” ATTACK: ASSESSING NEW YORK CITY’S LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS FROM A FIRST RESPONDER’S PERSPECTIVE John Sudnik Deputy Chief, Fire Department City of New York (FDNY) B.B.A., Baruch College – City University of New York (CUNY), 1985 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL March 2006 Author: John Sudnik Approved by: Dr. Christopher Bellavita Thesis Advisor Ellen Gordon Second Reader Dr. Douglas Porch Chairman, Department of National Security Studies iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Past history and recent intelligence have shown that New York City (NYC), a critical node of the U.S. economy, is clearly in the terrorist’s crosshairs. In order to reduce the probability, lessen the risk, and minimize the consequences of a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD), or “dirty bomb,” attack, NYC’s first responders must be adequately prepared for its seemingly inevitable occurrence. This particular type of attack on NYC has the potential to create immense panic and confusion on behalf of the general public. Adding to the complexity of the problem is the notion that, since 9/11, the expected actions taken by employees in NYC high-rise office buildings in response to shelter-in-place instructions can be extremely difficult to predict. Therefore, a proposed public awareness campaign and a shelter-in-place plan are two cost-effective and easily implemented terrorism preparedness programs that would build the confidence and increase the capability of the citizenry. Since an RDD incident would likely result in a major inter-agency emergency operation, the unification of command, control, and coordination among NYC’s first responder community is an essential element to its overall success. Hence, an informed and collaborative response by both public and private sector entities could potentially reduce casualties and save lives. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. PROBLEM STATEMENT .............................................................................1 B. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................2 C. METHOD .........................................................................................................7 II. THREATS ....................................................................................................................9 A. CURRENT TRENDS IN NYC TERRORISM..............................................9 1. Introduction..........................................................................................9 2. Recent History......................................................................................9 3. Types of Terrorist Groups ................................................................13 4. Types of Attacks of Greatest Concern .............................................14 5. Conclusion ..........................................................................................17 III. VULNERABILITIES ................................................................................................19 A. THE INEVITABLE RDD ATTACK ...........................................................19 1. Introduction........................................................................................19 2. Risk-based Funding ...........................................................................19 3. Nuclear Terrorism .............................................................................20 4. New York City’s Vulnerabilities.......................................................23 5. Implications for the U.S.....................................................................26 6. Conclusion ..........................................................................................28 IV. PREVENTION AND RESPONSE ...........................................................................31 A. FIRST RESPONDER APPLICATION OF RADIATION DETECTION TECHNOLOGY ...................................................................31 1. Introduction........................................................................................31 2. Personal Radiation Detectors............................................................31 3. Hand-Held Survey Meters ................................................................35 4. Radionuclide Identifier Devices........................................................38 5. Radiation Portal Monitors ................................................................39 6. Conclusion ..........................................................................................41 V. PUBLIC AWARENESS ............................................................................................43 A. MANAGING RADIOLOGICAL FEAR THROUGH PUBLIC EDUCATION AND RISK COMMUNICATION.......................................43 1. Introduction........................................................................................43 2. Fear of Radiation ...............................................................................44 3. Pre-event Fear Management.............................................................47 4. Event Fear Management ...................................................................50 5. Conclusion ..........................................................................................51 VI. SHELTERING-IN-PLACE ......................................................................................53 A. MANHATTAN