NO. 14-70040 In the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit MAX ALEXANDER SOFFAR Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, DIRECTOR, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Defendant-Appellee. On Appeal From The United States District Court For The Southern District Of Texas, Houston REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT Jonathan D. Landers Andrew G. Horne* Seth Kretzer 2817 W Tc Jester Blvd KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP LAW OFFICE OF SETH Houston, TX 77018 601 Lexington Avenue KRETZER (713) 301-3153 New York, NY 10022 440 Louisiana Street #200 (212) 446-4800 Houston, TX 77002 (713) 775-3050 *Counsel of Record April 15, 2016 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE STATE COURT’S EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE UNDERCUTTING THE RELIABILITY OF THE STATEMENTS SOFFAR SIGNED WAS REASONABLE DESPITE CRANE v. KENTUCKY, 476 U.S. 683 (1986). ............... 1 II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE STATE COURT PROPERLY APPLIED STRICKLAND v. WASHINGTON, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) WHEN IT FOUND COUNSEL EFFECTIVE DESPITE THEIR FAILURE TO INTERVIEW WITNESSES WHO WOULD HAVE STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE GUILT OF AN ALTERNATIVE PERPETRATOR. ................................................ 10 III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE STATE COURT REASONABLY APPLIED CULOMBE v. CONNECTICUT, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT SOFFAR SIGNED THE STATEMENT VOLUNTARILY. ............................................................................. 19 i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) ......................................................................... 20, 21 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) ........................................................................... 3, 10 Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987) ................................................................................. 9 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) ................................................................................. 5 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) ............................................................................... 22 Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009) ................................................................................. 4 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) ..................................................................... 1, 2, 4, 5 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 569 (1961) ............................................................. 19, 20, 21, 23 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015) ......................................................................... 3, 4 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) ............................................................................... 19 Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) ............................................................................... 21 Forsythe v. State, 664 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. App. – Beaumont 1983, pet ref’d) ...................... 5 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont’d) Page(s) Foster v. Townsley, 243 F.3d 210 (5th Cir. 2001) .................................................................. 6 Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2007) ................................................................ 14 Harrison v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) ................................................................................. 11 Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) ........................................................................... 14, 15 Martinez v. Dretke, 404 F.3d 878 (5th Cir. 2005) ................................................................ 11 Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986) ............................................................ 21, 22 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ............................................................................... 19 Moss v. Hofbauer, 286 F.3d 851 (6th Cir. 2002) ................................................................ 14 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) ............................................................................... 21 Rogers v. State, 774 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), overruled on other grounds, Peek v. State, 106 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) .......................... 14 Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 2002) ................................................................ 20 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ......................................................................... 10, 18 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont’d) Page(s) Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) ................................................................................. 2 United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2004) ................................................................ 22 United States v. Jones, 287 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2002) ................................................................ 12 United States v. Long, 852 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1988) ................................................................ 23 United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 1998) ................................................................ 23 United States v. Reliford, 210 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2000), judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom Clinton v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 296 (2000) ........................... 13 United States v. Rodgers, 186 F. Supp. 2d 971 (E.D. Wis. 2002) .................................................. 22 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ............................................................................... 14 White v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1998) .................................................................. 9 Woodward v. Epps, 580 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2009) ................................................................ 11 STATUTES Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) ................................................... 3 iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont’d) Page(s) RULES TEX. R. EVID. 801(d) .................................................................................... 5 v INTRODUCTION In stark contrast to Appellant’s thirteen-page Opening Brief, which limited itself to setting forth the standards of review applicable at this stage of the proceedings and alerting the Court to newly-decided instructive opinions of other courts, Appellee has filed a thirty-five page brief that advances new arguments never before presented to any court and recasts many of the arguments he has previously made in novel ways. To the extent Appellant has already addressed arguments made by Appellee, he will not do so again here. Rather, this submission is limited to addressing the most egregiously erroneous of the newfound arguments and assertions. ARGUMENT I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE STATE COURT’S EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE UNDERCUTTING THE RELIABILITY OF THE STATEMENTS SOFFAR SIGNED WAS REASONABLE DESPITE CRANE v. KENTUCKY, 476 U.S. 683 (1986). Try as he might, Appellee cannot mount any serious challenge to the inescapable conclusion that Soffar was deprived his constitutional right to present a defense. Soffar’s life depended on showing the jury that (contrary to the prosecution’s contentions) there were no “secret facts” in the statements upon which his conviction rested. The way to do that—indeed, the only way to do that—was to introduce evidence identifying the specific facts the media had reported. This would have established that the very few accurate assertions in the statements were public knowledge. (Appellant’s Mot. at 34-53; Appellant’s Reply at 1-13; Original Brief at 2-6.) Given the context of the case, precluding Soffar from defending himself in that way was devastating. As a threshold matter, Appellee’s claim that “the Court’s application of a new rule to Soffar’s case would be barred by the rules against retroactivity” is meritless. (Appellee’s Br. at 17 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).) Appellant is not asking for any new rule to be adopted much less applied. Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that an accused’s constitutional right to present a defense “would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a confession when such evidence is central to the defendant’s claim of innocence.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). That well-settled rule governs the outcome of this case: The media reports were competent, reliable evidence central to Soffar’s claim of 2 innocence—that his statements were false and unreliable. (Appellant’s Mot. at 41-45; Appellant’s Reply at 9-10; Opening Br. at 3-4.) Accordingly, they should have been admitted. Appellee’s other three procedural arguments likewise fail. First, Soffar’s “description of the standard of review” was not “mistaken.” (Appellee’s Br. at 8 (citing Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015)). As here, the Supreme Court in Davis was faced with a situation in which the state court had assumed error but had ruled that the error was nonetheless harmlessness. Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2196. Consistent with a long line of prior cases, and consistent with the standard Soffar articulated in his Motion for a Certificate of Appealability and Brief in Support Thereof (the “Motion”), (Appellant’s Mot. at 45), the Supreme Court held that, with regard to the harmless error question, the standard set forth in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) applies and subsumes the deference afforded under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective