Torts, Sharkey Fall 2006, Dave Fillingame I. INTRODUCTION A. Intellectual Approaches to Tort Law 1. Corrective Justice 2. Economic Approach/Deterrence Approach 3. Compensation Approach B. Holmes: Two theories of common-law liability: 1. Criminalist (Negligence) 2. “A man acts at his own peril” (strict liability) 3. Judge People by an Objective not a Subjective Standard of Care C. Judge v. Jury in Torts II. INTENTIONAL TORTS A. Elements B. Physical Harms 1. Battery a. Eggshell Skull Rule (Vosburg v. Putney) b. Intent to Act v. Intent to Harm c. “Substantial Certainty” Test (Garratt v. Dailey) d. “Playing Piano” (White v. University of Idaho) e. “Transferred” Intent 2. Defenses to Battery: Consent a. Consent b. Consent: Implied License c. Consent to Illegal Acts 3. Defenses to Battery: Insanity 4. Defenses to Battery: Self-Defense and Defense of Others a. Can be used as a defense when innocent bystanders harmed b. Can be used in defense of third-parties c. Must be proportional force 5. Defenses to Battery: Necessity C. Trespass to Land 1. No Damage is Required, Unauthorized Entry on Land is Enough a. An unfounded claim of right does not make a willful entry innocent. b. Quarum Clausum Fregit 2. Use of Deadly Force in Protection of Property a. Posner: We Must Create Incentives to Protect Tulips and Peacocks. b. Use Reasonable Force: Katko v. Briney (Iowa 1971) 3. Defense of Privilege a. Privilege of Necessity b. “General Average Contribution” c. Conditional (Incomplete) Privilege Vincent v. Lake Erie (Minn. 1910) d. The privilege exists only so long as the necessity does. e. Public Necessity 4. Miscellaneous a. Any intrusion above or below the property is a trespass b. Airplane overflights, violating air traffic rules treated as trespass c. Exception: Intangible Trespass D. Emotional Torts 1. Assault Torts 1 Torts, Sharkey Fall 2006, Dave Fillingame a. Mere words do not amount to an assault b. The threat must be immediate – imminent apprehension c. Qualify Your Threats and You Should Be OK 2. Offensive Battery a. Requires malice 3. False Imprisonment a. Four Walls Not Required (But Some Restraint on your Movement Is) b. Defense 4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED) a. Precursur of Modern IIED (Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] b. A Parasitic Tort c. Conduct should generally be “Outrageous” and “Extreme” III. NEGLIGENCE A. Duty/Breach: How Do We Establish Little-“n”-negligence? 1. “Reasonable Person” Test of Negligence a. Kids will be Kids; Adults should know Better (Roberts v. Ring) b. Beginners and Experts c. Children Engaged in Adult Activities d. Other Adult and Child Activities e. The “God is My Copilot” Driving Defense f. Policy basis for holding the permanently insane liable for their torts g. The Reasonably Insane Person h. Reasonable Blind Person i. Reasonable Drunk? j. Wealth is Irrelevant k. Reasonable Woman Standard 2. The Hand Formula a. US v. Carroll Towing Co. (2d Cir. 1947) b. The Foreseeable Unreasonable Risk Approach c. Hand Formula from a Moral or Corrective Justice Perspective d. Special Duties May Alter Hand Formula 3. Custom a. Ordinary Usage of Business: Unbending Test for Negligence (Titus) b. Universal, Customary, Carelessness Does Not Excuse Negligence c. Some Precautions So Essential that Universal Disregard is no Excuse d. Third Restatement View e. Custom and Economic Incentive 4. Medical Malpractice (Custom-ish) a. Typical Standard: Custom (T.J. Hooper not welcome here) b. “Two Schools of Thought” Doctrine: An Absolute Defense c. Rejection of the Customary Standard d. Locality Rule and Specialist Testimony e. Lama v. Borras (1st Cir. 1994) f. Informed Consent: Canterbury v. Spence (D.C. Cir. 1972) g. No Fault Insurance for Medical/Products Injuries 5. Statutes and Regulations a. Can Provide Evidence of “Negligence Per Se” b. But Regulatory Compliance is Not an Absolute Defense Torts 2 Torts, Sharkey Fall 2006, Dave Fillingame c. But Consider Customary (or Common Law) Exceptions d. When do you know a statute has a private cause of action? e. Complex Administrative Schemes (Implied rights of Action) f. Can also provide evidence of a suggested standard of care g. Proximate Cause (Third Party Intervention) May Not Save You h. Safe harbors for Statutory Violations 6. Affirmative Duties a. Defining Duties b. Generally No Duty to Rescue c. Gratuitous Promises d. Owners and Occupiers of Land e. Other Special Relationships B. Causation 1. Cause in Fact a. The Harm May Have Occurred Anyway (Grimstad) b. Burden Shifting and “but for” Causation Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel c. Burden Shift, “but for” causation, and Med. Malpractice (Zuchowicz) d. Expert Testimony For Causation (GE v. Joiner) 2. Proximate Cause a. Remotely Caused Damages Non-Recoverable (Ryan v. R.R. (1866) b. Plaintiff‟s Response to Emergencies (Tuttle v. Atlantic R.R.) c. Directness Test: In re Polemis d. Foresight Test: Wagon Mound e. Palsgraf: Foresight plus Duty f. Restatement: Harm Within the Risk (Cardozo‟s View) g. Statutory Duty can help define the “Harm within the Risk” 3. Causation and NIED a. Old Standard: Physical Impact b. Zone of Danger c. Dillon Rule C. Plaintiff’s Conduct and Defenses 1. Contributory Negligence a. Basic Doctrine (Butterfield v. Forester) b. A protection to corporations and industry? c. Contributory Negligence and Hand Formula d. Plaintiff‟s (n)egligence Must Also Be a Cause 2. Exceptions to Contributory Negligence a. Property Rights and Contributory Negligence (LeRoy Fibre) b. The Seatbelt Defense (Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co.) c. Last Clear Chance (Fuller v. Illinois R.R.) d. Willful, Wanton, or Reckless Conduct of Defendant 3. Assumption of Risk a. Early Doctrine: Industrial Accidents and Fellow Servants b. Birth of the Doctrine: Lamson v. American Axe Co. (Mass. 1900) c. The “Flopper”: Murphy v. Steeplechase (N.Y. 1929) d. Secondary Assumption of Risk: Meistrich v. Casino Arena (N.J. 1959) e. Assumption of Risk and Contract (Ob.-Gyn. v. Pepper) 4. Comparative Negligence Torts 3 Torts, Sharkey Fall 2006, Dave Fillingame a. Li v. Yellow Cab (Ca. 1975) b. Mostly eliminates last clear chance doctrine c. Primary Assumption of risk still a complete defense (Knight v. Jewett) d. Secondary Assumption of Risk Folded into Comparative Negligence D. Multiple Defendants 1. Joint Tortfeasors a. Joint Liability b. Joint Liability and Burden Shifting: Kingston v. R.R. (Wis. 1927) c. Traditional Rule: No Contribution/Indemnity with Joint Tortfeasors d. Several Liability e. Joint and Severally Liable f. Partial Indemnity on a Comparative Fault Basis (AMA v. Sup. Ct.) g. Settling with Defendants 2. Vicarious Liability a. Vicarious Liability b. Rationale c. Tests d. Motive Test: The Nelson Rule e. Foresight Test: Ira S. Bushey v. United States (2nd Cir. 1968) f. “Location of the Wrong” Test g. Vicarious Liability for Indep. Contractors (Petrovich v. Health Plan) E. Tort Law Under Uncertainty 1. Res Ipsa Loquitur (RIL) a. The Occurrence of the Event Itself is Evidence of Negligence (Byrne) b. Elements c. A Permissive Inference (Morejon v. Rais Construction) d. Control Need Not Literally Be “Exclusive” (Colmenares) e. Exclusive Control Not Needed: Third Parties and Chains of Custody f. RIL as an Information Forcing Rule: Medical Malpractice (Ybarra) 2. Collective Liability a. Concert of Action (Kingston) b. Alternative Liability (Summers v. Tice (Cal. 1948)) c. Market Share Liability (Sindell v. Abbott Labs.) Preconditions for Adopting Market Share Liability d. Variations on Market Share Liability e. “Risk Contribution Theory” (Collins v. Lilly - Wisc.) f. “Market Share Alternative Liability” (Martin v. Abbot Labs – Wash.) g. Market Share Liability Rejected (Skipworth v. Lead Industries) (Pa. 1997) h. Risk Contribution Theory Returns (Gramling v. Mallett) (Wisc. 2005) i. Proportional Share Liability 3. Scientific Uncertainty a. Burden Shifting of Causation to the Defendant (Zuchowicz) b. Lost Chance Doctrine 4. Medical Monitoring (MM) a. Recovery for Future Medical Expenses: MM (Bower v. Westinghouse) b. Medical Monitoring Rationale c. Rationale against Medical Monitoring d. No Damages for “Enhanced Risk” of Disease (But MM is OK) Torts 4 Torts, Sharkey Fall 2006, Dave Fillingame e. No Lump-Sum Damages for M.M (R.R. v. Buckley (U.S. 1997) f. Medical Monitoring and Class Actions IV. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW A. Coase Theorem 1. Zero Transaction Costs 2. Positive Transaction Costs (a.k.a. “Reality”) a. Problems 3. Applications a. Nuissance Law: Incompatible Land Use b. Little girls getting hit with busses (and other “stranger situations where bargaining is not possible) 4. Cheapest Cost Avoider B. Accident Cost Reduction V. STRICT LIABILITY A. Traditional Strict Liability 1. Strict Liability and Property Rights a. Yes, Recovery (Fletcher v. Rylands). b. No! We Have a right to (natural) non-Negligent Use of Private Prop. c. 30 States Now Accept the Rylands Principle, 7 Reject It. 2. Ultrahazardous or Abnormally Dangerous Activities a. Restatements b. Abnormally Dangerous Activity c. Don‟t Use Strict Liability when Negligence will Do 3. Trespass and Assault, without Intent B. Trespass to Chattels/Conversion 1. Trespass to Chattels: “The Little Brother to Conversion” a. Elements b. Showing (Physical) Damage is Important 2. Conversion a. Elements b. Knowledge/Intent, Good/Bad Faith, Care/Negl. = Not Necessary c. Conversion of Intangible Property d. Expanding “Conversion” and Relevant Policy Considerations C. Nuisance 1. Definitions a. A Reasonableness Standard: What is an “unreasonable” interference? b. Absolute Property Rights v. “Live and Let Live” c. Aesthetic Blight is Normally not a Nuissance 2. Solar Easements a. Majority Rule – No Easement: Fountainebleu b. Minority Rule – Yes Easement: Prah v. Marettyi c. Spite Fences 3. Uses Normal Person, Not Egg-Shell-Skull, Extra-Sensitive Standard 4. “Coming to the Nuisance” is Generally No Defense a. Minority View: Assumption of Risk 5. Injunction versus Damages a. The Right to Clean Air (Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.) b. Purchased Injunctions: Spur Industries v.