University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Masters Theses Graduate School 5-2007 Naturalizing Intuition: A Cognitive Science Approach to Moral Cognitions Joseph R. Kuntz Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Kuntz, Joseph R., "Naturalizing Intuition: A Cognitive Science Approach to Moral Cognitions. " Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 2007. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/296 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Joseph R. Kuntz entitled "Naturalizing Intuition: A Cognitive Science Approach to Moral Cognitions." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in Philosophy. John K. Davis, Major Professor We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance: Betsy Postow, David A. Reidy Accepted for the Council: Carolyn R. Hodges Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School (Original signatures are on file with official studentecor r ds.) To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Joseph R. Kuntz entitled “Naturalizing Intuition: A Cognitive Science Approach to Moral Cognitions.” I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in Philosophy. John K. Davis _________________________ Major Professor We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance: Betsy Postow _________________________ David A. Reidy _________________________ Accepted for the Council: Carolyn R. Hodges _________________________ Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School (Original signatures are on file with official student records) Naturalizing Intuition: A Cognitive Science Approach to Moral Cognitions A Thesis Presented for the Master of Arts Degree The University of Tennessee, Knoxville Joseph R. Kuntz May 2007 Copyright © 2007 by Joseph R. Kuntz All rights reserved. ii ABSTRACT I argue for a naturalized conception of the faculty of intuition with particular interest in intuition's role in moral contexts. I examine intuition in philosophical discourse: namely, the Classic Intuitionists G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and H.A. Prichard. I bring to light relevant distinctions among their conceptions of intuition. The explanation of an intuitive faculty in their philosophy has come to stand for the paradigm of intuition in moral philosophy. In the section following, I will present the objections that call into question intuition. I draw from Robert Audi and Laurence BonJour since their respective projects attempt to deal with these same objections in an attempt to formulate respective Moderate Intuitionist positions. I show how these objections raised against intuitionism are objections to the epistemological role of intuition. After, examining the objections, I present Mediocre Intuitionism and Moderate Intuitionism both of which attempt to rearticulate the use of intuition in moral thinking in ways that are less objectionable. I argue that all these conceptions of intuition are moot, inadequate or incomplete. Finally, I examine research in cognitive science related to intuition and its bearing on the development a complete and adequate conception of intuition. Empirical study of cognition illuminates how conscious and unconscious processes manifest themselves as an intuition. Surprisingly, a relatively consistent picture of intuition can be derived from various empirical studies. Cognitive science will be able to tell us something about the immediacy of intuition, whether intuition is indeed non-inferential, and about the self- evidence of intuition. In particular, the results from empirical studies of intuition affect Moderate Intuitionists' reformulation of intuition. These analyses point to a naturalized conception of intuition. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page Introduction……………………………………………………..……………………1 Intuition in Philosophy……………………………………………………………..2 Preliminary Conception of Intuition……………………………………………….5 Epistemological Components of Intuitive Knowledge…………………………6 Intuitionist Epistemology: Structure of Justification…………………………...8 Intuition and Cognitive Science…………………………………………………..10 Outline of Thesis………………………………………………………………….13 Chapter 1…………………………………………………..………………………..15 The Classic Intuitionists……………………………………………………………...15 G.E. Moore ………………………………………………………………………..15 W.D. Ross………………………………………………………………………...18 H.A. Prichard……………………………………………………………………..21 Summary of Classic Intuitionist Positions Regarding Intuition……………………..24 Self-evidence……………………………………………………………………...24 Immediacy………………………………………………………………………...25 'Non-inferentiality'……………………………………………………………….26 … the Remaining Problem………………………………………………………..27 Chapter 2…………………………………………………………..………………..28 Problems for Classic Intuitionism: The Epistemological Burdens of Intuition ..…...28 Replies to the Objections to Classic Intuitionism……………………………………30 The Dissensus Objection………………………………………………………….30 The 'Non-Discursive' Objection……………………………………………….….34 The Dogmatic Objection………………………………………………………….35 The Meta-justification Problem…………………………………………………..36 The Causal Objection……………………………………………………………..37 The External Criterion Problem…………………………………………………..39 Chapter 3………………………………………..…………………………………..42 Mediocre Intuitionism…………………………..……………………………………42 Moderate Intuitionists: Robert Audi and Laurence BonJour...………………………44 Robert Audi……………………………………………………………………….45 Laurence BonJour………………………………………………………………...48 Summary of the Problems for the Moderate Intuitionists……………………...……51 Chapter 4……………………………………………………..……………………..53 Cognitive Science's Study of Intuition………………………………………………53 Experimental Evidence Concerning Intuition..…………………………………..57 Are Intuitions Defeasible and/or Fallible?.............................................................57 Immediacy and Other Issues Relating to Intuitive Knowledge………………….58 Janet Metcalfe……………………………………………………………….59 Bowers et al. ……………………………………….………………………..64 Chapter 5………………………………………………………..………………….68 Unification of the Moderate Intuitionist Position and Cognitive Science…………..68 iv Self-evidence……………………………………………………………………..68 'Non-inferentiality'……………………………………………………….……….69 Immediacy………………………………………………………………………..71 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...……72 List of References…………………………………………………………………...74 Vita…………………………………………………………………………….…….79 v Introduction The following is an analysis of a fundamental cognition in moral epistemology: intuition. I venture to say that all interesting arguments in philosophy turn significantly on intuitions. Consider arguments over Justice, Euthanasia, and Abortion: Various positions in these debates are marked out by differing intuitions. Yet, to a large extent, intuition is still unexamined. I take as part of my thesis that intuition is a cognitive aspect of humans that can be studied by empirical science. I set out to unearth what intuition is by elucidating how it is used in philosophical discourse and by its study in cognitive science. Then, I draw these to concepts together to create a more coherent view of what it is that moral philosophy turns on: intuition. I articulate Classic and Moderate Intuitionists' conceptions of intuition, articulate arguments against these positions, and evaluate their legitimacy. Ultimately, I argue for a conception of intuition that draw from philosophical literature and conclusions drawn by cognitive science.1 Perhaps, the resulting naturalized conception of intuition is a necessary product of the methodology I have taken. I am willing to bite the bullet on this point. The very aim of this project is to advance a naturalized conception of intuition that is philosophically rigorous and consistent with cognitive science's study of the faculties of the human mind. 1 For those crying ‘foul’ since they already familiar with the fact that most intuitionist are non- naturalist, let me preface the rest of this project with the following claim. Intuitionism’s non- naturalism has to do with the fact that moral facts are either non-natural properties or that intuited propositions contain (implicitly or explicitly) non-natural terms, e.g. ‘goodness’. I take no position on whether moral facts are non-natural. My aim here is not to naturalize the non-natural moral facts or to reduce non-natural moral terms to natural terms. Instead, I aim to offer a naturalized account of the apprehension of them by what we sometimes call ‘intuition’. 1 Empirical study of cognition illuminates how conscious and unconscious processes manifest themselves as an intuitive belief. Surprisingly, a relatively consistent picture of intuition can be derived from various empirical studies. Cognitive science will be able to tell us some things about intuitive knowledge - about the immediacy of intuition, whether intuition is indeed non-inferential, and about the self-evidence of intuition. Intuition in Philosophy Rationalists use intuition as explanation for the means of arriving at the justification of a priori propositions.