ABSTRACT James Richard Wils. “IN BEHALF OF THE CONTINENT”: PRIVATEERING AND IRREGULAR NAVAL WARFARE IN EARLY REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, 1775-1777. (Under the direction of Dr. Carl E. Swanson) Department of History, July 2012. The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate the vital importance of American privateers during the early years of the Revolutionary War and their impact on the achievement of American independence. Most Revolutionary War historians have glossed over the naval aspects of the Revolutionary War, and have virtually ignored privateers. Naval historians have long debated on the importance of privateers to a nation’s maritime operations, with some of the most prominent scholars arguing that privateers were secondary and ineffective. In fact, privateering and prize capture often contributed greatly to national war efforts, and in the case of the Revolutionary War, privateers were the single most effective American force in the first three years of warfare. At the siege of Boston beginning in the summer of 1775, George Washington recognized the necessity of a naval force to prevent resupply of the British garrison by sea. Tasking several of his army officers with procuring and arming private vessels for this purpose, Washington essentially commissioned the first American privateer fleet. While these vessels were eventually absorbed into the Continental Navy upon its formation, they were privateers by all but the legal definition, lacking only letters of marque, and Washington himself referred to them as such. This fleet was instrumental in bringing about the evacuation of British troops from Boston, at the same time emphasizing the need for a national navy. Following the successes of Washington’s fleet in New England, many of the colonies and eventually the Continental Congress began issuing letters of marque to owners of private vessels, and able seamen took up the endeavor with great enthusiasm. Whether driven by patriotism or profit, nearly 1,700 privateers cruised on behalf of the United States in the Revolutionary War. While the Continental Army labored to overcome British military might, and the Continental Navy struggled to stay afloat, American privateers preyed on British merchantmen and supply vessels with relative ease and great success. The Royal Navy, hampered with blockade or convoy duties, had little success in discouraging privateering operations. With the arrival of French forces in 1778, privateers were left nearly unchecked to continue harassing British merchant and supply lines, dealing a greater economic blow to Britain than it was prepared for. In this thesis, I have outlined the history of Revolutionary War privateering from its inception, its impact on public sentiment and the British war effort, and its role in winning support for the American cause from France and other European allies. Where necessary, I have provided an overview of eighteenth-century prize law, as well as the problems privateering presented for the American government and military. Government correspondence and newspapers of the day provided many reports of privateering successes, demonstrating that American privateers carried the Revolution through the early years of warfare, despite failures by the army and navy. While insufficient for any significant military victory over Britain’s naval superiority, privateers ultimately undermined Britain’s ability to fight an effective campaign in North America, thereby influencing the outcome of the American Revolution. “IN BEHALF OF THE CONTINENT”: PRIVATEERING AND IRREGULAR NAVAL WARFARE IN EARLY REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, 1775-1777 A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Department of History East Carolina University In Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in Military History By James Richard Wils Summer 2012 Copyright © 2012 James Richard Wils “IN BEHALF OF THE CONTINENT”: PRIVATEERING AND IRREGULAR NAVAL WARFARE IN EARLY REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA, 1775-1777 By James Richard Wils APPROVED BY: DIRECTOR OF THESIS ________________________________________________________ Dr. Carl E. Swanson, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER ________________________________________________________ Dr. Wade G. Dudley, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER ________________________________________________________ Dr. John Tilley, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER ________________________________________________________ Dr. Charles Ewen, Ph.D. CHAIRMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY ________________________________________________________ Dr. Gerald Prokopowicz, Ph.D. DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL ________________________________________________________ Dr. Paul Gemperline, Ph.D. DEDICATION To my wife, who made this possible, And to my daughters, who made it necessary. And to my brothers, by oath or by blood, Bráithreachas thar gach ní. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS In many ways, this is the hardest page to write, because there are so many to thank, and I will invariably forget someone who deserves not to be forgotten. Nevertheless, I must mention a few, without whom I would not have come this far. First, I must thank Dr. Carl Swanson for his time and unwavering enthusiasm for my work. The meetings we had always left me with the feeling that my work was as important to him as it was to me. I enjoyed our conversations about anything and everything that came to our minds, and I will cherish his advice throughout my remaining scholarly pursuits. I also thank Dr. Wade Dudley, who imparted wisdom in and out of the classroom, as a mentor and as a friend, and who taught me that it’s okay to laugh once in a while. Thanks also to Dr. John Tilley, who has been central in the last seven years of my education, as my teacher and advisor, my supervisor, and my friend. He reignited the passion for history that I had somehow lost along the way, and his classroom anecdotes will be with me for a lifetime. And thanks to Dr. Charles Ewen for agreeing, with little notice, to serve on my thesis committee. Though we are not well acquainted, he has my deep and heartfelt appreciation for his service and for his encouraging words about my work. In my personal life, I want to thank everyone who supported me and encouraged me to finish, even when the future looked bleak. To my parents and siblings. To those who were with me when my children were born. To those who performed music with me. To those who laughed with me and to those who cried with me. And to the woman I share my life with – I cannot thank her enough for putting up with me through all of this. Stephanie, I can’t wait to share the rest of forever with you, watching our beautiful daughters grow and learn. I love you. Finally, and most importantly, I thank the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, who never gave up on me, even in my darkest hours. Amen. CONTENTS Prologue A Private Rebel Navy vii Chapter I Historiography of Privateering in Colonial, Revolutionary, and 1 Early Republican America Chapter II Revolutionary War Privateering in its Infancy: The Battle of 38 Machias and Washington’s Schooners Chapter III The Allure of Privateering and the Competition for Manpower 53 Chapter IV The Impact of American Privateers on Public Sentiment and the 75 British War Effort Chapter V American Privateering and Prize Capture in International Waters 93 Epilogue A War in Two Theaters 106 Bibliography 116 Appendix A Prizes Taken by Washington’s Schooners, 1775-1777 124 Appendix B Ordnance Stores Aboard HMS Nancy and HMS Hope 127 Appendix C Types of British Merchant Vessels Captured as of 1777, and Their 128 Total Values Appendix D Comparisons of Operational Strength Between Privateers and 129 Continental Warships PROLGUE: A PRIVATE REBEL NAVY Most studies of the American Revolution do not focus on the naval aspects of the war that established the United States. Many Revolution scholars concern themselves primarily with its political or military intricacies. For instance, some seek to answer questions dealing with the various land campaigns of the opposing armies, attempting to discern the manner in which the Continental Army held its own, despite overwhelming odds, against the British war machine and ultimately achieved liberty for the thirteen American colonies. Others examine the Revolution’s political spectrum; they study legislation and colonial policy to determine why Britain and its American colonies came to an impasse that they could only resolve through military action. Still others eschew the military and political history of the Revolution, and look at economy as the conflict’s cause and driving factor. While their approaches to historical study of the American Revolution differ substantially, these scholars possess one commonality: They virtually ignore the importance of the naval war. Sadly, there is good reason for this neglect; the naval war simply was not overly important to the outcome of the Revolution, at least in tactical or strategic terms. John Tilley, one of the few historians writing about the Revolution’s naval component, explains its scholarly neglect. “It is understandable that the two countries most interested in the Revolution, the United States and Great Britain, should have paid so little attention to this aspect of the subject, for the former participated in the naval war only inconsequentially and the latter lost it.”1 Writing specifically about the Royal Navy during the Revolution, Tilley laments such indifference, arguing that “the British navy was intimately involved in the fighting from the very 1 John Tilley, The British Navy and the American Revolution (Columbia, SC: