E-ASIA .~ h.~ri """'n" of ••" •• http://e-asia.uoregon.edu Famous Espionage Cases Tracking Julius Rosenberg's Lesser KnoW'n Associates Steven T. Usdin A fresh look at the case of Julius the one hand and civilian defense Rosenberg, executed in 1953 for contractors on the other. The conspiracy to commit espionage, leakage to the USSR ofvast in the light ofnew information amounts of data about highly about two of his lesser known sensitive technologies would not associates, Joel Barr and Alfred have occurred if counterintelli­ Sarant, reveals disturbing paral­ gence agencies had had the imag­ lels to some contemporary intelli­ ination to conceive ofmassive gence issues. Soviet espionage against indus­ trial targets undertaken by Like 9/11, the most " The National Commission on American citizens or had taken importantgovernment Terrorist Attacks Upon the seriously the vetting procedures failure in the cases of United States, also known as the for granting access to classified Rosenberg, Barr, and 9/11 Commission, concluded in information. Sarant, was one of 2004 that the "most important imagination. failure" that left America vulner­ In contrast to Rosenberg, Barr able to attack was "one ofimagi­ and Sarant evaded detection and nation." The cases ofRosenberg, slipped out ofthe United States. Barr, and Sarant demonstrate Their subsequent careers behind that the responses ofthe Federal the Iron Curtain, where they " Bureau of Investigation and the became pioneers of Soviet high US Army to communist penetra­ technology, are evocative of tion during World War II were another contemporary concern: characterized by a similar lack of the transfer of trained personnel imagination. The FBI aggres­ from the former Soviet Union to sively identified communists who rogue states. held sensitive positions in gov­ ernment, including jobs that afforded communists routine access to classified military infor­ The Rosenberg Ring mation. But the Bureau and the army treated communists as Joel Barr was one ofthe original potential subversives, not as members of a group ofengi­ spies acting on behalfofthe neers-civilian employees ofthe Soviet Union. US military and its contractors­ whom Julius Rosenberg recruited Steven T. Usdin is a senior editor at The 9/11 Commission also high­ to spy for the Soviet Union. From BioCentury Publications and author lighted the lack ofcoordination the time they joined the Young of Engineering Communism: How between intelligence and law Communist League in 1936, Barr Two Americans Spied for Stalin and enforcement agencies. The and Rosenberg viewed the United Founded the Soviet Silicon Valley, to Rosenberg case involved a simi­ States government as a fascist be published by Yale University lar breakdown, primarily regime little better than Nazi Press in October 2005. between the army and the FBI on Germany. Studies in Intelligence Vol. 49, NO.3 13 Rosenberg Ring Barr and"Sarant passed the Soviets more than 9,000 pages Later, Barr recruited Alfred tions, the Rosenberg group had Sarant, the only known member of relating to more than jobs that provided unfettered the Rosenberg ring who was nei­ 100 weapons programs access to a wide range ofsensitive ther Jewish nor a graduate ofCity during World War II. technologies. College ofNew York. Barr and Sarant were talented electrical Military security officials engineers who found technical attempted to compartmentalize advances in radar and electronics R&D-for example by assigning as compelling and important as during World"War II and, in the the design ofthe various compo­ class struggle. This dual set of process, helped the Soviet Union nents in a weapons system to interests made them remarkably lay the foundation for a defense teams at different institutions. At successful, first as spies for the industry that maintained rough some point, however, all the USSR and later as senior figures parity with the United States pieces had to be assembled and in the Soviet defense industry. throughout the Cold War. tested by people who understood how they fit together and what Controversy over the value ofthe Barr, Sarant, and Rosenberg held they were supposed to do. As atomic secrets that Rosenberg low-level positions during World manufacturing engineers, Barr helped transmit to the USSR has War II helping to design manufac­ and Sarant were exactly at that obscured the tremendous value of turing processes and performing point. In order to help design and the information about conven­ quality assurance inspections. In optimize manufacturing pro­ tional weapons systems that he contrast to more senior scientists cesses, they had to comprehend and his comrades stole. They and engineers, who typically were the basic principles underlying a provided detailed specifications aware ofthe details ofonly a few particular weapon and to have for some ofthe most important specific projects and who were detailed knowledge of all ofits military technologies developed subject to intense security precau- components. Men assigned to fig­ ure out how to mass produce advanced technologies were in an excellent position to teach the Soviets how to do the same. Because practical "how-to" expe­ rience from related projects was often relevant to their own work, manufacturing engineers were encouraged to study weapons systems that they were not spe­ cifically assigned to work on. Barr and the other engineers working in his department "had complete freedom ofthe plant and were permitted to go into any other sections," one of his former supervisors at Western Electric later told the FB!.l Joel Barr (left) and Alfred Sarant in Greenwich Village, New York, in 1944. 1 Declassified FBI file, serial 65-159392-120, (From Barr's personal papers, courtesy of the author. Photographer unknown.) available in FBI Reading Room, Washington, DC. 14 Studies in Intelligence Vol. 49, NO.3 RosenbergRing Postwar Russian" radar bore a striking resemblance to Barr and Sarant worked on, or replicas ofthe SCR-584, as well had access to, detailed specifica­ American designs. as clones of the AN/APQ-13 tions for most ofthe US air- and radar, a close cousin of the ground-based radars; the AN/APQ-7. Norden bombsight; analog fire­ control computers; friend-or-foe " In conjunction with the technol­ identification systems; and a and then automatically aimed ogy ofthe US proximity fuse­ variety of other technologies. and fired artillery. 4 which Rosenberg literally Working from a makeshift micro­ wrapped up and delivered to Fek­ film studio in a Greenwich Vil­ While the Rosenberg group's lisov as a Christmas present in lage apartment, they copied and technology transfer probably did 1944-upgraded Soviet versions turned over to Soviet intelli­ not have a decisive impact dur­ of the SCR-584 and M-9 allowed gence more than 9,000 pages of ing World War II-the USSR had Moscow to shoot down Francis secret documents relating to great difficulty keeping up with Gary Powers' U-2 plane over more than 100 weapons pro­ the demand for basic weapons Sverdlovsk on May Day 1960. grams during World War II, systems and was in a poor posi­ according to Alexander Feklisov, tion to absorb high technology-it In addition to data on radars, one of their case officers. 2 In was extraordinarily useful in the analog computers, and the prox­ addition to Feklisov's memoir, immediate postwar period when imity fuse, the Rosenberg group some details ofthe secrets Barr Russia quickly brought its arma­ turned over a treasure trove of and Sarant stole are mentioned ments up to American levels of secret information about jet in the ''Venona'' decrypts, decoded sophistication. engine design and radio and com­ diplomatic cable traffic between puting technologies. The group's Much of the information Barr Moscow and Soviet intelligence total contribution amounted to and Sarant borrowed from West­ officers in New York. For exam­ over 20,000 pages oftechnical ern Electric's filing cabinets ple, a December 1944 cable noted documents, plus the entire ended up in the hands ofAdm. that Sarant had "handed over 17 12,000-page design manual for Axel Berg, the man Stalin authentic drawings" of the the first US jet fighter, the P-80 3 assigned during World War II to ANIAPQ-7 radar. "Shooting Star."6 In addition to create a Soviet radar industry. designs for specific weapons sys­ Detailed information about According to Feklisov, Barr tems, the data gave Soviet scien­ American R&D helped Berg take turned over blueprints for the tists and planners invaluable Soviet radar production from SCR-584, a microwave radar sys­ insights into America's develop­ zero in 1940 to a level in 1955 tem designed at MIT's radiation ment strategies. In technology that equaled or exceeded the lab that the army hailed as one of development, information about United States' output in quan­ the most important technological a rival's mistakes and dead ends tity and capabilities. 5 Russian breakthroughs of the war. He is almost as valuable as details of radar bore a striking resem­ also passed plans for the M-9 gun its accomplishments. director, an analog computer that blance to American designs, par­ predicted a moving object's future ticularly the radar sets manufactured at Western Elec­ position based on radar input Flawed Counterintelligence tric. In 1949, for example, the USSR started mass-producing The success of Barr and his 2 Alexander Feklisov, The Man Behind the Rosen­ comrades in gaining access to bergs (New York: Enigma Books, 2(01), 136. 3 Venona decrypt 1749-50, New York to Mos­ 4 Feklisov, 135. highly classified information and cow, 13 December 1944. Available at 5 "The Electronics Industry in the USSR," CIA, http://www.nsa.gov/venona/releases/13_Dec_19 SC RR 101, I June 1955 (declassified 24 Janu­ 44_RCp2.gif. ary 2001): 7-11,25-28. 6 Feklisov, 160. Studies in Intelligence Vol.