Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Volume 36 | Issue 1 Article 6 3-26-2013 Erecting New Constitutional Cultures: The Problems and Promise of Constitutionalism Post- Arab Spring John Liolos Boston College Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Legal History Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons Recommended Citation John Liolos, Erecting New Constitutional Cultures: The Problems and Promise of Constitutionalism Post-Arab Spring, 36 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 219 (2013), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol36/iss1/6 This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ERECTING NEW CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROMISE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM POST-ARAB SPRING John Liolos* Abstract: Constitutions contain two types of elements: functional and as- pirational. The functional elements establish the institutions that com- prise the state and the pragmatic rules of governance—the “constitution in practice.” Aspirational elements articulate the nation’s commitment to the higher principles and ideals it seeks to attain. In a well-ordered state, a constitution’s aspirational elements provide the true north for the na- tion’s compass, and the functional elements adequately pursue those ends. If the functional components of a constitution cannot or do not ad- equately pursue the nation’s stated aspirations, the constitution, the gov- ernment, and the rule of law are in jeopardy. The recent upheaval in the Middle East, known as the Arab Spring, provided three nations (thus far) with the opportunity to erect new constitutional cultures: Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. For these countries, adequately concretizing revolutionary as- pirations in their new national constitutions, while also providing func- tional elements and institutions to reinforce these aspirations, is vital to establish secure and legitimate constitutional orders. This Note explores these ideas of constitutional theory universally and applies them to the particular situations in these Arab Spring nations. Introduction A paramount task of a democratic nation’s constitution is to effec- tively prescribe the supreme law of the land derived from the consent of the governed.1 A constitution seeks to fulfill important legal func- tions, including organizing political power within a state, establishing * John Liolos is an Executive Articles Editor for the Boston College International & Com- parative Law Review. The author expresses gratitude to all those persons, living and de- ceased, who dedicated themselves to that most noble of human aspirations: rational self- governance. 1 See Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 Chi.- Kent L. Rev. 89, 97 (1988). 219 220 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 36:219 government institutions, and providing administrable laws.2 A constitu- tion, and its surrounding culture of constitutionalism, is often also a statement of a nation’s commitment to the ideals it values most highly and aspires to attain.3 A constitution contains two types of elements: functional and aspirational.4 The functional elements of a constitution establish the institutions that comprise the state and the pragmatic rules of governance—the “constitution in practice.”5 Aspirational ele- ments, by contrast, articulate the nation’s commitment to higher prin- ciples, such as social justice or democracy.6 In short, aspirations mani- fest the national ideals at the time they are realized.7 In a well-ordered state, the aspirational aims of a constitution provide the true north for the nation’s compass and determine policies the functional provisions should implement to achieve the legitimacy of the laws and promote a perpetually progressing society.8 If the functional components of a con- 2 See, e.g., Surya Deva, The Constitution of China: What Purpose Does It (Not) Serve?, 2 Jin- dal Global L. Rev. 55, 59 (2011); F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme Court, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 645, 663 (2009) (noting that the gap between a constitu- tion in theory and a constitution in practice is driven by administrability); see also Vicki C. Jackson, What’s in a Name? Reflections on Timing, Naming, and Constitution-Making, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1249, 1254 (2008) (“Constitutionalism entails a sufficiently shared willing- ness to use law rather than force to resolve disagreements; to limit government power and to protect human rights through law and defined processes; to provide a reasonable de- gree of predictability and stability of law that people may rely on as they structure their lives; and to maintain a government that is legitimate and effective enough to maintain order, promote the public good, and control private violence and exploitation.”). 3 See Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution 49 (1992) (“Writing a constitutional text offers an opportunity for a victorious movement to make a collective effort both to frame their fundamental principles and to mobilize broad popular support for their crucial initiatives.”). 4 See Richard Albert, Counterconstitutionalism, 31 Dalhousie L.J. 1, 36 (2008); Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 657, 698 (2011); Jon Mills, Principles for Constitutions and Institutions in Promoting the Rule of Law, 16 Fla. J. Int’l L. 115, 116 (2004). 5 See, e.g., Albert, supra note 4, at 36–37 (“[T]he pragmatic model [of constitutional- ism] creates manageable expectations of rights within the rule of law . .”); Levinson, supra note 4, at 700 (quoting Zachary Elkins et al., The Endurance of National Con- stitutions 38–47 (2009)); Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 909, 924 (2006) (providing examples of constitutional text prescribing rules and limitations for organs of government); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const. Comment. 95, 103 (2010) (“Various political institutions implement constitutional provisions . .”). 6 See Albert, supra note 4, at 36. 7 See Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1631, 1634– 35 (2009). 8 See Levinson, supra note 4, at 663; J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed Environmental Quality Amendments Don’t Measure Up, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 245, 256 (1999); see also, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (presenting an example of a 2013] Post-Arab Spring Constitutional Cultures 221 stitution cannot adequately pursue its aspirational goals, the constitu- tion and government will lose support and lack legitimacy.9 Such a dis- connect could result in social strife and political unrest.10 The recent upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa, popu- larly known as the Arab Spring, has resulted in three nations toppling their old regimes thus far.11 In Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the overthrow of the former governments provided the opportunity not only to draft a new constitution, but also to cement the revolution by framing consti- tutional principles in a way to mobilize broad support.12 These upris- ings were organic movements comprised of frustrated citizens demon- strating against their tyrannical governments for freedom, greater representation, and economic opportunity.13 Often, frustrations arose when the functional provisions in the former constitutions did not ef- fectively implement some express aspirational commitments, contribut- ing to social unrest and constitutional hypocrisy.14 Now that the people of these nations have successfully overthrown their governments, the question remains whether they can create constitutions that successfully constitution providing an institution with the power to fulfill an aspiration); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract 171 (Donald A. Cress trans., 1987) (“What makes the Constitution of a state truly solid and lasting is that proprieties are observed with such fidelity that the natural relations and the laws are always in agreement on the same points, and that the latter serve only to assure, accompany and rectify them.”) 9 Cf. Levinson, supra note 4, at 678 (providing an example of disenfranchised masses pressuring elites for political reform with the threat of revolution); Dankwart A. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model, in Transitions to Democracy 14, 19 (Lisa Anderson ed., 1999) (discussing the importance of observing social and economic conditions when considering a political state). 10 Cf. Dorf, supra note 7, at 1639 (“Entrenched structural rules also can preserve de- mocracy against prospective tyrants.”); Levinson, supra note 4, at 663 (concluding that government institutions risk subversion if they are not relatively stable). 11 Betsy Hiel, Arab Spring Uprisings Have Now Toppled Three Governments, Pittsburgh Trib.- Rev. (Oct. 23, 2011), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/s_763372.html. 12 See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 49, 53 (describing the advantages of creating a con- stitution during the period immediately following