parrhesia 31 · 2019 · 154-173 gaston bachelard's philosophy of science: between project and practie bas de boer Without pretending in any way to be lay- ing the foundations of modern physics, I hope to suggest how common philosophical positions must be modified to accommo- date reality as it is revealed in the scientific laboratory. —Gaston Bachelard, The New Scientific Spirit INTRODUCTION In this paper, I will explore the relation between science as a rational project and scientific research as a human practice. On the one hand, science can be under- stood as a project manifesting a rationality that transcends the situatedness of human practices. On the other hand, however, science seems to be a fundamental human activity as it is in scientific practices that scientific objects and facts come into being. The French philosopher Gaston Bachelard was among the first to spe- cifically address the relation between the rational and the practical aspects of sci- ence, without prioritizing either of the two. Based on developments in 20th century physics, Bachelard maintains that science is best understood as a collective activity taking place in local scientific practices, and he emphasized that the objects of the sciences exist only insofar they can be realized in what Bachelard calls phenomenotechnique.1 This concept denotes Bachelard’s insights that the objects of physics are not to be found in an external nature, but are artificially realized in scientific experiments and the technologies used in those experiments. When extending to contemporary scientific practices in general, we can no longer understand the different sciences as being concerned with the discovery of their objects, but instead with the construction of them. Ac- cordingly, the way in which scientific objects are created within scientific prac- tices is the central focus of Bachelard’s epistemology.2 Nowadays, the idea that scientific objects are constructed in situated practices, and are therefore for a large part dependent on human interventions, figures prominently in (continental) philosophy and anthropology of science. For exam- ple, it forms the core of the early work of the French philosopher-anthropologist Bruno Latour, who is interested in studying practices of science-in-the-making, as opposed to focusing on the finished theories and facts of “ready-made science.”3 In showing that the objects of the sciences are actively constructed by groups of scientists, Latour challenges the idea that science is a rational project able to at- tain universal truths about an external world.4 In this context, Latour and Woolgar approvingly, yet mistakenly as I hope to show in this paper, refer to Bachelard’s concept of phenomenotechnique: The artificial reality, which participants describe in terms of an objective entity, has in fact been constructed by the use of inscription devices. Such a reality, which Bachelard (1953) terms the “phenomenotechnique,” takes on the appearance of a phenomenon by virtue of its construction through material techniques.5 In this quote, Latour and Woolgar contrast objectivity with construction. This contrast implies that while the researchers in the laboratory act as if they are speaking about an entity that is objectively out there, in fact they are speaking about something that is constructed and does not exist outside of the structure of the laboratory. Hence, while Latour stresses that scientific objects are situated constructions realized in scientific practice, he does not explicitly address the question whether there are specific characteristics to their process of produc- tion that justify the adjective ‘rational,’ which was a central question in Bach- gaston bachelard's philosophy of science · 155 elard’s epistemology. As a consequence, his analyses of scientific practices tend to emphasize the practical character of knowledge production, but often fail to appreciate the rational criterion that warrants the specific practical actions. This brief discussion allows to formulate the question I address in this paper more precisely: How are the ‘rational’ and the ‘practical’ integrated in scientific prac- tices? Bachelard was similarly concerned with this question when distinguishing between the practice of the science and the project of science. His work has not received much attention in recent philosophical analyses of scientific practice.6 In this paper, I propose to use Bachelard’s epistemology as an entry-point to the question how ‘scientific’ and ‘practice’ are interrelated such that something as ‘scientific practice’ is constituted. The paper is structured as follows: Firstly, I show why, according to Bachelard, science can only be realized through an epistemological rupture with our ordi- nary experience (1). Secondly, I will show how this break is realized in scientific practice by introducing Bachelard’s notion ‘phenomenotechnique’ (2). Thirdly, I discuss why Bachelard holds that a scientific rationality remains to be assumed within phenomenotechnical constructions, and why he holds that scientific ob- jects are not only technical, but also rational realizations (3). Fourthly, I use Bachelard’s epistemology to show how the scientific object ‘cognition’ is realized within the cognitive neurosciences (4). To conclude, I offer some thoughts of how Bachelard’s epistemology can be of ongoing relevance by showing how it allows to evaluate the socio-material environment in which science takes place in terms of the interrelation of the practical and the rational within the phenomenotech- nique (5). 1. SCIENCE AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL RUPTURE One of the central aspects of Bachelard’s philosophy of science is his notion of epistemological rupture, which stresses that there is—and should be—a funda- mental divide between scientific experience and ordinary experience. Science should overcome the “obstacles that everyday life has set up.”7 Bachelard juxta- poses the world of everyday life with the world of science, and argues that science should break with our initial experience in order to realize its rational potential. In fact, he holds that science “must be formed against nature, against all that comes from nature’s impetus and instruction, within us and outside us, against natural allurements and colourful, diverse facts.”8 Only when successfully sup- pressing human primary impulses, it becomes possible to enter the domain of 156 · bas de boer science that aims for the development of theoretical knowledge. According to Bachelard, our initial contact with the world is—contrary to the ra- tionalist purpose of science—grounded in our primary drives that induce reverie and dream.9 Primitive encounters with objects induce reveries that create im- ages transcending the objects that we encounter. This act of transcending takes place through our primitive drives, and precedes any kind of reflection: “We are being faithful to a primitive human feeling, to an elemental organic reality, a fun- damental oneiric temperament.”10 This oneiric aspect of our primary experience is characteristic of the way the reality of everyday life is constituted. Only when overcoming this oneiric state, a rational stance towards the world can come into being. Rationality is a continuous process of overcoming primary impulses: “In point of fact I see no solid basis for a natural, direct, elemental rationality […] Rationalist? That is what we are trying to become.”11 The second reason for the need for an epistemological rupture between science and everyday life is illustrated in The Philosophy of No in the context of develop- ing a scientific understanding of heat: “Between sensory knowledge and scientific knowledge there is a gap. Temperature is seen on a thermometer, one does not feel it. Without theory, one would never know whether what is seen and what one feels correspond to the same phenomenon.”12 We need theory in order to con- nect the different ways in which temperature can become present to us. Without theory, so Bachelard holds, it is not rationally warranted to infer that the numeri- cal presentation of heat on a thermometer is related to the heat of the sun that we feel on our skin. Only when appreciating the complexity of temperature requires, and breaking with our everyday experiences, it can be understood that the con- cept of heat is complex, and to investigate how the different aspects of heat are integrated. Bachelard explicitly terms his philosophy of knowledge a non-Cartesian epistemol- ogy.13 His non-Cartesianism is most clearly visible in his criticism on Descartes’s wax argument. In the Second Meditation, Descartes argues that wax cannot be clear and distinctly perceived by the senses because its form changes when heated, “for whatever came under the senses of taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now changed; and yet the wax remains.”14 This is why he concludes that the idea of wax is not grasped by the senses, but is understood by the mind alone. Bachelard, however, argues that precisely the diverse manifestations of the wax under differ- ent circumstances are the basis of scientific research because these complicate gaston bachelard's philosophy of science · 157 our initial experience. When revealing complexity it becomes possible to connect the different complex elements of wax. At the same time, revealing this complex- ity works against our natural inclination to think of wax as a singular object in our ordinary experience. While Descartes concludes that certainty is founded in a simplicity existing in the mind alone, Bachelard holds, on the contrary, that sci- entific certainty should be found in thecomplexity of the shape of the wax under different experimental circumstances. In Bachelard’s view, when asking for the possibility of scientific certainty, we should not start from the individual mind of the philosopher, but turn to how processes of objectification actually take place within the sciences. When look- ing at scientific practice, it becomes clear that the scientific objects never exist in the mind alone, but always have a twofold relation with the empirical results of scientific experiments.