SCEPTICISM AND METAPHILOSOPHY SCEPTICISM AND MET APHILOSOPHY By DEREK DANNY SMITH A Thesis Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies In Partial Fulfillment ofthe Requirements For the Degree of Master ofArts McMaster University June,2002 Copyright © 2001 by Derek Smith All rights reserved To Adelard and Rolande Thibeault and their long-lasting, loving marriage of which there can be no doubt MASTER OF ARTS McMASTER UNIVERSITY Hamilton, Ontario (Philosophy) TITLE: Scepticism and Metaphilosophy AUTHOR: Derek Danny Smith, B. A. (York University) SUPERVISOR: Dr. Nicholas Griffin NUMBER OF PAGES: vii, 262 iii ABSTRACT Scepticism, taken as a challenge to the possibility ofjustifying knowledge claims in general, has a history perhaps as long and varied as attempts to construct positive theories of knowledge. The relation that holds between scepticism and the rest of epistemology is often assumed to be straightforwardly adversarial. However, in light of the widespread "end or transformation" debate within epistemology in recent decades, the proliferation of sophisticated scholarship concerning scepticism and justification may be taken as a prima facie endorsement ofthe continuing vitality of traditional epistemology. The publication in 1984 of Barry Stroud's The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, focused interest in the epistemological community on the burden of specifically modem (global, post-Cartesian, external world) scepticism. However, during the overlapping two decades since Significance, the influence of Richard Rorty's work (particularly Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature published in 1979) has led to a growing suspicion that epistemology has neither a stable nor defensible mandate. In this thesis, I try to connect the two discussions in a novel way, by arguing that the metaphilosophical problems arising from the stalemate I diagnose in the vibrant contemporary scepticism debate does not suggest that epistemology as a discipline is robustly healthy. I characterize metaphilosophical issues as a cluster of concerns involving the methodology, nature, aim, selfimage and criteria ofsatisfaction of doing philosophy. Most generally, metaphilosophy is a philosophical exploration of the nature of philosophy; more specifically, it deals with the expectations and aspirations of inquiry. David Hume is rightly remembered as a thoughtful exponent of the power of sceptical reasoning. More recently, he has been recognized for his influential attempt to develop a naturalistic theory of belief that serves to explain how we form and tenaciously cling to our most deeply held beliefs-despite our inability to rationally justify them. I contend that there are metaphilosophical lessons to be learned from Hume's struggle to maintain and defend the theoretical invulnerability of scepticism, despite his evident discomfort adjusting to the potential consequences of such a position. Michael Williams has been an insightful critic of the "pessimism" that he detects in the work of Stroud and "the New Humeans." I outline the major issues in his exchange with Stroud, and evaluate the strengths of each position. I also argue that Williams' "contextualism" fails to rescue epistemology in any substantial way from the fundamental sceptical challenges that can be raised. For each of the central philosophers under consideration (David Hume, Barry Stroud, and Michael Williams), I construct an account of what I call their criteria of satisfaction. The specific classification of particular criteria is much less important here than the metaphilosophical lesson that I extract from the nature of the frequent clashes between different epistemologist's favoured criteria. Into the contemporary debate about modem scepticism, I introduce ancient sceptical concerns like the "problem of the criterion" and the Five Modes of Agrippa, which serve to illustrate the importance of long-standing sceptical metaphilosophical considerations for this discussion. I contend that these ancient problems can help clarify the nature of the contemporary stalement in the debate about modem scepticism. Even if epistemologists become dissatisfied with what they take to be the criteria of satisfaction of the traditional project, motivating the adoption of revised criteria of satisfaction will still encounter grave difficulties. Finally, I discuss possible morals to be drawn from the wider metaphilosophical concerns. I ultimately argue that the remarkably active state of contemporary literature about scepticism should not be mistaken as a straightforward positive indicator of the continued health of philosophical theories of knowledge. To the contrary, an examination of the metaphilosophical issues surrounding scepticism reveals even more urgent problems with the inherent variability and instability of epistemic criteria of satisfaction. An exploration of these issues threatens to lead if not to metaphilosophical scepticism, then at least to a thorough reevaluation of the nature and self-image of the epistemological project. v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Nick Griffin, for adding this project to his already hectic schedule. His confidence in my work allowed me to explore the topic to the fullest range ofmy interests and ability. Special thanks are due to Professor David Martens, who offered greater than usual support in his capacity as second reader. His timely and insightful comments greatly improved the final project. I would also like to express my extraordinary gratitude to my third reader, Wil Waluchow--ilot only for agreeing to serve in this capacity, but for his constant support and assistance during my time at McMaster. I would also like to thank my extended family for their constant support. Specifically, I would like to thank my parents, Dan and Marie, and my sister, Wendy, for their continuous words of encouragement; more important, I appreciate what they never said ("Are you done that thesis yet?"). I would like to thank my friends and colleagues for everything else. Finally, I would like to thank Kelly for her patience and understanding--;iobody writes a thesis alone, and perhaps nobody experiences the ups and downs ofthe process more than a thesis writer's partner. CONTENTS ABSTRACT .......................................................... iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................. vi CHAPTER 1: Why Should We Bother Investigating Scepticism? ................ 1 Notes ......................................................... 20 CHAPTER 2: The Nature ofHume's Scepticism(s) ........................... 22 2.1 The Humean Condition: Sceptical Reflection and Natural Belief 2.2 Hume's Epistemology and the Foundation ofHis Scepticism 2.3 Naturalism and Insulation 2.4 Hume's Project, In His Own Words 2.5 The Nature and Scope ofPhilosophy Notes .......................................................... 91 CHAPTER 3: Scepticism and Contemporary Epistemology ..................... 99 3.1 The Contemporary Influence ofHume, and the Significance ofBarry Stroud and Michael Williams 3.2 Criteria ofSatisfaction 3.3 A Theoretical Diagnosis: Epistemological Realism and the Contextualist Alternative 3.4 Is Satisfaction Possible? Notes ......................................................... 170 CHAPTER 4: Beyond Scepticism and Epistemology, Toward Metaphilosophy ..... 174 4.1 What now then? 4.2 Naturalism, External ism, and the Status of Circularity and Revision 4.3 The Old Face ofScepticism 4.4 Business as Usual? 4.5 You Must be Joking: Stephen Leacock's Alternative Notes ......................................................... 247 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 253 vii CHAPTER 1: Why Should We Bother Investigating Scepticism? It would be hard to imagine a claim more at odds with our ordinary, common sense view of the world than what passes as the general sceptical conclusion: 1 We do not (and perhaps cannot) know that the world around us exists. This claim stands defiantly counter to our unreflective experience, which seems to suggest that we interact with an external world of independent objects on a constant basis. It is, of course, not suitable to merely assert the reality of our apparent interaction with the external world, because to do so is simply to beg the question against the case for scepticism. All but the most radical scepticism admits of the apparent interaction. The question aims at our justification for claiming to know that such interaction occurs, or more specifically that we can infer from our experience of appearances to independently existing objects. That we seem to experience an external world is not disputed. Rather, this fact counts as the most basic common ground for sceptical and nonsceptical accounts alike. A popular formulation of a sceptical challenge, usually presented from within the framework of a thought experiment like Descartes's evil deceiver or contemporary Brain-in-a-Vat variants,2 suggests that our ordinary experience could be exactly as it is without there being any justified inference or reason to posit the independent existence of such a world. Ordinarily, we probably would not even consider such possibilities (let alone the need to defeat them in order to claim to "know" that, say, "I am now holding a piece of paper in my hands"). Philosophically, however, it would seem incumbent upon practitioners of positive epistemologies to explain what justifies our dismissal of such 1 2 sceptical scenarios. That is, proponents of positive epistemologies must show how it is that the supposed "threat" of scepticism