PACIFYING THE PEACEKEEPERS: HOW STATE INVOLVEMENT IN U.N. PEACEKEEPING REDUCES MILITARY THREATS TO DEMOCRACY by TIMOTHY JAMES ALEXANDER PASSMORE B.A., Lee University, 2006 M.Litt., University of St. Andrews, 2007 M.A., University of Colorado Boulder, 2015 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science 2019 This thesis entitled: Pacifying the Peacekeepers: How State Involvement in U.N. Peacekeeping Reduces Military Threats to Democracy written by Timothy James Alexander Passmore has been approved for the Department of Political Science ___________________________________________ Associate Professor Megan Shannon (Chair) ___________________________________________ Professor Jaroslav Tir ___________________________________________ Associate Professor Carew Boulding ___________________________________________ Professor David H. Bearce ___________________________________________ Assistant Professor Benjamin Teitelbaum (Department of Musicology) Date________________ The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline. ii ABSTRACT Passmore, Timothy James Alexander (Ph.D., Political Science). Pacifying the Peacekeepers: How State Involvement in U.N. Peacekeeping Reduces Military Threats to Democracy. Dissertation directed by Associate Professor Megan Shannon. What explains why countries undergoing transitions to democracy are major contributors of personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations? In recent decades, the provision of such personnel has been adopted largely by weak or nascent democracies. In the same period, the world has witnessed a decline in military coup activity. I argue that new democracies use peacekeeping to reduce the threat posed by the military during the years of transition and thereby increase the likelihood of democratic consolidation. In the short term such governments can credibly commit to maintaining the military since peacekeeping offers a variety of private benefits, while its revenues can be used to bolster the defense budget. In the long term peacekeeping can contribute to the reorientation of the military into a democratic institution through the socialization of troops to democratic norms, as well as the professionalization of the military as a subordinate institution. I therefore argue that governments in new democracies will pursue not only large, but also strategic contributions to peacekeeping missions in order to maximize these benefits. I test these arguments using cross-national time series analysis of personnel contributions to peacekeeping operations from 1990 to 2011, as well as three illustrative cases: Argentina, Bangladesh, and Ghana. The analyses indicate that new democracies make larger contributions than other countries, and this effect is enhanced both where the military was more powerful at the time of transition and where greater economic revenues can be accrued to the military. Moreover, new democracies tend to send their troops to missions with more peacekeepers from strong democracies. The tasks involved in the mission influence deployments also, where more peacekeepers are sent to narrow, defense-focused missions if iii the country has a greater military legacy, and to civil-oriented multidimensional missions when facing greater domestic economic pressure. These findings indicate that new democracies make a number of strategic decisions that reflect varied motivations to deploy military personnel to peacekeeping missions in pursuit of democratic consolidation. iv For Kim. v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This endeavor has only been possible with the support of many people. First and foremost, I simply would not have arrived at this point without my wife and best friend, Kimberly. Her patience, grace, and unconditional love over the last six years are an accomplishment far greater than this project, and words are insufficient to express my gratitude and respect for her. To my parents, Stephen and Margaret, without whose sacrifice and investment my life would be vastly different. They have given so much to so many, and deserve the richest of rewards. Also to Sarah and Oliver for inspiring me with their integrity and dedication to all they do. At CU Boulder, my utmost thanks go to my advisor, Meg Shannon, for investing in and empowering me from the beginning. It’s been an honor to write with, research for, and learn from Meg over the last few years. I am also hugely grateful to Jaroslav Tir for all the invaluable advice, research opportunities, and trips to Belgian pubs, and to Carew Boulding, always ready with coffee and encouragement. To the remaining members of my committee, I am sincerely grateful to David Bearce and Benjamin Teitelbaum for taking the time to read this thing. Among the many wonderful graduate students at CU, I wish to thank Andrew Hart and Erin Heubert for their mentorship, and to my cohort for sharing in the laughter and tears. The staff and faculty at CU Boulder have also been a tremendous source of help and support. I am especially grateful to Carol Bender, Jennifer Fitzgerald, Haruko Greeson, and Jana Jones. Many incredible friends have supported me through this period in ways I couldn’t have hoped for. My thanks go in particular to the Boulder Squad and the Gunbarrel Group. vi To Ruth and Roger: I am eternally grateful to you for giving me the farm as a writing haven for two (and hopefully no more) thesis projects. I also owe a debt to two past professors: to Lee Cheek, whose encouragement would lead to me still being in school seventeen years later, and to Steve Swindle, whose investment as an instructor, mentor, and later a colleague was integral to my getting to this moment. For comments that helped shape this project I am indebted in particular to Kyle Beardsley, Brandon Boylan, Gaspare Genna, and the faculty in the Department of International Studies and Political Science at the Virginia Military Institute. I am also grateful for support and encouragement from Lisa Hultman and Jake Kathman. Much gratitude is also due to several sources of funding for this project, including the Horowitz Foundation, The Beverly Sears Fund, the Center to Advance Research in the Social Sciences, the University of Colorado Graduate School, and the Department of Political Science. vii CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 1.1 The New Peacekeepers ..................................................................................................... 1 1.2 The Argument in Brief ..................................................................................................... 3 1.3 Contribution of this Research .......................................................................................... 7 1.4 A Note on Scope ................................................................................................................ 9 1.5 Outline of the Dissertation ............................................................................................ 10 CHAPTER 2 DEMOCRATIZATION AND PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS .................................................................................................. 13 2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 13 2.2 Who Keeps the Peace? .................................................................................................... 16 2.3 Regime Type and UNPKO Participation ...................................................................... 19 2.4 The Democratization-Peacekeeping Nexus ................................................................... 24 2.4.1 Entry Barriers .......................................................................................................... 25 2.4.2 Credible Signal ........................................................................................................ 26 2.4.3 Information Provision ............................................................................................. 30 2.4.4 Socialization ............................................................................................................ 31 2.5 Hypotheses ...................................................................................................................... 34 2.6 Research Design ............................................................................................................. 35 2.6.1 Models and Dependent Variables ........................................................................... 35 2.6.2 Democratization ....................................................................................................... 37 2.6.3 Control Variables ..................................................................................................... 38 2.7 Results and Discussion .................................................................................................. 41 2.8 Robustness Tests ............................................................................................................ 49 2.9 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 52 CHAPTER 3 PLACATING THE