1 The Future of Mosul Before, During, and After the Liberation Dylan O’Driscoll Research Fellow Middle East Research Institute September 2016 About MERI The Middle East Research Institute engages in policy issues contributing to the process of state building and democratisation in the Middle East. Through independent analysis and policy debates, our research aims to promote and develop good governance, human rights, rule of law and social and economic prosperity in the region. It was established in 2014 as an independent, not-for-profit organisation based in Erbil, Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Middle East Research Institute 1186 Dream City Erbil, Kurdistan Region of Iraq T: +964 (0)662649690 E: [email protected] www.meri-k.org NGO registration number. K843 © Middle East Research Institute, 2016 The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Please direct all enquiries to the publisher. About the Author Dylan O’Driscoll is a Research Fellow in International Politics and National Security Programme at the Middle East Research Institute (MERI). He holds a PhD and MA from the University of Exeter, UK. Acknowledgments I would like to thank all the interviewees and people I had discussions with on the topic for giving me their time, local knowledge and personal insights. A very special thanks goes to Shivan Fazil for his help in organising the interviews and kick off workshop, his input towards the project and for his much-needed interpreting skills. I would also like to thank Dlawer Ala’Aldeen for his help facilitating the project and for his much-valued and insightful feedback. Gratitude is owed to Athanasios Manis, Dave Van Zoonen and Khogir Wirya for their feedback, suggestions and support throughout the project. A massive thanks to Qasim Botani for his technical support, cover and map design and for putting the final report together. I would also like to thank other members of MERI, including Hawraman Ali, Aram Mahmoud, Linda Fawaz, Fuad Ali Smail, Amanj Rafiq, Dilzar Mohamed and Jamal Hussein for their feedback or operational support. This report would not have been possible without the help of the people mentioned above. It suffices to say the opinions expressed are that of the author alone. Abbreviations GoI Government of Iraq IDPs Internally Displaced People INGO International Non-Governmental Organisation IS Islamic State ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and Levant ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham JCCC Joint Crisis Coordination Centre (KRG) KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party KRG Kurdistan Regional Government KRI Kurdistan Region of Iraq MERI Middle East Research Institute NPC Nineveh Provincial Council PTSD Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan TAL Transitional Administrative Law UK United Kingdom UN United Nations UNAMI United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq UNCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees US United States Contents Executive Summary ...........................................................................................................8 Recommendations..............................................................................................................9 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................12 Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 14 2. Past issues ..........................................................................................................................16 2.1. De-Ba’athification ................................................................................................................ 16 2.2. Sunni Boycott ........................................................................................................................ 17 2.3. Maliki’s Rule .......................................................................................................................... 18 2.4. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................19 3. Pre-Liberation ..................................................................................................................20 3.1. Political Agreement is Essential ......................................................................................... 21 3.2. Armed Forces Agreement is a Priority ............................................................................. 22 3.3. Internally Displaced People; Preventing a Humanitarian Disaster ............................... 22 3.4. Reconstruction Plans ........................................................................................................... 24 3.5. Reconciliation ........................................................................................................................ 24 3.6. Capacity Developing ............................................................................................................ 25 3.6.1. Politicians ...................................................................................................................................25 3.6.2. Security ........................................................................................................................... 25 3.7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 26 3.8. Recommendations ................................................................................................................ 27 4. Entering Mosul ................................................................................................................28 4.1. Participating Forces .............................................................................................................. 28 4.2. Immediate Aftermath .......................................................................................................... 31 4.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 31 4.4 Recommendations ........................................................................................................32 5. Governance .......................................................................................................................33 5.1. Historical Governance in Iraq ............................................................................................ 33 5.2. Federalism and Iraq .............................................................................................................. 33 5.3. Governance in Nineveh ...................................................................................................... 37 5.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 39 5.5 Recommendations ........................................................................................................39 6. Disputed Territories ........................................................................................................40 6.1. Context ................................................................................................................................... 40 6.2. Replacing Article 140 ........................................................................................................... 41 6.3. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 42 6.4. Recommendations .......................................................................................................42 7. Re-Establishing Stability .................................................................................................43 7.1. Reconciliation ........................................................................................................................ 43 7.2. Reconstruction ...................................................................................................................... 45 7.3. Reconstructing the Society.................................................................................................. 46 7.4. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 47 7.5. Recommendations ................................................................................................................ 48 8. Final Conclusion ..............................................................................................................50 References .........................................................................................................................51 Appendix I: Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution ......................................................57 Appendix II: Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law ............................57 Executive Summary The post-conflict planning following the 2003 invasion of Iraq was weak at best and as a result many elements were at play