introduction 1 IntroductIon on 6 April 1941, Germany launched simultaneous invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was defeated in a matter of days. the ensuing cam- paign in Greece (code-named operation Marita), lasted just over three weeks and ended in a complete Allied defeat. Initially neutral, Greece had become involved in World War II on 28 october 1940 when Italy invaded the country from its Albanian territory. In April 1939 Britain and France had issued a guarantee of military support to the Greeks, should they be attacked by a foreign power, but Greece did not need, ask for, or require any substantial British ground deployment to repel the Italian incursion. the Greeks quickly drove Mussolini’s troops back across the Albanian frontier and held them there. As prospects of a German intervention became greater in early 1941, however, the Greek government reversed its earlier position and invited Britain to send what ground forces could be spared. As a consequence, an imperial commitment (W Force), based on a British armoured brigade and infantry divisions from Australia and new Zealand, began landing in Athens in early March 1941.1 By 20 April, when it was clear that W Force could do little more to slow the continuing German advance, the Greek Government agreed that this ex- peditionary force should be evacuated. Between 24 and 29 April more than 50,000 British and dominion troops left the Greek mainland. on 25 April the Greek government fled to crete, which subsequently fell to German forces on 30 May.2 1 during the negotiations for its deployment the British and dominion Force to be sent to Greece was known as ‘Lustreforce’, after operation Lustre, the codename for British naval effort to ship it from Egypt. While in Greece, the headquarters of the force referred to itself, in its operational and administrative instructions, as ‘BtG’—British troops Greece. For ease of reference, throughout this book the name ‘W Force’ will be used to represent the force. the term ‘W Force’ was initially given to the Imperial troops and the central Mace- donian Field Army Section (cMFAS) under Wilson’s command from 12.00 p.m., 5 April. this name was derived from the fact that troops were under the command of Lieutenant General Henry Maitland Wilson. the use of the name ‘W Force’ was common at the time, has been used in official and general histories of the campaign ever since, and remains recognisable today—much more so, for example, than BtG. 2 M. Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation, Yale university Press, new Haven, 1993, p. 2. 2 introduction For Greeks defeat meant the beginning of a harsh occupation and bitter resistance. For new Zealand and Australia the manpower losses suffered on the mainland (and immediately afterwards in crete) significantly re- duced the immediate military capability of both nations’ expeditionary forces. In Britain the loss of mainland Greece represented another in a series of serious military setbacks. For the Axis powers, although the fall and subsequent occupation of most of Greece ended a costly and embar- rassing stalemate in Albania for Italy, the subordination to Germany that followed effectively meant the end of Mussolini’s ability to conduct an independent policy. For Germany, on the other hand, the success of the invasion was important for its future plans against the Soviet union—a clash which was to be the decisive campaign of the war in Europe. despite the clear importance of the German invasion of Greece within the international history of World War II, limited scholarly research has as yet been conducted into the operational aspects of the mainland campaign, apart from the generally narrative approach of the official histories.3 often, particularly in Australasia, those works that do take a ‘battlefield’ focus tend to limit themselves to traditional, non-academic narratives of events, which are generally uncritical, unreflective and often subject to nationalist and partisan agendas.4 the body of research conducted into the mainland Greek campaign might thus be described as thin—especially when weighed up against that which exists for the Battle for crete which followed, or recent investigations into the operational aspects of the fall of France, for example, or the campaigns in north Africa.5 the battle for mainland Greece in April 3 Some examples of works that do devote significant attention to operational events include: J. Bitzes, Greece in World War II: To April 1941, Sunflower university Press, Manhat- tan, 1989; A. terzakis and d. connolly, The Greek Epic, 1940-1941, Greek Army Press, Athens, 1990; c. Polyzious, The Allied Campaign Corps in Greece (March – May 1941), Hellenic Army General Staff History directorate, Athens, 1991; Anon., An Abridged History of the Greek- Italian and Greek-German War, 1940-1941, Hellenic Army General Staff History directorate, Athens, 1997; r. Higham, Diary of a Disaster: British Aid to Greece, 1940-1941, university Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1986; M. Willingham, Perilous Commitments: The Battle for Greece and Crete 1940-1941, Spellmount, Staplehurst, 2005; K.H. Golla, Der Fall Griechenlands 1941, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, Hamburg, 2007. Some of the more analytical articles in question include: r. Hobson, ‘the Episode in Greece’, Army Quarterly & Defence Journal, Vol. 120, no. 2, 1990, pp. 152-66; J. Sadkovich, ‘Italian Morale during the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941’, War & Society, Vol. 12, no. 1, 1994, pp. 97-123; J. Sadkovich, ‘Anglo-American Bias and the Italo-Greek War of 1940-1941’, Journal of Military History, Vol. 58, no. 4, 1994, pp. 617-42. 4 See, for example, W. Phillips, The Middle East Campaigns of 1940-1942: Greece and Crete, Phillips Publications, coffs Harbour, 2000; P. Ewer, The Forgotten Anzacs: The campaign in Greece, 1941, Scribe, Melbourne, 2008. 5 For crete see, for example, A. Beevor, Crete, Hodder, London, 2005; J. Forty, Battle for Crete, Ian Allen Publishing, London, 2009; J.H. Spencer, Battle for Crete, Pen and Sword, .