DISCOURSE AND EMOTION IN SUSTAINING VIOLENT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DURING MILITARY OCCUPATIONS: IRAQ, NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By Irena L. Sargsyan, MA Washington, DC 5 May 2016 Copyright 2016 by Irena L. Sargsyan. All Rights Reserved. ii DISCOURSE AND EMOTION IN SUSTAINING VIOLENT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DURING MILITARY OCCUPATIONS: IRAQ, NORTHERN IRELAND, AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES Irena L. Sargsyan, MA Dissertation Adviser: Andrew Bennett, PhD ABSTRACT Why do violent social movements rise or fail during military occupations? How are some leaders able to overcome the problem of collective action and sustain violent campaigns that require voluntary, risky actions, but others are not? Why are only some leaders effective in achieving political objectives through sustained collective violence? In Iraq (2003–11), how was Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Sadrist Trend, able to muster a violent militia and vast popular support and thereby become a potent political player? Why did the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq fail to maintain its influence, and why did Al Qaeda in Iraq gain and then lose the ability to mobilize violence in the same period? Similarly puzzling variations in the outcomes of violent collective action have been observed elsewhere. In Northern Ireland (1969–98), how did the Provisional Irish Republican Army outstrip the Official Irish Republican Army in sustaining collective violence? In the Palestinian territories (1987–2015), how did Hamas defeat its established rival Fatah and transform itself into a highly organized political and social movement with a capacity for lethal terrorism? iii I argue that favorable microstructural conditions and emotional appeals from credible leaders with legitimacy among domestic audiences are necessary and jointly sufficient to sustain violent collective action. It is the interaction of discursive psychological variables and microstructural conditions through emotional mechanisms that enables only some leaders to sustain what I term violent social movements, or VSMs. I develop a middle-range theory of VSMs, using the methods of case- and mechanism-oriented comparisons, within-case process-tracing, discourse analysis, and archival research, while also drawing on my fieldwork in Iraq, Israel, Northern Ireland, and the Palestinian territories. iv To my son, Levon, and my parents, Zhanna and Levon, with infinite love and gratitude. —Irena v TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1: A Theory of Violent Social Movements…………...……………………………………………….1 The Puzzle, Its Theoretical Significance, and Its Policy Implications……………..……………...........................1 The Argument and the Hypotheses.………………………………………………………..................................12 A Review of the Literature and Alternative Explanations...………………………………..................................16 The Research Design….…………………………………………………………………...……………............43 Chapter 2: Sustaining Violent Social Movements in Iraq, 2003–11…………………………..……………..71 The Microstructural Conditions and Violent Collective Action in Iraq, 2003–11.…….………......…...........…..73 A Shared Discursive Opportunity: The US-Led Occupation and Collective Emotions……...………….............89 Contending Violent Social Movements in Iraq and the Role of External Assistance in Sustaining the Sadrist Trend, the ISCI, and AQI-ISI.....................................101 Sustaining Violent Collective Action: The Interaction of Microstructural Conditions and Discursive Psychological Variables.…………………………………..…………........................143 Chapter 3: Sustaining Violent Social Movements in Northern Ireland, 1969–98………............................190 The Microstructural Conditions and Violent Collective Action in Northern Ireland, 1969–98……...…............192 A Shared Discursive Opportunity: The British Occupation and Collective Emotions.……….……..................222 Contending Violent Social Movements in Northern Ireland and the Role of External Assistance in Sustaining the OIRA and the PIRA…………………………………...……244 Sustaining Violent Collective Action: The Interaction of Microstructural Conditions and Discursive Psychological Variables.…………………………..…………………........................271 Chapter 4: Sustaining Violent Social Movements in the Palestinian Territories, 1987–2015.....................321 The Microstructural Conditions and Violent Collective Action in Gaza and the West Bank, 1987–2015...........323 A Shared Discursive Opportunity: The Israeli Occupation and Collective Emotions.……................................346 Contending Violent Social Movements in Gaza and the West Bank and the Role of External Assistance in Sustaining Fatah-PLO and Hamas……………..…………..........................366 Sustaining Violent Collective Action: The Interaction of Microstructural Conditions and Discursive Psychological Variables………………………………………..…….........................395 Chapter 5: Conclusion………………………………………………………………......................................452 Bibliography: Selected Books and Articles.………………………………………………………….……...466 vi CHAPTER 1 A THEORY OF VIOLENT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS The Puzzle, Its Theoretical Significance, and Its Policy Implications Why do violent social movements (VSMs) rise or fail during military occupations? How can some leaders overcome the problem of collective action, or the “rebel’s dilemma,” and thus both mobilize and sustain violent campaigns that require voluntary, risky actions, while others cannot do so?1 Specifically, how did the Sadrist Trend succeed in sustaining violent collective action (VCA) to achieve its political objectives and propel its leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, into the ranks of potent political actors in post-Saddam Iraq during the period 2003–11? How was al-Sadr able to lead the movement through a successful transition from military to political resistance after his Jaysh al-Mahdi Army (JAM) was beaten by the Coalition forces in 2004 and by the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in 2008? In contrast, why did the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) receive only modest support from Shias, despite being led by the powerful al-Hakim clerical dynasty? And why did Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) first gain and then lose an ability to sustain violent campaigns? Similarly puzzling variations in the outcomes of VCA have been observed in other places. In Northern Ireland during the years 1969–98, for nearly three decades, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) outstripped the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA) and sustained 1 Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1998). 1 collective violence.2 In the Palestinian territories during the years 1987–2015, Harakat al- Muqawama al-Islamiyya (known as Hamas) defeated an established rival, Harakat al-Tahrir al- Watani al-Filastini (known by the acronym Fatah), and evolved into an organized political and social movement with an effective military infrastructure and a capacity for lethal terrorism. How have Hamas’s leaders maintained its relevance, popular base, and ability to incite violence—even in the presence of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)? It is exceedingly difficult for a VSM to sustain VCA—especially when it is opposing a powerful occupying force—because this action tends to provoke repression, mass incarcerations, and other forms of retaliation by indigenous governments or foreign authorities. If “rationality requires inaction,” what solidifies and sustains violent civilian mobilization?3 How do episodes of contention evolve into sustained VCA by civilians? What strategies do leaders of VSMs employ? Why are some leaders effective in mobilizing—and sustaining—violent resistance, while others are not? Which mechanisms catalyze VCA? And which local actors should the United States and its allies support to foster stability in transitional, failing, or postconflict fragile states? The rise of a VSM during a military occupation may not be counterintuitive. For example, a military occupation can subjugate the local population, delegitimize the indigenous government, and spur a nationalist backlash—all of which, in turn, can trigger resistance. But it is truly puzzling how VSM leaders manage to sustain VCA in the presence of formidable foreign armies that operate with legal immunity in occupied territories. 2 The core of the Irish Republican Army was the Irish Volunteers (Oglaigh na hEireann), a group that originated in Dublin in November 1913. In 1919, the Volunteers (and a few affiliated groups, including the Fenians and the Irish Republican Brotherhood) began calling themselves the Irish Republican Army (IRA)—the name which they officially adopted in 1922. The term IRA is used in this study to denote the movement before it split in 1969 into the Official IRA (OIRA) and the Provisional IRA (PIRA). 3 Allen Buchanan, “Revolutionary Motivation and Rationality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 9, no. 1 (Autumn 1979), p.66 (emphasis in the original). 2 Despite this puzzle’s theoretical significance and its policy implications, political scientists lack theories of how VSMs manage to sustain themselves once they have emerged and spread. In explaining the causes of collective violence, scholars of civil conflict have primarily focused on preexisting grievances,4 structural and rational choice mechanisms,5 top-down elite manipulation of identities by national leaders,6 and bottom-up