Ar-Raqqa Crisis Overview: November 2016 - October 2017 Syria, November 2017 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Map 1: Ar-Raqqa Governorate and Sub-districts1 Between November 2016 and October 2017, the campaign to expel the group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from Ar-Raqqa governorate led to an escalation of TURKEY conflict across the area. Conflict resulted in multiple phases of significant displacement of civilians ² TELL ABIAD and resulted in high levels of need of both the displaced and those that remained in areas of direct ALEPPO conflict. Furthermore, the ability of host communities across Ar-Raqqa governorate to absorb internally displaced persons (IDPs) became increasingly stretched as their number grew. With EIN ISSA SULUK AL-HASAKEH conflict reducing across the governorate at the time of writing, thousands of IDPs will return to their communities of origin, likely to locations in need of post-conflict reconstruction and with severely AR-RAQQA limited basic services. Additionally, significant challenges are arising as displacement flows into JURNEYYEH Ar-Raqqa from Deir-ez-Zor governorate increase with a corresponding escalation of conflict. "Ar-Raqqa KARAMA Kms 0 5 10 20 30 40 • It is estimated over 300,000 persons were displaced within and from Ar-Raqqa governorate TURKEY 2 AL-THAWRAH between November 2016 and September 2017. Although many displacements were temporary or AR-RAQQA MAADAN within the governorate, a portion of IDPs have left Ar-Raqqa governorate, primarily to Aleppo or Al- Areas of control SABKA Hasakeh governorates, followed by Damascus, with smaller numbers leaving Syria entirely. Generally, MANSURA as conflict progressed, IDPs fled to territory that came under control of the Syrian Democratic Forces SDF (SDF) in previous phases of fighting, rather than further into ISIL-held territory. GoS IRAQ 3 • The population of Ar-Raqqa city dropped from an estimated 229,000 in late 2016 to fewer than Former ISIL HOMS JORDAN 3,000 persons in October 2016.4 Although clashes within the city did not begin until June 2017, there Deir-ez-Zor already reaching Ar-Raqqa governorate, particularly in Ein Issa, it is possible that gaps and were significant outflows of people as early as April in anticipation of increased conflict. needs will be exacerbated further. • Conditions within Ar-Raqqa city deteriorated significantly as conflict progressed from outer • As of October 2017, the majority of IDPs in Ar-Raqqa were living in apartments or houses made semi-urban neighbourhoods to the city centre. As main supply routes to the city were cut off and available to, rented to, or shared with them by the host community, with smaller numbers in the population departed, many markets and bakeries closed, causing food shortages and reducing collective shelters. In areas close to frontlines, IDPs have stayed in informal tented settlements, often fuel supplies. This limited the number of hours of electricity per day and thus also availability of water nearby to their villages of origin to facilitate returns following de-escalation of conflict. Finally, since pumped through the main network; electricity was completely unavailable by October 2017. In addition, conflict escalated, a number of managed camps in Ar-Raqqa and Al-Hasakeh have served as transit shelter damage increased, as did direct threats to the safety of civilians. sites for IDPs. The population of these sites has fluctuated, and, with recent influxes of IDPs from Deir- • Following the cessation of fighting in Ar-Raqqa city and complete evacuation of civilians in mid- ez-Zor, now greatly exceeds planned capacity. October 2017, it is likely that tens of thousands of IDPs will seek to return to areas of origin with • Conditions are better in sites located in areas with better humanitarian access, or where host limited access to livelihoods and in severe need of de-mining and repairs to shelters, roads and communities have been able to provide shelter to IDPs within collective centres and houses. other infrastructure. As of November 2017, a limited numbers of returns have been observed in the Nevertheless, in many areas, water, sanitation and health services are major concerns. In tented sites outskirts of Ar-Raqqa city, though larger scale returns are being prevented prior to clearance operations. and collective centres, IDPs frequently access untreated water or organize their own water trucking. With Additional returns can be expected as rubble and UXO are removed. the exception of host communities, most sites lack sufficient numbers of latrines, sometimes resulting in • Concurrently, resources and basic services in host communities outside of Ar-Raqqa city are open defecation. Additionally, most IDPs must travel significant distances to access adequate medical strained due to the continued presence of IDPs. With new significant waves of displacement from care. 1. Areas of control taken from syria.liveuamap.com 2. CCCM statistics as of 31 October 2017. 3. “2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic,” OCHA, December 2016. 4. “Ar-Raqqa City Situation Overview VI,” REACH, 13 October 2017. OVERVIEW: Key indicators5 across geographic locations Location Primary shelter type Electricity sources Water sources and Available health Food distributions, Reported protection reported issues facilities market functionality, concerns food availability Ar-Raqqa City Abandoned and damaged No electricity (due to Boreholes; water tastes bad No functioning health No distributions; no Threat from conflict (mines, houses exhaustion of fuel supply) and causes sickness facilities functioning markets and airstrikes, errant gunfire), severe food shortages forced recruitment Managed camps: Tents provided to arriving Main network, private Water trucking, boreholes; no Mobile clinics and care points Distributions reaching all Confiscation and/or loss of Ein Issa, Mabruka, households generators quality issues reported provided by NGOs, private locations; markets are identification documents; clinics, some public facilities functioning but some some exposure to scorpions Areesheh, Al Hol reported food shortages and snakes Ein Issa / Tell Abiad / Collective centres, shared Main network, generators, Main network, water trucking, Main hospital, primary care Distributions reaching some Some threat from disputes Suluk sub-districts and rented apartments/ batteries; some sites without boreholes; at some sites, facilities, NGO-run clinics, locations; markets are mostly between residents, exposure houses coverage water quality is poor and private clinics functioning but some food to scorpions and snakes, causes sickness shortages reported confiscation and/or loss of identification documents Ar-Raqqa sub-district Collective centres, shared Private generators, batteries, Water trucking, untreated Private clinics; most sites Distributions reaching many Some threat from conflict and rented apartments/ many sites without coverage water from rivers and with no access to healthcare locations; markets frequently (UXO), disputes between houses, tents irrigation canals; at some not functioning but food residents, exposure to sites, water quality is poor shortages reported scorpions and snakes and causes sickness Jurneyyeh sub-district Collective centres, shared Private generators Boreholes, water trucking; Private clinics; some sites Distributions reaching all Disputes between residents, and rented apartments/ some quality issues at with limited access to sites; markets are functioning exposure to scorpions and houses, tents informal site healthcare but some reported food snakes shortages Al-Thawrah (Tabqa) / Collective centres, shared Community generators, Main network; no quality Hospitals, private clinics Distributions reaching all None Mansura sub-districts and rented apartments/ some sites without coverage issues reported sites; markets are functioning houses, unfinished buildings and no reported food shortages Karama sub-district Shared and rented Private generators Untreated water from rivers, No health facilities available Distributions reaching most Disputes between residents, apartments/houses, tents water trucking; water causes sites; markets are functioning threat from conflict (mines, sickness and no reported food UXO), exposure to scorpions shortages and snakes Maadan / Sabka sub- Personal, makeshift, and Private generators, batteries Untreated water from rivers, No health facilities available No distributions; no Threat from conflict (armed districts mass tents, significant water trucking; water quality functioning markets and actors, UXO, airstrikes), numbers without shelter is poor and causes sickness common food shortages disputes between residents, exposure to scorpions and snakes 5. All sectoral information as reported in most recent relevant REACH assessments. 2 “IDPs in Sites and Host Communities,” REACH, September 2017. “Ar-Raqqa City Situation Overview VI,” REACH, 13 October 2017. INTRODUCTION DISPLACEMENT OVERVIEW Between 2014 and early 2017, the group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Map 2: IDP sites and host communities in NE Syria and areas of control as of 15 September 2017 QUAMISHLI controlled the majority of Ar-Raqqa governorate. Humanitarian access, as well as information DARBASIYAH AMUDA on the humanitarian situation of civilians in ISIL-held areas across Ar-Raqqa governorate, has ² TURKEY TAL been extremely limited due to strict movement restrictions and controls on information flows. Æ HMIS Æ TELL ABIAD BE'R AL-HULO Following the Syrian