RESEARCH REPORT Playing the Hard Power Card. Pakistan’s fencing of its Afghan border By Siegfried O. Wolf 18 April, 2020 - ISSN 2406-5633 Dr. Siegfried O. Wolf, Director of Research at SADF (Coordinator: Democracy Research Programme); he was educated at the Institute of Political Science (IPW) and South Asia Institute (SAI), both Heidelberg University. Additionally he is member (affiliated researcher) of the SAI as well as a former research fellow at IPW and Centre de Sciences Humaines (New Delhi, India). Abstract For decades a simmering conflict in the ties between Kabul and Islamabad, the issue of the Afghan- Pakistan border resurfaced after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 (Shah, 2013, p. 85) and the subsequent international engagement in Afghanistan. It is now gaining further momentum through the start of a unilateral border fencing project by Pakistan - which apparent last phase of implementation coincides with the U.S.-Taliban Deal (U.S. Department of State, 2020), the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the launch of negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government regarding the future of the country (intra-Afghan dialogue). Against this background, one must ask: what explains the construction of such a fence by Pakistan - particularly since the target country chose not to pursue such a project - and what is to be thought of its timing? In this SADF Research Report, it is argued that Pakistan’s border fencing is not just a part of a larger border management project intended to undermine the movement of cross-border terrorists, smugglers and drug traders. It has a clear geopolitical dimension reaching far beyond the officially proclaimed border control function - which by itself is a legitimate undertaking of any sovereign state. Concretely, the border fencing, when completed, will provide Pakistan with several strategic assets supporting its aims to exercise influence in Afghanistan. Considering the historically tense Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, Islamabad’s unilateral decision to create a barrier at its Afghan frontier must be interpreted as a projection of the country’s hard power to the detriment of Afghanistan’s national interests (Farmer & Mehsud, 2020, March 15). Kabul does not accept the legitimacy of the current de-facto border, the Durand Line, which is claimed as a violation of its sovereignty. Pakistan in turn defends that it is an accepted international border. The border fencing project also affects the interests of the Pashtuns, who live on both sides of the Durand Line. The impacts of such fencing on the daily lives and livelihoods of these groups will strengthen current feelings of marginalization. Pakistan’s border control and management efforts will likely feed a fresh cycle of frustration, leading to more violence in the frontier region RESEARCH REPORT instead of achieving the proclaimed goal of more security and stability for the borderland. Despite the increasing trend of border fortifications world-wide and the significance of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border for peace and stability in the region and beyond, surprisingly low attention is being given to Islamabad’s fencing project of its Afghan border. This report aims to contribute to bridging this gap. Keywords Pakistan; Afghanistan; Afghanistan-Pakistan Border; Foreign Policy; Durand Line; Border Fortification; Border Fencing; Pashtuns; Ethnic Marginalisation; Concept of Border Barriers. SADF Research Report N.3 2 RESEARCH REPORT Table of Contents: 1. Introduction - Context and initial conditions 2. Conceptual considerations 2.1 Initial observations and contextualizing borders 2.2 The emergence and development of physical border barriers 2.3 Reasons for building border fences & their functions 3. Competing views on Pakistan’s border project 3.1 The Afghan perspective 3.2 The Pakistani perspective 4. Pakistan’s unilateral border management project – a multi-dimensional approach 4.1 The security dimension 4.2 The political and strategic dimensions 4.3 The economic dimension 5. Assessment of potential effectiveness 6. Concluding thoughts 7. References List of Abbreviations ANDSF Afghan National Defence and Security Force DLA Durand Line Agreement LCMM Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides NACTA National Counter Terrorism Authority PTM Pashtun Tahafuz Movement SADF South Asia Democratic Forum TTP Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan UN United Nations U.S. United States of America SADF Research Report N.3 3 RESEARCH REPORT 1. Introduction - Context and initial conditions The Afghanistan-Pakistan nexus is one of the most significant South Asian hotspots (Wolf, 2012). Since Pakistan came into existence in 1947, its relationship with Afghanistan has been tense. Despite the fact that both countries share a common culture, religion and civilization, their bilateral relations have always been antagonistic (Wolf, 2017, p. 125). Despite some temporary improvements, suspicion and resentment between Kabul and Islamabad persisted and continues to contribute to a political deadlock. The two neighbours continuously blame each other for interfering in their respective internal affairs and hampering each other’s social, economic and political developments. Afghanistan accuses its eastern neighbour of supporting militant oppositional forces in order to destabilize authorities (Bajoria & Kaplan, 2011, May 4), whereas Pakistan blames Kabul of reinforcing insurgencies in its resource-rich border province of Baluchistan and holds it responsible for the deterioration of the security situation in its northern border regions. This should be seen in the light of specific historical circumstances, such as that relating to the disputed Afghan-Pakistan border (also known as the Durand Line), which traces back to colonial times. The exact length of the Durand line is neither specified nor well-defined; however, the border can be said to be approximately 2640 kilometres long (Shah, 2013, pp. 86-87). The drawing of the line begins in the alpine region of Sarikol range of the Pamir Mountains in the north and runs south-west until the Iranian border near the Koh-i-Malik Siah, in the desert near the Helmand River. It is interesting to note that according to Wiqar Ali Shah (2013, p. 87), ‘the area on the Pakistani side of the border was never declared as fully part of the British India and was always referred to as “Excluded Area”, “Yaghistan” or “No-Man’s- Land”, whereas on the Afghan side it was always an integral part of the Kingdom of Afghanistan.’ Until today, none of the Afghan governments – including the Taliban regime1- officially recognized the Durand Line as an international border; this further complicates bilateral relationships. The non- acceptance of the Durand-line as international border is intricately linked with territorial claims by the Afghan government over land held by Pakistan. Here, one needs to point out that additional territorial demands by the Pashtun tribespeople from within both Pakistan and Afghanistan exist as well (it is estimated that 28 per cent of Pakistan’s population and 42 per cent of Afghanistan’s are ethnic 1 It is reported, that Pakistan’s Interior Minister Nasirullah Babar had asked Mullah Omar, when the leader of the Taleban still governed Afghanistan, to recognise the Durand Line. As response, Taleban leader Mullah Omar had told Babar: ‘Get the hell out of here, you treacherous man’ (Sabawoon, 2020, January 28). SADF Research Report N.3 4 RESEARCH REPORT Pashtun2). More concretely, there are Pashtun claims over regions in Pakistan (Rahi, 2014, February 21). Proponents of the Pashtun cause hold that these areas should be part of an independent or at least an autonomous state for the Pashtuns called ‘Pashtunistan’3. This constitutes a severe challenge to the territorial integrity of Pakistan and is a significant factor in the dispute between Kabul and Islamabad. leverage within the country. 2. Conceptual considerations This section aims at the contextualization of land-based4, physical border barriers5 and elaborates on conceptual considerations prevalent in the respective literature. The report will bring forward the following conceptual arguments: Firstly, physical border barriers are built because of both external and internal factors relating to the states concerned. Secondly, economic and security reasons are crucial, yet not ultimately decisive, factors for governments that plan and implement a physical border barrier. In order to conduct such a large-scale, costly and contentious project such as a wall or a fence, there must be an additional political reasoning relating to both domestic and foreign policy goals. There is no precedence of domestic over foreign politics when justifying the construction of a border fortification. Instead, both dimensions reinforce each other. Nevertheless, the author stresses the significance of border fortification as a foreign policy instrument for the countries concerned. Thirdly, the end of the Cold War did reduce, but not end, the significance of border barriers as political institutions. In fact, the emergence of global Jihadism and cross-border militancy, especially in the post-9/11 era, led to a return to the wall as a geostrategic object and political instrument. 2.1 Initial observations and contextualizing borders The idea that states have clearly defined territories marked by a linear border is rather a recent 2 Here one needs to stress that the last census in Afghanistan was conducted nearly 40 years ago (Glinski, 2019, July 5). 3 In 1947, the Pakhtun Khudayi Khidmatgaran