1 106TH CONGRESS "!S. PRT. 1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT 106±32 THE MARCH 30, 1997 GRENADE ATTACK IN CAMBODIA A STAFF REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE OCTOBER 1999 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 59±737 CC WASHINGTON : 1999 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey BILL FRIST, Tennessee STEPHEN E. BIEGUN, Staff Director EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Staff Director (II) LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL SEPTEMBER 21, 1999. The Honorable JESSE HELMS Chairman Committee on Foreign Relations The Honorable JOSEPH BIDEN Ranking Minority Member Committee on Foreign Relations DEAR SENATOR HELMS AND SENATOR BIDEN: Attached is a report on my two recent trips to Cambodia, in De- cember, 1998 (Staffdel Doran) and July, 1999 (Staffdel Berkowitz/ Doran). The primary focus of the trips was the March 30, 1997 grenade attack in Cambodia, which injured an American citizen and which was investigated by the FBI. On the December, 1998 trip, I was ac- companied by Paul Berkowitz and Joseph Rees of the House Inter- national Relations Committee. On the July, 1999 trip, I was accom- panied by Paul Berkowitz and by Michael Westphal of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. To this day, the perpetrators of the grenade attack have not been identified. However, based on my analysis of the currently avail- able evidence, which includes FBI reporting, press accounts, and numerous interviews in Cambodia, Thailand and the United States, my report reaches the following conclusions: (1) Members of Hun Sen's Bodyguard Force participated in the planning and execution of the March 30, 1997 attack. (2) Hun Sen, being only one of two people with authority over the Bodyguard Force, must have known and approved of the attack. (3) By June, 1997, the U.S. Government was in possession of overwhelming evidence of conclusions #1 and #2 and has done nothing about it. U.S. Government passivity on this matter has had profoundly negative consequences for democracy in Cambodia, for today, Hun Sen once again holds unchallenged power in that unfortunate coun- try. With U.S. Government acquiescence, he has succeeded in com- pletely overturning the results of the 1993 U.N. elections, and gained international recognition of this feat to boot. Part of this ac- quiescence has been the total unwillingness of the U.S. Govern- ment to confront Hun Sen with its evidence of his involvement in this bloody massacre. iv The report details the evidence that leads me to these conclu- sions. Sincerely, JAMES P. DORAN, Professional Staff Member for East Asian Affairs CONTENTS Page I. Introduction .................................................................................................... 1 II. Background .................................................................................................... 2 Cambodian Political Situation .................................................................. 2 U.S. Congressional Developments ........................................................... 3 III. The Facts in the Case .................................................................................... 3 A Confession .............................................................................................. 4 A Suspect Called ``Brazil'' ......................................................................... 5 More Substantiation: The May 1997 Cambodian Police Report ............ 5 Alternative Theories .................................................................................. 6 IV. The Role of the U.S. Government ................................................................. 8 The FBI's Investigation: Shoddy, or Just Half-Hearted ......................... 8 The Chhay Vee/Chom Bun Theun Fiasco ................................................ 8 On-again, Off-again, and Mostly Off ........................................................ 9 The State Department: Denial as Policy ................................................. 10 V. Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 11 Appendix 1ÐUnclassified FBI Report of November 24, 1998 ............................. 13 Appendix 2ÐFBI Letter to Senator Jesse Helms ................................................. 21 Appendix 3ÐCambodian Police Report ................................................................. 27 (V) vi List of Names That Appear in the Report Hun SenÐex-Khmer Rouge soldier; part of Vietnamese-installed government in 1979; ruler of Cambodia since 1985 Prince Norodom RanariddhÐwinner of 1993 elections; co-pre- mier with Hun Sen, 1993±1997 Sam RainsyÐopposition politician; target of March 30, 1997 gre- nade attack Ron AbneyÐAmerican citizen injured in attack General Huy PisedÐCommander of Hun Sen's Bodyguard Force Him Bun HeangÐassistant to General Pised Major Chhin SavonÐon-scene commander of Bodyguard Forces at March 30 rally Mok ChitoÐCommander of Phnom Penh Municipal Police Force; nephew of Hun Sen Sar KhengÐInterior Minister from Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party (CPP) General Teng SavonÐCommander of Investigative Commission on the attack (CPP) BrazilÐa codename for a major suspect in the case General Nhiek Bun ChhayÐformer deputy chief of Cambodian armed forces who briefly held Brazil in custody Chhay VeeÐCambodian who confessed to participating in the crime, then recanted Chom Bun TheunÐaccomplice of Chhay Vee Kun KimÐvice-governor of Kandal province; close associate of Hun Sen I. INTRODUCTION On March 30, 1997, Cambodia was rocked by a bloody grenade attack at a political rally organized by opposition politician Sam Rainsy. Shortly after the rally began, at approximately 8:30 a.m., unidentified attackers tossed four hand grenades into the crowd, killing at least sixteen people and injuring over 150. Sam Rainsy, the apparent target of the attack, was not injured, though his personal bodyguard was killed in the blast. Also injured in the attack was American citizen Ron Abney, of Cochran, Geor- gia. Abney, an employee of the International Republican Institute who was accompanying Rainsy, received shrapnel wounds in the leg and hip. Rainsy immediately blamed then-Second Prime Minister Hun Sen for the attack. Hun Sen initially blamed the Khmer Rouge, but subsequently accused Rainsy of staging the attack on himself. Shortly afterwards, a Cambodian government commission was formed to investigate the incident. The injury to Abney, as well as an invitation from the Cambodian government, led to FBI involve- ment in the investigation. To date, no one has been brought to justice for this crime. The actual grenade throwers remain unidentified, as do the ultimate masterminds. However, it is my opinion that sufficient evidence ex- ists in order to yield a very obvious conclusion: Hun Sen and his Bodyguard Forces were behind this crime. In this report, this assertion will be demonstrated by summariz- ing all of the known publicly-available information on this matter. To date, no single document has culled together all of the available information, nor has the information been widely disseminated. The large majority of information presented in this report will come from three sources: (1) The unclassified FBI report to Con- gress, delivered to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on No- vember 24, 1998; (2) A February 19, 1999 FBI letter to Senator Jesse Helms and Congressmen Benjamin Gilman, Christopher Smith and Dana Rohrabacher; (3) A report by a Cambodian police official written in May, 1997. The texts of these three documents appear at the end of this report as appendices. (NOTE: The Cambodian police report appears to be haphazard and unprofession- ally written, in part due to poor translation into English. However, the report is al- most wholly congruent with and substantiates the information from the FBI and other sources. The redactions in the Cambodian police report are to protect the names of witnesses and FBI agents.) The remaining information in this staff report is from press ac- counts or interviews with various participants in this matter, in- cluding victims, Cambodian officials, human rights activists and journalists. This investigation entailed two trips to Cambodia and Thailand, in December, 1998 (Staffdel Doran) and July, 1999 (Staffdel Berkowitz/Doran). (1) 2 As a caveat, it should be stated that there may or may not cur- rently be sufficient prosecutorial evidence against Hun Sen or any of his subordinates. However, the three documents summarized and presented in this report speak for themselves. Readers should find that this evidence, viewed against the backdrop of Hun Sen's well-known history of resorting to violence against his political op- ponents, yields a common sense conclusion that Hun Sen in fact bears ultimate responsibility for this act of terrorism. Prior to presenting the evidence in this case, a bit of background is necessary. II. BACKGROUND Cambodian Political Situation At the time of the March 30, 1997 rally, Cambodia was ruled by a coalition government, with power nominally shared by the