Lying, deception and strategic omission : definition and evaluation Benjamin Icard To cite this version: Benjamin Icard. Lying, deception and strategic omission : definition and evaluation. Psychology. Université Paris sciences et lettres, 2019. English. NNT : 2019PSLEE001. tel-02170022 HAL Id: tel-02170022 https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-02170022 Submitted on 1 Jul 2019 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. THÈSE DE DOCTORAT de l’Université Paris Sciences et Lettres PSL University Préparée à l’École normale supérieure, Paris Lying, Deception and Strategic Omission Definition & Evaluation École doctorale no158 CERVEAU, COGNITION, COMPORTEMENT Spécialité SCIENCES COGNITIVES COMPOSITION DU JURY : M. Didier BAZALGETTE, Ingénieur Direction Générale de l’Armement, Examinateur M. Denis BONNAY, MCF Université Paris X / IRePh / IHPST, Examinateur Soutenue par Benjamin ICARD M. Hans VAN DITMARSCH, DR Université de Lorraine / LORIA, Le 4 Février 2019 Rapporteur et Président du Jury M. Paul ÉGRÉ, DR ENS Ulm / IJN, Dirigée par Paul ÉGRÉ Directeur de la thèse M. Pascal ENGEL, DE EHESS / CRAL, Rapporteur Mme Marie-Jeanne LESOT, MCF Université Paris VI / LIP6, Examinatrice Lying, Deception and Strategic Omission Definition & Evaluation Benjamin Icard Lying, Deception and Strategic Omission Definition & Evaluation PhDThesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor in Cognitive Science by Benjamin Icard Under the supervision of Professor Paul Égré Examination Committee Supervisor: M. Paul Égré École normale supérieure - IJN Committee: M. Didier Bazalgette Direction Générale de l’Armement M. Denis Bonnay Université Paris X - IRePh / IHPST M. Hans van Ditmarsch Université de Lorraine - LORIA M. Pascal Engel EHESS - CRAL Mme Marie-Jeanne Lesot Université Paris VI - LIP6 À mes parents À Alice This work was supported by a doctoral scholarship from the Mission pour la Recherche et l’Innovation Scientifique of the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA-MRIS). The author also received funding from the Project “New Ideas in Mathematical Philosophy”, the PSL Research Grant “Improving Prediction for a Better World”, the ANRs 14-CE30-0010-01, 10-LABX-0087 IEC, 10-IDEX-0001 PSL*. The writing of the dissertation has been helped by the ANR 17-EURE-0017 FrontCog. Copyright c 2018 by Benjamin Icard. Printed and bound at the Département d’Études Cognitives, ENS Ulm. Acknowledgments First and foremost, I would like to express my profound gratitude to Paul Égré, my PhD Advisor, for his invaluable input, precious guidance, support, and generosity over the years. I had the great opportunity to meet Paul during my Master’s Degree, and since then on many occasions I could realize how lucky I was to work under his supervision. Without his continuing support and wise advice, things would have been much more arduous. I am very grateful to Hans van Ditmarsch and Pascal Engel for accepting to be rapporteurs of my dissertation thesis. I also want to express my sincere gratitude to Marie-Jeanne Lesot, Denis Bonnay and Didier Bazalgette for being examinateurs at my defence. Special thanks go to Denis Bonnay and Hans van Ditmarsch for their very useful feedback and advice during, and between, my Comités de suivi de thèse. I am also thankful to Brent Strickland for his substantial help since the beginning of my empirical investigations on the topic of lying. I thank Didier Bazalgette for his constant support before and during my PhD, thanks to him I could undertake this thesis with a DGA scholarship and for as- sociating me to applied projects then. I am also particularly grateful to Philippe Capet for his friendship and constant attention concerning topics related to de- ception in intelligence warfare. I also thank the following scholars, who dedicated some time and thought to my i work: Alexandru Baltag, Peter van Emde Boas, Raul Fervari, Mathias Girel, Neri Marsili, Sonja Smets in particular. I am thankful to the audience and commentators in the conferences, workshops and seminars in Paris, Amsterdam, Leiden and Leuven for their interest, and their sometimes challenging inputs. I would also like to thank Ghislain Atemezing, Reinaldo Bernal, Samira Bou- jidi, Romain Bourdoncle, Serge Bozon, Bouchra Budel, Géraldine Carranante, Jean-Marie Chevalier, Rose-Hélène Doranges-Daupin, Nathalie Evin-Abitbol, Au- rélien Fermo, Miguel Flament, Martin Fortier, Clémentine Fourrier, Guillaume Gadek, Vincent Gaudefroy, Benoit Gaultier, Félix Geoffroy, Janek Guerrini, Anna Giustina, Helena Hachmann, Guillaume Herzog, Dan Hoek, Rojdi Karli, Eka- terina Kubyshkina, David Landais, Baptiste Lanne, Sandra Lasry, Bénédicte Legastelois, Nathalie Marcinek, Hugo Mell, Raphaël Millière, Pierre-Alexandre Miot, Boian Nikiforoff-Kharisanoff Vega, Mélanie Sarzano, Ian Shilito, Andrès Soria-Ruiz, Claire Sourdin, Chloé Tahar, Tristan Thommen, Louis Vayssette, Juli- ette Vazard, Jacques-Henri Vollet. Lastly, I would like to thank Alice, my parents and my brother and sister for their continuous support, for their interest and for their care all along these years of intense work. Paris, December 2018 ii Contents Acknowledgments i Contents iii Introduction 1 1. Methodological Approaches ........................ 4 2. Theoretical Aspects ............................. 7 3. Practical Interests .............................. 12 4. General Outline ............................... 17 1 Two Definitions of Lying 23 1.1 Introduction ................................ 23 1.2 Defining Lying: standard account and theoretical challenges . 27 1.2.1 The Traditional Definition: the Subjective View . 27 1.2.2 Main Conceptual Challenges to the Traditional Definition . 30 1.3 The Subjective vs. Objective View on Lying: previous experi- mental results ............................... 33 1.3.1 Turri & Turri’ Plea for Falsity: the Objective View . 33 1.3.2 Wiegmann & al.’ Defense of the Subjective View . 38 1.4 The Subjective Core Definition of Lying . 44 1.4.1 Main Point ............................. 44 1.4.2 Pilot Experiment ......................... 46 1.4.2.1 Pilot Hypothesis .................... 46 1.4.2.2 Design and Materials . 46 1.4.2.3 Results .......................... 48 1.4.2.4 Analyses ......................... 50 iii 1.4.3 Replication ............................. 51 1.4.3.1 Replication Hypothesis . 51 1.4.3.2 Design and Materials . 51 1.4.3.3 Results .......................... 52 1.4.3.4 Post Hoc Analysis ................... 54 1.4.4 Comparing the Results ...................... 55 1.5 Discussion ................................. 56 1.6 Conclusion ................................. 62 2 The Surprise Deception Paradox 65 2.1 Introduction ................................ 65 2.2 A Language for Analysis ........................ 68 2.2.1 A Dynamic Epistemic Syntax L(B,K,[⇑]) . 68 2.2.2 Epistemic Plausibility Models for Language L(B,K,[⇑]) . 68 2.2.3 Matching L(B,K,[⇑]) with Smullyan’s Story . 73 2.3 The Deceptive Plot ............................ 75 2.3.1 Emile’s Misleading Announcement . 75 2.3.2 Raymond’s Successive States of Deception . 76 2.3.3 The Events Leading to Raymond’s States of Deception . 77 2.3.4 Emile’s Whole Deceptive Plot on April Fool’s Day . 79 2.4 Unveiling the Deception ......................... 79 2.4.1 Emile’s Explanation on Deception . 79 2.4.2 Raymond’s Self-Referential Reasoning . 84 2.5 A Source of Surprise ........................... 88 2.5.1 Emile’s Surprise Announcement of Deception . 88 2.5.2 Emile’s Successful Action of Surprise . 91 2.5.3 Raymond’s Distinct States of Surprise . 92 2.6 Conclusion ................................. 94 3 The Definition of Intelligence Messages 97 3.1 Introduction ................................ 97 3.2 Information Evaluation in Intelligence . 100 3.2.1 The Intelligence Cycle in a Nutschell . 100 3.2.2 The Traditional Scale for Information Evaluation . 101 iv 3.2.3 Some Virtues of the Alphanumeric Scale . 105 3.3 Discerning Facts from Interpretations . 106 3.3.1 The Fact vs. Interpretation Assumption . 106 3.3.2 Identifying Issues in the Assumption . 107 3.3.2.1 Semantic Confusion in the Definition of Ratings . 107 3.3.2.2 Pragmatic Misunderstandings Intra-Officers . 108 3.3.2.3 Pragmatic Inconsistencies Inter-Officers . 109 3.3.3 A Descriptive Proposal for Intelligence Messages . 113 3.4 The Definition of Intelligence Messages . 114 3.4.1 A Matrix for Defining Informational Types . 114 3.4.2 The Most Classical Types of Messages . 115 3.4.3 Some Types Based on Semantic Vagueness . 117 3.4.4 Some Other Types Based on Pragmatic Vagueness . 121 3.5 Conclusion .................................124 4 A Dynamic Procedure for Information Evaluation 127 4.1 Introduction ................................127 4.2 Some Reminders on Information Evaluation . 129 4.2.1 The 6×6 Matrix for Intelligence Evaluation . 129 4.2.2 The Credibility vs. Reliability Assumption . 131 4.2.3 Identifying Issues with the Assumption . 133 4.2.4 A New Proposal for Intelligence Evaluation . 138 4.3 The Evaluation of Intelligence Messages . 138 4.3.1 A Formal Language L(intel)