leonardo reviews editor-in-chief Michael Punt associate editors Hannah Drayson, Dene Grigar, Jane Hutchinson A full selection of reviews is published monthly on the Leonardo website: <leonardo.info/reviews>. b o o k s no prizes for guessing why philoso- tigating the structures of existing spe- pher David Chalmers named the task cies and what we know of ancestral the AncIent Origins oF of objectively explaining the highly species using morphological (current conscIousness: How the subjective nature of experience the and fossil), molecular and functional braIn Created ExperIence Hard Problem. This hard problem is of evidence. In this process, Feinberg by Todd E. Feinberg and Jon M. Mallatt. enormous interest to all who think, and Mallatt ask straightforward ques- The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A., and its study has traditionally been tions. What are the basic features 2016. 392 pp., illus. Trade. ISBN: 978-0- the focus of philosophical investiga- that are needed for consciousness? 262-03433-3. tion. As a hard problem, Feinberg and When did these features first appear? Reviewed by Craig Hilton, Mallet argue, the study of conscious- Evidence strongly suggests that Unitec, New Zealand, Mt. Albert, ness requires a multidisciplinary consciousness first appeared during Auckland, New Zealand. approach. the Cambrian explosion, when ver- Email: <[email protected]>. How does this physical thing, tebrates first started to visually map mostly housed in our heads behind their environments. doi:10.1162/LEON_r_01559 our eyes, produce this phenomenal In a dedicated chapter, Feinberg Something wonderful happened experience of consciousness and an and Mallatt raise the question, “Does around half a billion years ago and understanding of what is like to be? consciousness need a backbone?” at least once. Feinberg and Mallatt The subtitle How the Brain Created Posed another way: Could conscious- take us through a methodical and Experience hints that this study looks ness have evolved independently convincing argument that conscious- back at the evolutionary arrival of more than once? The authors note ness has its roots in vertebrate evolu- consciousness. On the dust jacket, that invertebrates, despite having tion, and thus consciousness (defined Thurston Lacalli points out that hard different brain and sensory appa- by American philosopher Thomas problems need to be tackled at a base ratus from vertebrates, have func- Nagel as an experience of what it is level, and in this case it seems sensi- tion consistent with consciousness. like to be) is likely to be ubiquitously ble to ask: What are the rudimentary forms of these phenomena as they represented among all the vertebrates Reviews Panel: Fred Andersson, Jan Baetens, we currently live alongside. The emerge in evolution? John F. Barber, Roy Behrens, K. Blassnigg, conclusion that all vertebrates have This study (and that is what it Catalin Brylla, Annick Bureaud, Chris Cobb, always been conscious is not widely is—a serious study) approaches the Giovanna Costantini, Edith Doove, Hannah Drayson, Phil Dyke, Ernest Edmonds, Amanda accepted by experts and is seemingly hard problem from philosophical, Egbe, Anthony Enns, Enzo Ferrara, Kathryn not particularly palatable to a spe- neurobiological and neuroevolution- Francis, George Gessert, Allan Graubard, cies that considers itself unique (and ary positions. The work is the result Dene Grigar, Rob Harle, Craig Harris, Craig J. of a cross-disciplinary collaboration Hilton, Jane Hutchinson, Amy Ione, Richard behaves accordingly) in the ability Kade, Valérie Lamontagne, Mike Leggett, Will to think and consider its existence by Todd Feinberg and Jon Mallatt. Luers, Kieran Lyons, Roger Malina, Jacques in the context of the world. Feinberg Feinberg is a neurologist, a practicing Mandelbrojt, Florence Martellini, Elizabeth and Mallatt remind us that we are clinical psychiatrist (Icahn School of McCardell, Eduardo Miranda, Robert A. Mitchell, Michael Mosher, Sana Murrani, investigating a very basic conscious- Medicine, New York) and the author Frieder Nake, Maureen A. Nappi, Claudy ness but that it is consciousness nev- of From Axons to Identity: Neurologi- Opdenkamp, Jack Ox, Luisa Paraguai, Jussi ertheless. Some species understand cal Explorations of the Nature of the Parikka, Ellen Pearlman, Ana Peraica, their existence, that they are; others Self. Mallatt is an evolutionary biolo- Stephen Petersen, Michael Punt, Hannah Rogers, Lara Schrijver, Aparna Sharma, may muse on that existence in itself; gist and associate professor of biology George K. Shortess, Brian Reffin Smith, and still fewer (perhaps just the one) and medical science (Washington Yvonne Spielmann, Eugenia Stamboliev, consider this phenomenon interesting State University and University of Paul Sternberg, Malgorzata Sugiera, James Sweeting, Charissa N. Terranova, Yvan Tina, enough to write a book about it. The Washington). Flutur Troshani, Ian Verstegen, John Vines, Ancient Origins of Consciousness is a Grounded by the basic philo- Claudia Westermann, Cecilia Wong, Martyn comprehensive update on the hard sophical puzzles of consciousness, the Woodward, Jonathan Zilberg problem of consciousness. There are authors go about methodically inves- ©2018 ISAST LEONARDO, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 87–96, 2018 87 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/LEON_r_01561 by guest on 27 September 2021 and at least some sort of basic con- tive literature reading lists (particu- sciousness. larly his Film Language: A Semiotics of There it is. Consciousness predates the Cinema, 1974). Tied to semiotics us and not just us. Consciousness and psychoanalysis, interest in Metz’s predates primates and mammals and work passed with interest in those possibly arose separately on more subjects. Metz’s present book repre- than one occasion. This is strong sents a delayed continuation of his evidence that there exists a significant legacy in an English translation of his survival advantage for any organism last book (L’énonciation impersonnelle, that is consciously aware of the risks ou le site du film), first published in and rewards of the external environ- 1991. In the introduction, translator ment and of its own internal state Cormac Deane notes how dissimilar and has an experience of being, an the text is to Metz’s earlier ponder- awareness of self. Hence, it seems ous works and argues that Metz is that we share a planet with conscious not looking backward at his formed beings who experience what it is to system but rather is looking forward be and who understand themselves to new challenges that would preoc- Octopuses, despite their apparent as distinct from others. More study cupy film theorists. The result is a cleverness, are thought to fail crucial will no doubt shed more light on the wide-ranging pass through tens of consciousness criteria with their extent of consciousness’s reach, but examples of films of all kinds, only independent neurally controlled consciousness it seems is quite pos- bookended with the theoretical arma- arms. Countering this, The Ancient sibly significantly more common than ture of how Metz thinks enunciation Origins of Consciousness makes the we might have believed. works in films. case for mental unity in the octopus While The Ancient Origins of Con- The title, Impersonal Enunciation, brain and therefore the possibil- sciousness may require some com- suggests that the subjectivity of the ity of consciousness defined as an mitment from the reader to navigate film takes place outside of actual peo- experience of what it is to be. If this the multidisciplinary approach the ple (impersonal), while the “place” of is truly the case, it is possible that authors employ to address the com- film is asking where that nonperson consciousness emerged in cephalo- plexity of the hard problem, this well- might be. For Metz—long associated pods’ ancestors alongside their post- structured book is well worth the with linguistic reduction (the por- Cambrian evolution of good vision. effort required. As the authors state trayal of film on a linguistic model)— Unfortunately, these species are not in the preface, “We do not skimp,” true enunciation doesn’t actually take as well studied as vertebrates, and and they certainly did not—but they place in film. The theory is an appar- the authors remain cautious, judging have also designed this book thought- ent volte-face: Technical enunciation cephalopod molluscs and arthropods fully to ensure that nonexperts can as outlined for French semioticians to be “probably conscious.” If arthro- remain engaged and informed as by Benveniste is not a true pronomial pods and cephalopods do turn out to they encounter robust arguments and case in the example of film, the film’s possess consciousness, then without conclusions that are well supported “you” to our “I.” Rather, Metz argues, a doubt consciousness is considerably on all fronts. From this perspective, it contains merely a “source” and a more widespread than is currently no review can do justice to the work “target.” thought and has also emerged from behind The Ancient Origins of Con- The heart of the book is 11 short the evolution of quite different neural sciousness. chapters documenting various ways structures. Independent evolution in which film appeals to the viewer, would help explain emerging evi- Impersonal EnuncIatIon, including the voice in the image, the dence that other invertebrates may or the Place of FIlm voice outside the image, text added possess consciousness. Honeybees, by Christian Metz; translated by Cormac to an image, the addition of second- for instance, have learning and mem- Deane. Columbia Univ. Press, New York, ary screens and mirrors, the display ory abilities that appear to be able to U.S.A., 2015. 280 pp. Trade; paper; eBook. of metatechnical elements to “expose comprehend certain abstract things. ISBN: 978-0-231-17366-7; ISBN: 978-0- the apparatus,” films within films and This seems incompatible with the size 231-17366-7; ISBN: 978-0-231-54064-3. so on. of their brains, which are very small. Reviewed by Ian Verstegen, Metz smirks at the imputation of However, their brains are rather University of Pennsylvania.