Collison 1 Saving a Country without a State: Foreign Intervention and State Capacity in 21st Century Somalia John Collison Collison 2 Table of Contents I. Introduction: 3 II. Research Design: 8 III. Literature Review: 14 a. State Capacity b. Foreign Intervention in Civil Wars IV. Background on Somalia: 23 V. The US and UN Interventions, 2004 to mid-2006: 30 a. Background/Course of Events b. Measuring Foreign Intervention Success c. Measuring State Capacity VI. The Ethiopian Intervention, December 2006 to January 2009: 45 a. Background/Course of Events b. Measuring Foreign Intervention Success c. Measuring State Capacity VII. AMISOM’s Intervention in Somalia, January 2009 to August 2011: 61 a. Background/Course of Events b. Measuring Foreign Intervention Success c. Measuring State Capacity VIII. Kenya’s Intervention in Somalia, October 2011 to October 2012: 79 a. Background/Course of Events b. Measuring Foreign Intervention Success c. Measuring State Capacity IX. Conclusion: 98 Collison 3 Chapter 1: Introduction Since the end of World War II, civil wars have become more prevalent than interstate wars, and have thus presented the international community with unique challenges to the preservation of global peace. From Lebanon to Bosnia to Syria, foreign powers have intervened in bloody internal conflicts, sometimes with ostensibly humanitarian aims, often in the pursuit of specific strategic agendas, and all too often with little discernible success. The question of what determines success or failure in a foreign intervention into a civil war is one of the most debated in the literature on international relations. Many prominent political scientists, such as Patrick Regan, have concluded that interventions tend to prolong rather than resolve civil wars. Rather than attempt to identify a universal secret to successful foreign intervention in all cases of civil war, I instead seek to understand the importance of state capacity in facilitating interventions that are successful in overcoming rebel insurgencies. Specifically, I intend to use the experience of Somalia, through the comparison of several recent instances of intervention in that country’s torturous civil war, to gain some insight on how the state capacity of a host country’s government can help or hinder a supportive foreign intervention against its rebel opponents. Somalia’s civil war began with the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, which left the country a failed state. Since the UN interventions of the 1990s, the international community struggled to resolve the state of anarchy and conflict in Somalia, and repeated interventions seemed unable to overcome powerful insurgents. However, in the last few years, Somalia has experienced some success in building up state capacity, reducing violence, and reining in the insurgency, with the support of foreign entities such as Kenya, the United States, and the UN. I find that state capacity has been the consistent, determining factor in the relative success of foreign intervention in the Somali Civil War. While there are other factors influential to the success or failure of specific instances of intervention in Somalia, such as interethnic hostility or insurgent fragmentation, I argue that no phenomenon explains the degree of success across multiple interventions in the last two decades better than the gradual growth of state capacity in the Somali government. My hypothesis fundamentally asserts the influence of an independent variable, state capacity, on the dependent variable of foreign intervention success. State capacity is a concept almost as broadly discussed as that of foreign intervention in civil war. The concept gained popularity and depth in the academic scholarship during the 1970s and 80s, as scholars sought to understand the different dimensions of state growth, as observed in the numerous new states that emerged in the postcolonial era. The exact definition of state capacity has been debated, as the term is often used in different Collison 4 disciplinary contexts, but one could consider Theda Skocpol’s 1985 definition to be a mainstream one: state capacity is the ability to “implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances.”1 The impact of state capacity on internal conflict is controversial. Many scholars observe that weak state capacity can be a reliable predictor for the onset of civil war, but the effect of state capacity on resolving civil wars is less thoroughly understood. Recent studies suggest that state capacity is vital in incentivizing parties to adhere to peace agreements. But there has been less research on state capacity’s influence on military, rather than diplomatic, solutions to internal conflict, especially when foreign powers are involved. It is this potential relationship I intend to explore, through the case of Somalia. Scholars tend to distinguish between different kinds of state capacity, including coercive, juridical, fiscal, and administrative. For the purposes of my study, I intend to focus on these four dimensions of capacity, as well as to examine the development of overall state capacity in a holistic sense. These encompass the central government’s extraction of tax revenue, the presence of basic social services like healthcare and government pensions, and the establishment of a judicial system to administer justice and adjudicate social or economic disputes. I’m also interested in the government’s ability to preserve a stable climate for business, through the provision of basic security, consistent taxation and regulation, and limiting graft. I intend to observe the extent (or lack thereof) of these various operationalizations of my independent variable through government and NGO records, other relevant sources of data, and assessments of different dimensions of state capacity from respected, neutral sources for each time period in my case studies. For my dependent variable, observing that every instance of foreign intervention I’m studying has been in support of the internationally-recognized government of Somalia against non-state actors, I define success in foreign intervention as the consistent reduction of rebel violence and territorial control. A successful intervention should contribute to a decline in rebel violence and territorial control not just for a matter of weeks but with some permanence. To measure this variable, I thus examine the decline in violence and proportion of the country controlled by insurgents over the course of a year from the beginning of the intervention period. It is also necessary to specify what I consider an intervention for the purposes of this thesis. Somalia’s unusually weak coercive capacity makes the role of intervener particularly important to this conflict. Many scholars have identified a state’s fiscal and administrative capacity as complimentary to its ability to maintain security. The Somali state has struggled to field any kind of cohesive military force since its disintegration in the 1990s, and it could be said to have therefore outsourced the function of coercive state capacity to clan militias and, more importantly, to foreign interveners. The interplay Collison 5 between the state’s administrative and fiscal capacity and the military support provided by its foreign partners is thus highly relevant to the progression of the Somali Civil War. While there are many broad definitions of foreign intervention discussed in the literature, for the purposes of this study, I focus on military interventions, in which the interveners apply military force, either through forces on the ground or with airpower, or through covert operations to provide indirect assistance, to support the central government against insurgents. This is not to neglect the significance of economic and diplomatic intervention on behalf of the Somali government, which undoubtedly had some effect on the growth of state capacity over the last decade. However, while understanding that the relationship between state capacity and foreign intervention can in part be complementary, I also seek to explain the observation by some Somalia experts that much of the recent growth in state capacity can be attributed to internal developments within Somalia, rather than simply an influx in foreign aid. I seek to illustrate that the hypothesized mechanism by which state capacity facilitates military success against the insurgency ultimately, through a feedback effect, contributes at least in part to the recent growth in Somali state capacity. The mechanism by which I hypothesize state capacity affects foreign intervention is as follows: as the Somali state increases its capacity, it spends more revenue on the improvement of social services, bureaucracy, and a judicial system. The state is thus better able to compete with rebel groups in providing some of these basic functions of governance, and gradually important interest groups, including clan elders and business elites, defect from supporting the rebel groups to supporting the government, taking certain constituencies with them. This process undermines the cohesion and popularity of the insurgency, facilitating the ability of foreign forces to defeat insurgents militarily and in the long-term reduce their violence and territorial control. Military success against the insurgents in turn gives the state more breathing room to build up capacity, and thus reinforce this mechanism. My research design is fundamentally