March 26, 2012 Dr. Phillip C. Saunders Director, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on ―Developments in China‘s Cyber and Nuclear Capabilities‖ Dr. Saunders is speaking in his own personal capacity as a member of the academic community. This statement represents his views based on his research. It should not be implied to represent the views of the Department of Defense or the Administration. Chinese Nuclear Forces and Strategy China‘s initial quest for a nuclear weapons capability was motivated by recognition of the political value of nuclear weapons and by Mao Zedong‘s determination to remove China‘s vulnerability to nuclear blackmail, which had been a factor in several crises involving the United States.1 China‘s senior political and military leaders have consistently emphasized that the principal utility of nuclear weapons lies in deterring a nuclear attack and countering nuclear coercion.2 Although Chinese leaders believe that possession of nuclear weapons bestows international status, they do not believe that more warheads increase a state‘s power or status. Unlike U.S. and Soviet strategists who focused heavily on the potential impact of relative capabilities in nuclear war-fighting scenarios, Chinese leaders appear to have concluded that one or a few nuclear weapons striking an adversary‘s homeland would constitute unacceptable damage, making a large arsenal unnecessary to achieve the desired strategic effects. Following its first nuclear test in 1964, Beijing announced that it would adhere to a policy of no-first-use (NFU) of nuclear weapons and called for worldwide nuclear disarmament. It has maintained this official positions ever since. Western analysts have described China‘s nuclear strategy as a ―minimal deterrent‖ that relies on a small number of nuclear weapons to deliver punitive, counter-value responses to an adversary‘s first strike.3 Minimum deterrence refers to ―threatening the lowest level of damage necessary to prevent attack, with the fewest number of nuclear weapons possible.‖4 China‘s choice of minimal deterrence was influenced by technological constraints on its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems, but was also heavily shaped by the views of senior political leaders (especially Mao), which have had an enduring influence on PRC nuclear doctrine. Chinese leaders did not dictate a specific number of nuclear weapons; China‘s nuclear forces appear to have been sized based on the need for a few weapons to survive a first strike and launch a retaliatory attack. China‘s 2006 Defense White Paper provides a concise overview of the key elements of China‘s ―self-defensive‖ nuclear strategy: 1 Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force. China's nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC). China exercises great restraint in developing its nuclear force. It has never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.‖ This description highlights a number of key elements of China‘s nuclear strategy and policy, including the goals of deterrence and preventing nuclear coercion; ―no-first use‖ policy; the goal of eventual elimination of nuclear weapons; and China‘s explicit determination (which dates from the beginning of its nuclear weapons program) not to engage in nuclear arms races. In terms of doctrine, a no-first use policy implies an operational focus on retaliatory counter-attack, or ―striking after the enemy has struck.‖ In terms of force structure, ―limited development of nuclear weapons‖ and a ―lean and effective nuclear force‖ do not translate directly into requirements for specific numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Rather, they suggest that the quantitative requirements for a ―lean and effective‖ nuclear force will depend on the ability of Chinese nuclear forces to survive a potential adversary‘s nuclear first strike via some combination of mobility, dispersal, camouflage, and operational resilience and then to launch a retaliatory strike that can penetrate an adversary‘s missile defenses and inflict unacceptable damage. Chinese nuclear force requirements thus depend significantly on the intelligence, conventional precision-strike, nuclear strike, anti-submarine warfare, and missile defense capabilities of potential adversaries. China‘s nuclear forces are not solely focused on the United States, but U.S. capabilities (and potential future advances) in these areas make it a key driver of Chinese force structure. The development of China‘s nuclear forces is broadly compatible with the thinking of Chinese top political leaders (especially Mao and Deng) described above. Technological limitations meant that the Chinese deterrent initially relied primarily on air-delivered weapons and then on vulnerable silo and cave-based missiles. Chinese experts privately admitted that the credibility of China‘s deterrent rested on a potential adversary‘s uncertainty about whether a first strike could destroy all of China‘s long-range nuclear missiles. Ambiguity about the total size of China‘s nuclear arsenal was therefore viewed as an important element of China‘s deterrent capability. Rather than build large numbers of highly vulnerable first-generation missiles, China decided in the late 1970s and early 1980s to develop a second generation of mobile land and sea-based missiles that would 2 be more survivable and better able to provide a credible second-strike capability. As these new systems began nearing deployment in the late 2000s, U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty and deployment of ballistic missile defenses challenged the premises behind mutually assured destruction, prompting Chinese complaints that the United States sought ―absolute security‖ for itself while keeping others vulnerable. China‘s current nuclear forces consist of a mix of first and second generation nuclear missiles, with new DF-31 and DF-31A solid-fueled mobile Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) gradually being deployed to augment existing DF-5A ICBMs. China has also upgraded its regional nuclear deterrent with the deployment of the DF-21 Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) to supplement first generation DF-3 and DF-4 Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles. In terms of a sea-based deterrent, China‘s initial XIA class nuclear missile submarine (SSBN) suffered from a troubled development process and may never have constituted a truly operational system.5 China has already built two Type-94 JIN class SSBNs and may ultimately deploy five of the submarines, which will be equipped with JL-2 SLBM missiles.6 The interaction between evolving U.S. military capabilities and China‘s nuclear modernization is likely to produce a significant expansion of the number of deployed warheads that can reach the United States. However, it is difficult to speak about the numbers with confidence because China provides no official data on the current or projected size of its nuclear force, the number and capabilities of its delivery systems, or its overall modernization plans. A 2010 Pentagon report estimates that China‘s current ICBM arsenal consists of approximately 20 first-generation ICBMs and approximately 30 solid-fueled, road-mobile second-generation ICBMs. China‘s future nuclear forces are likely to include additional second-generation ICBMs and possibly upgrades to allow its first generation ICBMs to carry multiple warheads.7 The 2011 report gave an updated estimate of 55-65 ICBMs and also noted that ―China may also be developing a new road- mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV).‖8 The Pentagon report also notes that ―the first of the new JIN-class (Type 094) SSBN appears ready, but the associated JL-2 SLBM appears to have encountered difficulty, failing several of what should have been the final round of flight tests. The date when the JIN-class SSBN/JL-2 SLBM combination will be operational is uncertain.‖9 Most observers expect these modernization efforts to produce both a quantitative expansion in the number of Chinese ICBMs and SLBMs that can reach the United States and qualitative improvements in the capabilities of Chinese missiles. The Pentagon report also notes that China is developing ―a range of technologies to attempt to counter U.S. and other militaries‘ ballistic missile defense systems, including maneuvering re- entry vehicles, MIRVs, decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. PRC official media also cites numerous Second Artillery Corps training exercises featuring maneuver, camouflage, and launch operations under simulated combat conditions, which are intended