BICOM Strategic Assessment Southern Syria: How to stop the Iranian plan for regional dominance Brig. Gen. (res.) Michael Herzog September 2017 EMBARGOED until 00.01hrs Thursday 28 September 2017 Key points existing military assets on the ground, which were originally deployed to fight ISIS, could . The July de-escalation agreement for southern be used to block Iran’s plans, rather than Syria agreed by Russia, the US and Jordan withdrawing them following the defeat of ISIS. spans across three southern governorates of They should also seek to foster cooperation Quneitra, Dar’a and Sweida’ and has generally with willing regional partners who are likely ensured relative quiet on the ground. On 18 concerned about Iran’s plans; adopt a stated July, Russian military police battalions were policy according to which any long-term deployed inside the zone, establishing check political solution to Syria should include the points and observation posts together with evacuation of all non-Syrian militias and Iran’s the Syrian army, as close as eight miles away military presence; seek common ground with from Israel’s border. Russia on limiting Iran’s military footprint in . While Jordan welcomed the return of the Syria; support Israel and Jordan’s demand Syrian regime to the border between the two to significantly distance Iran and its proxies countries, Israel has rejected the agreement, from their borders, while reconsidering the arguing that it ignores and implicitly accepts abandonment of some of the moderate rebel Iran’s design to fill the post-ISIS void, forces in these border areas. establishes a long-term presence in Syria and turn that theatre into an active military front against Israel. Introduction . Iran aims and is working to create a land corridor A trilateral agreement announced on 7 July stretching from Iran, through Iraq and Syria by the US, Russia and Jordan to turn the area to Lebanon and plans on long-term military of southern Syria bordering Israel and Jordan deployment in Syria for itself and its proxies into a de-escalation zone highlighted the little- and the building of underground factories in noticed fact that the situation on the ground Lebanon to manufacture accurate rockets for had escalated considerably since the beginning Hezbollah. Such a situation would amount of 2017. While most eyes were fixed on the to the creation of an Iranian sphere of direct developments in the northern parts of Syria, war influence in the heart of the Middle East and in has erupted and reached dangerous levels in the dangerous proximity to Israel. Israeli planners south of the country in Dar’a, the Yarmouk Basin, now believe that in a future war with Hezbollah the Quneitra governorate, and al-Badiya in the Israel could face Syrian and Lebanese theatres south-east (for more details see the Background as one front guided by a unified military logic. – Escalation in Southern Syria section of this paper). The southern Syrian arena has involved . In light of this Iranian strategy, Israel has military actions by numerous actors – an array extended its “red lines” in Syria. Israel initially of rebel groups, jihadists, the Syrian army, Iran focused on preventing the transfer of strategic and its Shiite proxies, Russia, Jordan and Israel – weapons to Hezbollah and the establishment facing one another in several sub-theatres. of an Iranian/pro-Iranian stronghold on Syria’s border with Israel. Recent reports that Israel This paper details the de-escalation agreement bombed a Syrian state facility in northern and analyses its potential significance for Syria’s Syria producing rockets and chemical neighbours Israel and Jordan, mapping their weapons indicate it is prepared to cast the concerns against the background of conflicting net wider to prevent advanced or chemical interests and strategies pursued by various weapons reaching Hezbollah. stakeholders. In particular, Israel’s public . While addressing the challenge of Iranian objection to this agreement sheds light on the influence in Syria requires a proactive broader context surrounding the situation in American strategy, it seems that the US southern Syria, namely, the concern that Iran is narrowly focused on defeating ISIS and and its proxies might fill the void created by beyond that goal has acceded to a dominant the upcoming defeat of ISIS and turn Syria into Russian role in Syria. For its part, Russia has a permanent political, military and economic so far respected Israel’s red lines, including in stronghold, threatening Israel and Jordan. the recent strike attributed to Israel in northern Syria. However, it is doubtful that it will go far beyond that to stop the Iranians in Syria. The de-escalation agreement and zone . The US and the UK should address the The de-escalation agreement (titled the Iranian regional challenge strategically. They “Memorandum of Principle for De-escalation in should carefully examine if and how their Southern Syria”) has not been published and 1 some of its details remain to be finalised. From g. Israel is not a party to the agreement, but what is known, it can be summarised as follows: was consulted throughout the process. That it was negatively surprised by the concluded a. Russia sponsored this agreement in the context text indicates that this process of consultation of its general initiative to establish a number was inadequate. of de-escalation zones in Syria under the Russian-led Astana political process for Syria, The agreement, which went into effect on 9 which comprised Russia, Iran and Turkey, July, has generally held on the ground, though including such a zone in southern Syria (one clashes between rebel groups and ISIS in the of four intended zones1). However, the current Yarmouk Basin erupted beginning the third agreement was designed by Russia, the US week of August. Meanwhile, under the umbrella and Jordan, since Jordan and Israel wanted to of the agreement, the Syrian army began exclude Iran and Turkey and include the US. symbolically demonstrating and practically asserting sovereignty in the south: Syrian units b. The zone spans across the three southern have shared positions with Russian units; the governorates (from west to east): Quneitra, Syrian Chief of Staff General Ali Ayoub visited Dar’a and Sweida’, encompassing over 10,000 Syrian units in the area on 1 August, including square km. The agreement establishes a in the outskirts of Quneitra near Israel’s border; cessation of hostilities in these areas and sets and Syrian army units expanded their control the stage for the provision of humanitarian along the Syria-Jordan border. In a watershed assistance and the return of refugees. development, in the second week of August, the c. Each of the parties will ensure that forces Syrian army assumed control of the important 3 under its influence will abide by the terms of Nasib Crossing on the border with Jordan, after the agreement: Russia vis-à-vis the Syrian more than two years of absence. regime, Iran, and Iranian proxies; the US and However, doubts abound about the agreement’s Jordan vis-à-vis rebel forces supported by them. long-term viability as it excludes the salafi-jihadi Excluded are the extreme Islamist elements on groups, opens space for the Syrian regime’s – and the ground; ISIS and al-Qaida-affiliated groups. potentially Iranian – ambitions in the south, and d. Russia agreed that all elements of “non- faces Israeli objections. Syrian” origin (implying Iranians, Hezbollah and other Shiite militias) will be distanced from the border area. However it is unclear Israel’s interests and policies how far away2 and under what exact terms. Establishing and implementing “red lines” According to Russian official statements, the e. Israel has been very careful not to be dragged US agreed to reaffirm the principle of Syria’s into the war in Syria. At the same time, Israel sovereignty and territorial integrity, and defined and articulated a number of “red lines,” implicitly accepted and legitimised Syrian whose potential crossing would trigger Israeli President Bashar al-Assad’s continued role military action in the Syrian theatre – and has as part of the political solution. repeatedly acted on them. The agreement will be monitored by Russian f. These “red lines” include the following: military police on the ground, as well as by a monitoring centre in Amman. On 18 July, Preventing and deterring cross-border terror Russian military police battalions were attacks and firing into Israel’s territory. Israel has deployed inside the zone, establishing check made it a point to respond to even unintended points and observation posts together with fire into its territory so as to remove the potential the Syrian army, as close as eight miles from temptation to target Israel. It has also occasionally Israel’s border. In late August, the Amman used these incidents to hit pro-Iranian/Syrian Center for Ceasefire Control in Southern regime operational infrastructure close to its border. Syria (AMC) was launched. Preventing the shipment of strategic “tie breaking” weapon systems – such as accurate 1 The Astana process produced an agreement (May surface-to-surface rockets, sophisticated 4, 2017) to establish four such zones, one of them in anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, and non- the sSouth of the country. Two more dDe-escalation zones were established as part of this process (through Egyptian mediation): one in northern Homs and one in 3 The Nasib Crossing is an international border crossing the Eastern Ghouta suburb of Damascus. along the Damascus-Amman highway, south of Dar’a, 2 Reports range from 20km to 40km. In the northern part and served as the key trade conduit between the two of the Golan Heights, where the Dar’a governorate is no countries. It was taken from the regime by rebel forces longer to its east, the Qunietra governorate is narrower in April 2015.