November 2007 Haiti: Real Progress, Real Fragility A Special Report by the Inter-American Dialogue and the Canadian Foundation for the Americas Haitian President René Préval says that working with the United Nations and other his country no longer deserves its “failed international partners – including a core state” stigma, and he is right. Haiti’s recent group of Latin American countries, the progress is real and profound, but it is United States and Canada – has achieved jeopardized by continued institutional modest but discernible progress in improv- dysfunction, including the government’s ing security and establishing, at least mini- inexperience in working with Parliament. mally, a democratic governing structure. There is an urgent need to create jobs, But institutions, both public and private, attract investment, overhaul and expand are woefully weak, and there has not been Haiti access to basic social services, and achieve significant economic advancement. Unem- tangible signs of economic recovery. Now ployment remains dangerously high and a that the United Nations has extended its majority of the population lives in extreme peacekeeping mandate until October 2008, poverty. Still, Haiti should be viewed today the international community must seek with guarded optimism. There is a real pos- ways to expand the Haitian state’s capacity sibility for the country to build towards a to absorb development aid and improve the better future. welfare of the population. The alternative could be dangerous backsliding. The Good News President René Préval was inaugurated in Haiti is beginning to emerge from the May 2006 following presidential and parlia- chaos that engulfed it in recent years. This mentary elections that were accepted as free is a moment of relative stability that pres- and fair by the international community, ents a window of opportunity for Haiti to and most importantly, by the great majority move towards a more sustainable path of of Haitians. Local and municipal elections economic growth, political development, were held in December of last year, com- and poverty reduction. But this is also a pleting Haiti’s electoral cycle and filling key period of fragility and continued vulnerabil- positions through the democratic process. ity, and further advancement is by no means During his first year in office, President assured. Préval, in his quiet and self-effacing way, has proven to be an effective leader. He has In February 2006, Haiti held its first elec- appointed competent ministers to criti- tions in five years, which brought to power cal posts, and reached across party lines to former President René Préval and restored bridge Haiti’s historic political polarization. elected rule for the first time since the Préval has forged alliances with moderate ouster of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand elements within Haiti’s civil society, politi- Aristide two years earlier. Over the past cal parties, and business sectors, while hold- eighteen months, the Haitian government, ing onto support from the Haitian poor, This report reflects the findings of a joint delegation to Haiti by the Inter-American Dialogue and the Canadian Foundation for the Americas that took place from July 29 to August 1, 2007. The authors express their appreciation to Lionel Delatour of CLED for his contribution to the trip and Caroline Lavoie of FOCAL for her assistance with the report. and maintaining the backing of the interna- progress has restored the confidence of the tional community. To date, Préval’s instincts Haitian population in the UN mission and have generally been democratic and inclu- increased support for the Haitian govern- sive, and he has made tough choices, includ- ment as a whole. But the new calm in Haiti ing the decision to confront the criminal will be hard to sustain; any reduction in gangs in Port-au-Prince. The government is UN forces without a substantial increase in still weak, however, and has limited capacity the Haitian police presence would lead to to set internal priorities and implement deci- a return of violence. Moreover, while Latin sions and policies. The government has little American countries continue to contribute evident experience in working with Parlia- the bulk of UN troops, many will eventually ment, and the Parliament itself remains seek to shift their focus from peacekeeping poorly organized and under-resourced. It to development. Haiti would benefit from has not adequately contributed to the gov- a strategy to manage that process over the erning process. long term. Préval has made Haiti’s security situation has markedly Haiti’s economy appears to be stabilizing tough choices, “ improved in recent months. This is largely after years of stagnation and decline. Haiti such as confronting due to more effective performance by the achieved a GDP growth rate of more than 9,100-troop strong United Nations Stabi- 2 percent last year, even though per capita the criminal gangs in lization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), growth remained negative. This year the Port-au-Prince. which entered the country more than three country’s growth rate will be more than 4 years ago. The UN Security Council has percent – barely above the rate of population ” extended the mandate of the peacekeeping increase but a move in the right direction. mission until October 15, 2008, with a total The uptick has been driven by an increase force of 7,060 military troops and 2,091 in foreign aid and remittances, and new U.S. police officers. This one-year renewal marks trade preferences passed last year may help MINUSTAH’s longest extension since the to sustain it. Haiti’s manufacturing sector is mission began, and is a welcome sign of the showing glimmers of revival. Haitian eco- international community’s continued com- nomic officials have established a favourable mitment to Haiti. Most importantly, last macroeconomic climate, cutting the inflation spring Préval supported efforts by UN forces from above 40 percent to below 10 percent to confront the gangs directly, particularly in and stabilizing Haiti’s currency. Despite the troubled Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods these gains, Haiti’s economy remains virtu- of Cité Soleil and Martissant. The Haitian ally stagnant on most fronts and plagued by National Police initiated a vetting process to widespread joblessness. Even with sustained examine officers’ records in detail, and hun- domestic leadership, it will take many years dreds suspected of corruption were purged of foreign assistance before Haiti can make while new recruits were selected and trained. its own economic way. The Haitian government’s political will Key Challenges to tackle the gangs, combined with better Some of Haiti’s most urgent political and social cooperation between the UN and the Hai- challenges are: tian National Police, has led to the capture or killing of major gang leaders and the n Strengthening Parliament and its Rela- re-establishment of a state presence in some tions with the Government. All of Haiti’s of the country’s most dangerous slums. This institutions remain weak. Haiti’s Parliament 2 Haiti: Real Progress, Real Fragility has neither the resources nor the experience the Coast Guard is totally inadequate. In to perform its legislative role. The president order to stem corruption, hundreds of police and administration have few mechanisms have been purged, mainly for gang involve- for dealing with Parliament. Political parties ment or human rights abuses. Officials hope are focused on personalities and localities that an increase in police salaries will help to and play no role in integrating the larger reduce graft. There are three bills pertaining population. These are inter-related problems to the modernization of the judicial system that need to be addressed together. The currently before Parliament, but the wider Haitian Parliament today acts as though breakdown in the justice system makes it its main role is to ratify or block execu- nearly impossible to prosecute police offi- tive action rather than to propose or shape cers, and most ordinary criminals go free as policy. Many parliamentarians lack staff, well. Conversely, many potentially innocent equipment, offices, and other infrastruc- people wait behind bars for their cases to ture. Some elected officials use their cars as be adjudicated. The need to train more offices. In August, a parliamentary vote of judges and improve physical infrastructure is Haiti’s political “no confidence” ousted President Préval’s extremely pressing. stability is threatened minister of culture and underscored the “ precarious and confrontational relations n The Potential for Constitutional Break- by the possibility of between the executive and the legislature. In down. The Haitian constitution mandates indefinitely postponed addition, while many individual parliamen- frequent national elections that place great tarians have impressive credentials and are financial and organizational strain on the elections. well-intentioned, others have sought elected government and the international com- office principally to gain parliamentary munity. The numerous and costly elections ” immunity that protects them from prosecu- required by the constitution are untenable tion for illegal activities. given the scarcity of resources available to the Haitian state. The constitution, for n The Haitian National Police and Admin- example, demands that 10 Haitian senators istration of Justice. The need to recruit face election in December (in addition to and train a new Haitian police force is a an eleventh senate seat left vacant when its core priority for the government and the occupant died in a car accident last winter). international community. The task is daunt- This would be Haiti’s sixth national election ing and the failure of similar efforts in the in an 18-month period, and the cost is esti- 1990s emphasizes the need for long-term mated to exceed US$15 million. Amend- engagement with this issue. Still, there is ing the constitution in order to streamline movement in the right direction. Today, the Haiti’s elections requires actions by three Haitian National Police (HNP) is com- successive parliaments.