Montecuccoli as an Opponent of the Hungarians 1 di Thomas M. Barker, State University of New York at Albany in Armi Antiche , numero speciale per il 6° Congresso dell’Associazione Internazionale dei Musei d’Armi e di Storia Militare, Zurigo, 15-20 maggio 1972. Armi Antiche è il bollettino annuale pubblicato dall’Accademia San Marciano di Torino (www.accademiasanmarciano.org ), che ha gentilmente concesso l’autorizzazione alla pubblicazione di questo articolo sulle pagine del sito www.montecuccoli.org. La traduzione italiana che segue è a cura di A. Ziggioto. Hungary in Montecuccoli’s times (Map by A. Ziggioto) L’Ungheria al tempo del Montecuccoli (Cartina di A. Ziggioto) I - A servant of the absolutist State Raimondo Montecuccoli (1609-1680) - victor of the crucial Battle of Szentgotthard-Mogersdorf (August 1, 1664), founder presumptive of the standing, professional army of the Habsburg monarchy and the most influential military thinker between Machiavelli and Clausewitz - does not appear to have been particularly inclined by nature to rancor, hatred and ethnic prejudice. His deep Italian roots notwithstanding (and, indeed, to some extent because of them), he was an internationally minded personality. His early, Humanist-colored schooling and his aborted studies for a career at the Curia provided him with both the far-ranging interests of the Renaissance tradition and the world-wide perspectives of the Roman Catholic Church. More than two decades of participation in the Thirty Years War as a member of the polyglot Imperial Army - in which he served “from the pike upward” and in which he managed to advance through a felicitous combination of physical bravery and skill in finding strategically-situated patrons - contributed further to his cosmopolitan frame of reference. No other background could have been as effective in stifling bigotry, save in matters of religion. If Montecuccoli never had much sympathy for Protestantism, he surely learned to judge men mainly on the basis of ability and performance. His 1 various theoretical writings, the final, revised versions of which are best read in the German edition of 1899-1900 due to the lack of critical Italian texts 2, bear witness to the searching, questioning, objective, in fact, empirically scientific cast of his intellect 3. Of particular relevance in the present context is his earliest extant treatise, Sulle Battaglie , written while he was in Swedish captivity between 1639 and 1641 and never published 4. The manuscript, the tone of which is more narrative and somewhat less schematic than his later works, does not contain a single, unflattering comment about Hungary, which is mentioned only in connection with the use of light cavalry, whose special functions the author much appreciated. In sharp contrast to the absence of any anti-Magyar sentiment in the utterances of the younger, relatively unknown cavalry colonel are the venomous outpourings of the older, very famous war minister ( Hofkriegs-ratpräsident ) and army commander (Generallieutenant ). In a memorandum prepared toward the end of his life for Emperor Leopold I, Montecuccoli gave vent to what can only be called ferocious resentment: “The Hungarians are proud, restless, fickle and obdurate. They retain the characteristics of the Scythians and the Tatars from whom they stem. They incline to boundless license, whence, without recognizing it, they make themselves slaves of the vices and injustices of whoever is stronger than they are... Nor do they omit affecting the behavior, language, raiment and customs of the Turks. Consequently their kingdom was never tranquil. Never did rebellions, insurrections and depravities cease. Never does one see a harmonious Diet, never did they have clear, distinct and observed laws. Wherefore whosoever can bring himself to tread upon the historical paths of merely the last two centuries - the more ancient period being extremely tedious - will perceive such a series of foreign and domestic wars, of betrayals and revolutions, of confusion and constant frivolities that the spirit of this nation appears to be nothing if not Protean. First they are amicable, and later they are hostile. At one time they are joyous, at another downcast. Or else they adjure something and then disavow it, involving themselves simultaneously in a thousand contradictions... The character of the Hungarians is so instable, stubborn, ungrateful, undisciplined and tumultuous that it is impossible to rule them according to reason. Nor can they be won over by graciousness and sweetness, nor governed by laws. A people always to be feared as it does not fear itself, for which reason its willfulness must be curbed with an iron rod and vigorously bridled” 5. Montecuccoli’s survey of the undeniably chaotic history of the Kingdom of Saint Stephen - accompanied by a precise delineation of the measures, political and military, necessary to bring that realm under the effective control of the Viennese government - was based upon most unhappy experiences there during the middle period of his life. The Italian general’s first, specifically political contact with Hungarians appears to have been as a member of the Royal entourage at the Diet of Pressburg (Pozsony, Bratislava) in 1655. His contemporary notations of what he observed make very clear the conflict between Vienna’s centralizing tendencies and the insistence of the Hungarian nobility upon the preservation of an archaic, feudo-political constitutional structure. They also stress the personal rivalries among the chief magnates, in particular the bitterness of the disappointed candidates for election to the office of Palatine ( Nádor )6. Montecuccoli, whose military reputation had been permanently established by the brilliantly conducted retreat from Zusmarshausen (Bavaria) in 1648 and whose skill as a diplomat was currently being demonstrated in dealings with the notoriously difficult Queen Christina of Sweden, may also have laid the basis for becoming an Hungarian citizen himself, for six years later he was accorded the indigenat 7. Moreover, it was probably around this time that he was enfeoffed in the County of Nyitra in the Vah River region of present-day Slovakia. These Hungarian holdings, which supplemented a relatively meager income from his inherited properties at Pavullo nel Frignano (including the ancient family castle) and in the Dunkelsteinerwald of Lower Austria, cannot have been especially lucrative. Not only was Montecuccoli soon drawn into new military adventures - the Nordic War of 1657-1660 - and thus unable to devote much attention to his recent acquisitions, but the Pannonian Basin itself was destined to be swept by a fresh wave of martial turmoil, which would result in wide-spread devastation 8. In any event, at least when 2 compared to other military leaders of the age, the Modenese Count does not appear to have been unduly concerned with the accumulation of riches. There are no grounds for considering him a peculator 9. It should be stressed that Montecuccoli was an individual whose political principles were firmly Imperialist and whose material well-being, however modestly pursued, was linked to the fortunes of a slowly-emerging Absolutist state 10 . He is an example par excellence of the new seventeenth century type of mercenary or condottiere , i.e., not an autonomous warrior but a loyal servant of an adoptive government. Since readily available military resources were essential to Absolutist goals, in the final analysis the Italian general’s role in the development of the Habsburg regular army may have been the most significant aspect of his activity in Austria. The fact that he and most of his comrades were non-natives was also a characteristic feature of the era. In view of the Wallenstein episode Vienna had particular reason to be wary of indigenous Feldherren 11 . Surrounded by his foreign paladins, the Emperor Ferdinand III could feel more secure in the presence of the stormy Magyar grandees. That Montecuccoli was unimpressed with the antics of what post-1945 Hungarian historians call with considerable justification the “feudal-exploiting class” is hardly surprizing. The Diet of 1655 was only a prelude. The real maelstrom began three years later and lasted until 1664 when the Treaty of Vasvár (Eisenburg) brought at least temporary and relative peace. It would be fruitless to attempt to sketch here even in summary from the vertiginous events of this epoch 12 . It will suffice to recall that Austria was dragged into another war with Turkey as a result of Istanbul’s intervention in the affairs of the Principality. The Viennese government was ultimately forced to respond to appeals from that stricken territory and from the notables of its own portion (i.e., Upper Hungary or Slovakia) of the trissected ancient Kingdom. The Turks, dominant in central and southern Hungary since 1526, appeared to have become too aggressive, to have exceeded the tacitly-recognized bounds of only locally ennervating border warfare and to be threatening the admittedly instable Habsburg power base in that part of Europe. As in the past, the Hungarians, facing the disastrous consequences of Ottoman expansionism and impotent by themselves, called upon their German neighbors, whom they despised only a little less than the Infidel. “Német mászlág, török áfium” (“German tripe, Turkish Opium”), so runs the Magyar proverb even today. After one year of fighting for the right of the Hungarian magnates to rack their serfs, an exasperated Montecuccoli remarked: “The Hungarians