i Cuban-American Cuba Visits: Public Policy, Private Practices1 Susan Eckstein2 and Lorena Barberia3 Executive Summary Since Fidel Castro came to power in 1959 Cubans have come to comprise one of the largest immigrant groups in the United States. As a proportion of Latin American immigrants Cubans comprised 4 percent in the 1990 census. However, they are more prominent than their numbers suggest because of their geographic concentration and political clout. Currently Washington allows island émigrés to visit family remaining in Cuba one time per year. They are one of the only groups subject to restrictive visitation rights. Cuban-Americans differ in their views toward the restrictions. Drawing upon interviews with Cuban-Americans in Florida and New Jersey and with Cubans, this study shows that the yearning to visit island family and the public stance on visitation rights vary among Cuban-American immigrant cohorts, although all Cuban émigrés value family dearly. First-wave émigrés, who came between 1959 and 1979, are more likely to oppose publicly transnational visits than islanders who emigrated since 1980. This is especially true among the Cuban-American leadership. First-wave émigrés, along with their now grown children, dominate, politically and economically, the main communities of Cuban-American settlement, and they wield the most influence in Washington. The leadership and their supporters oppose people-to-people ties across the Florida Straits for political and, from their vantage point, moral reasons. Vehemently anti-Castro, they believe that the more isolated Cuba is, the more likely it is that the government will fall. At the same time, they publicly downplay the value many émigrés, especially those who came to the U.S. since 1980, attach to visits to family left behind. Post-1980 émigrés by now constitute about half of the Cuban-American population. In contrast to earlier émigrés who consider themselves exiles, the recent arrivals more typically see themselves as immigrants. In moving to the United States, they do not want to break with family left behind and they do not oppose visiting Castro’s Cuba on moral grounds. And, unlike earlier émigrés, they typically still have a considerable number of close kin on the island. While preferring to visit openly and legally, in light of lingering hostile Cuban-American community pressures and their limited public involvements, they do so quietly and, depending on U.S. law, sometimes illegally. 1 The Mellon Report series, and the studies upon which they are based, are supported by a generous grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Supplementary support for the study was received from the Cuban Committee for Democracy. 2 Susan Eckstein is Professor of Sociology at Boston University. 3 Lorena Barberia is Cuba Program Associate at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University. ii Annual visits are reaching an all-time high, as an increasingly broad spectrum of Cuban- Americans wish to see family remaining in Cuba, as they realize that travelers are not chastised, as they heed the Pope’s call for the world to open up to Cuba, and as the Castro government has eased travel restrictions. Under the changed circumstances, Washington policy, rooted in the Cold War and responsive to continued first-wave Cuban-American leadership corps politics, pressures, and principles, is no longer suited to the contemporary reality. The restrictive visitation policy proves unenforceable, it fuels law evasion, it is inconsistent with the continued deep family commitments of an ever-larger émigré pool, and it is premised on an erroneous foreign policy logic. Transnational people-to-people ties, often unwittingly, are doing more to undermine the Cuban Communist political economy than cross-border family isolation. Washington would benefit by allowing more flexible visitation rights. Stepped up people-to- people contact would advance the civil society build-up goals of both the 1992 Cuban Democracy and the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democracy Solidarity Acts. A more flexible visitation policy might not immediately bring about the political and economic transformations Washington and many Cuban-Americans want. However, it would promote family values, reduce noncompliance with U.S. law, increase Cubans’ independence of the state, reduce hostilities between the closest of neighbors, and keep emigration pressures somewhat at bay by allowing families to remain in contact without fleeing the island and by allowing Cuban- Americans to help their island kin in need. 1 Cuban-American Cuba Visits: Public Policy, Private Practices1 Susan Eckstein2 and Lorena Barberia3 I. Introduction Nearly all aspects of Cuban society have changed since Castro took power in 1959, but Cuban commitment to family remains as strong as ever. What impact has emigration had on families divided by the revolution? Since 1994 Washington has permitted émigrés to visit Cuban kin a maximum of once a year. The Cuban-American leadership supports restrictions, on the presumption that they isolate the Castro regime and generate internal pressure for change. Based on a study of the two key Cuban-American communities, this report will show, however, that (1) the Cuban-American leadership, at best, is representative of first-wave exiles from Castro’s Cuba, not of émigrés since 1980 who constitute an ever larger portion of the Cuban-American community;4 (2) early and recent émigrés differ in their views toward island travel and in the amount of close family they still have in Cuba; and (3) Washington’s efforts to regulate travel are ineffective. Following a discussion of Cuban immigration history that led families to live apart, the report examines the evolution of the main Cuban-American communities and their leadership, U.S. and Cuban laws regulating émigré visits and their impact, reasons for visits, and the effect of visits on the people-to-people, community, and national levels. This report draws on U.S. and Cuban sources. It draws on interviews the authors conducted with a non-random sample of 64 community leaders and rank-and-file residents in the two main U.S. Cuban-American settlements: in Greater Miami Dade County (Florida) and Greater Union City Hudson County (New Jersey). It also draws on informal discussions with nearly 40 Cubans (ordinary islanders, scholars, and officials) about emigration and cross-border ties.5 II. Cuban Immigration History Cuban-Americans’ ties to their homeland must be understood in the context of Cuban-U.S. immigration history. Actual and coveted Cuban-American/Cuban contacts vary with the social, economic, and political background of émigrés, when and why they emigrated, and how much family they still have on the island. 1 The Mellon Report series, and the studies upon which they are based, are supported by a generous grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. Supplementary support for the study was received from the Cuban Committee for Democracy. 2 Susan Eckstein is Professor of Sociology at Boston University. 3 Lorena Barberia is Cuba Program Associate at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University. 4 The most significant divide within the Cuban-American community—socially, culturally, economically, and politically—is between those who left the island before and after 1980. We refer to the two cohorts as first- and second-wave émigrés, respectively. However, there are additional nuanced differences among émigrés who came in different years within each of the two waves. 5 Unless otherwise noted, quotes in the document come from these interviews. 2 U.S. law accounts only in part for Cuban immigration rates. Indeed, U.S.-Cuba immigration policy has changed over the years partly in response to conditions not of Washington’s making or choosing. U.S.-Cuba immigration policy has rested on lofty principles, on welcoming Communist victims. However, it came to be influenced by pressures from the emergent Cuban-American community, and, paradoxically, also by policies of the very island regime Washington sought to bring to heel. The Cold War led Washington to privilege Cuban immigration, and in so doing fueled the evolution of a well organized, economically successful Cuban-American community that continued to influence immigration and related policy after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, when fear of a Communist specter in the United States’ backyard ceased to guide Washington foreign policy. Cuban ties to the United States predate the revolution. Prior to 1959, Cubans came frequently and fairly freely to the States. Building on that tradition, Cubans discontent with Castro from the very beginning sought refuge on U.S. shores. Political exiles, mainly officials of the Batista government, came first. The Cuban upper class, and then others of the pre-Revolutionary business, professional, and middle class, soon joined them. This emigration represented a class exodus, in response to the radicalization of the revolution. Cubans who fled benefited from pre-existing Cold War legislation for global victims of Communism. The Walter-McCarran Act of 1952 offered preferential immigration status to Communist refugees. The Act contributed to over 200,000 islanders emigrating to the States between 1959 and 1962. Aspiring émigrés from other countries were less fortunate. At the time the Immigration and Naturalization Service typically set a cap of 20,000 persons per country. Several specific U.S. programs, in addition, privileged Cuban émigrés and facilitated their adjustment to the U.S. In particular, the Cuban Refugee Program, initiated in 1961 and in effect until 1973, provided a broad range of financial, educational, professional retraining, employment, and other services to incoming Cubans. Three-fourths of all émigrés benefited from the multifaceted program, with its budget of $957 million over the twelve-year period. Because Miami’s Dade County could not readily absorb the fast-growing immigrant population, one aspect of the Program (of only limited success) involved resettlement elsewhere. Then, in 1962, the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act granted most Cuban immigrants, regardless of their motives for coming, immediate refugee status.