53. Competing Conceptions of the Self in Kantian and Buddhist Moral Theories David Cummiskey 1. Introduction Kantians emphasize the separateness and distinctness of persons. Budd- hists, on the other hand, emphasize the interconnectedness and commonali- ty of all persons, and all forms of life. The starting point of Chinese Budd- hist ethics is the universality of suffering and the truth of interconnected- ness. For Kant, the autonomy of the will is the source of the dignity of humanity. For Buddhists, the core values are wisdom and compassion, and they too are thoroughly interconnected and interdependent. Since contemporary Kantians argue that the distinctness and separate- ness of persons is the key to a justification of deontological constraints, it is not clear how a Buddhist approach to ethics could incorporate such con- straints in its normative theory. This essay focuses on the contrasting con- ceptions of the self in Buddhist and Kantian theories and argues that the Buddhist conception of the self is incompatible with contemporary Kantian deontology. This raises a puzzle about the Buddhist justification for the prohibition on harming and killing. Our focus is on Chinese Tiantai (T’ien t’ai) Buddhism in particular, especially as represented by the Lotus Sutra and its doctrine of skilful means. In the end I conclude that a consequentialist virtue ethics, and an indirect consequentialist account of moral prohibitions (the precepts of Buddhism), provides the best interpretation of the Chinese Tiantai Budd- hist ethical systems. Many consider the Tiantai school of Buddhism to be the first distinctly Chinese sect of Buddhism and the Lotus Sutra the high- est teaching of Tiantai Buddhism. Although the interpretation offered here can be extended to all forms of Buddhism, the emphasis on the Lotus Sutra limits its textual basis to Chinese and East Asian Buddhism in particular. It should be emphasized, however, that the methodological approach of this essay is not a scholarly study of classic Buddhist texts. Buddhist moral psychology and its conception of the self are our interest and focus. Instead of a textual study of the Buddhist cultural tradition, this essay aims at a rational reconstruction of Chinese Tiantai Buddhist moral philosophy. What is the best, the philosophically most defensible, version of the tradi- tion? The goal is to explore the central concepts and develop an interpreta- tion that fits with the core concepts but is also independently plausible. 2. The Problem To begin, consider an interesting feature of all Buddhist ethics: the uncon- ditional constraints on harming any sentient creature. The first precept of Buddhist ethics is a prohibition on harming and killing. A commonplace of contemporary Western moral theory is that constraints are paradoxical in that they prohibit infringement of the constraint even when infringing it would prevent more harm.1 For example, one cannot kill to prevent kil- lings. One cannot violate a constraint to prevent more violations of that very constraint. The puzzle or paradox is why it is impermissible to minim- ize wrongs or killings. It would seem that if my killing is wrong, then kil- lings should not happen, and thus when all killing cannot be prevented, the less killing the better. Why is the focus on the agent’s action (do not kill) over and above what the agent can prevent from happening (even more killings)? A common answer to this question is to appeal to a Kantian conception of respect for persons to justify constraints. The idea roughly is that the wrong action is intrinsically wrong because it violates formal, rational constraints on justifiable action and/or that these agent-centered constraints reflect the special status of other persons as ends-in-themselves (and not 1 For discussion of the paradox of deontology, see Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982). means only). As Rawls first emphasized, Kantian constraints are based on taking seriously the distinctness and separateness of persons. Kantian ethics emphasizes the distinct dignity of persons, founded on autonomy of the will, thus setting humanity apart from the rest of nature. So here is our core question: without these types of Kantian foundations, what is the justi- fication for the Buddhist constrain on harming? Why is a Buddhist not allowed to harm to prevent more harm? It may seem that a simple solution involves extending Kantian respect to all sentient creation. It might be argued that Buddhism simply treats all sentient life as an end-in-itself: the interests of all creatures count morally, so Buddhism simply extends the scope of Kantian deontological con- straints. But this simple solution is clearly inadequate. To avoid a conse- quentialist interpretation of the Kantian idea that we should “treat persons as an end”, we need to focus on the alleged distinctness of humanity from the rest of creation, in particular on the separateness of persons as auto- nomous agents. A focus on promoting the interests of all simply does not justify deontological constraints, because the idea that “treating as an end” involves deontological constraints, rather than promoting interests, is itself based on the alleged distinctness of humanity from the rest of creation—in particular on the separateness of persons as autonomous agents each with distinct conceptions of the good. This is a common point of contact between otherwise diverse contem- porary Kantians. Robert Nozick, Thomas Nagel, Stephen Darwall, Chris- tine Korsgaard, David Velleman, Thomas Scanlon, Thomas Hill, Paul Hurley, Frances Kamm, and many more Kantian moralists have argued that a Kantian conception of agency is a necessary condition for con- straints. Consequentialists tend to agree that it may be necessary, but still object that it is not sufficient. On the other hand, Peter Singer and many others consequentialists have argued that a more basic respect for all sen- tient interests, based on the commonality of suffering, grounds consequen- tialism. Of course, consequentialists do support constraints on harming as es- sential means of promoting the overall good. In addition, consequentialists, like Buddhists, can also focus on character and motives. A consequentialist virtue ethicist claims that actions are right when they reflect the motives, character-traits, or virtues that (indirectly) lead to the best possible conse- quences. In the end, we will conclude that these alternative indirect conse- quentialist approaches provide a clear basis for a philosophically defensi- ble form of Buddhist virtue ethics. 3. The Buddhist Conception of the Self (and No-Self) Chinese Buddhist ethics focuses on character and moral psychology, and it thus has much in common with Aristotelian virtue ethics. The Buddhist conception of the self, however, is really at odds with an Aristotelian ap- proach. The Buddhist conception of the self is thoroughly anti-essentialist and really not at all Aristotelian. Indeed, the self in Buddhism is more akin to Hume’s bundle theory of the self. The self for the Buddhism is composed of five aggregates: (i) physical form, (ii) sense perception, (iii) emotions and feelings, (iv) cognition, and (v) consciousness; and these aggregates are embedded in the forces of karmic causality that cause rebirth itself. No core, or essential self, tran- scends and survives the flux of change and impermanence. The self, like everything else, exists only as a relational thing that is interconnected and thoroughly dependent on a web of relationships. The Doctrine of interdependent origination (or codependent arising) is the core metaphysical doctrine of Buddhism. It asserts that all of existence is essentially interrelated, interdependent, and interconnected. This is the heart of Buddhist philosophy: “One who sees interdependent origination sees the Dharma, and one who sees the Dharma sees the Buddha.”2 The Buddhist doctrine of no-self applies the doctrine of interdependent origina- tion to the self, and concludes that there is no essential enduring self. Al- though the causal integration and slow transformation of the elements of the self creates the illusion of an enduring self, the self is simply a momen- tary configuration of discreet, although causally codependent, changing elements. The self is essentially interrelated, interconnected, and interde- pendent on the rest of existence. There is really no unitary permanent self. Again, the self is constituted by physical form, sense perception, emotions and feelings, cognition, consciousness, and the forces of karmic causality that cause rebirth itself. It is the relation of these changing elements that 3 constitutes what we call the self, and nothing more. 2 Quoted by John S. Strong in The Experience of Buddhism, third edition (Florence, KY: Wadsworth, 2008), 109. I have learned much from Strong. 3 On the doctrine of no-self, see Steven Collins, Selfless Persons (Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, 1982). In Western philosophy these issues are explored in David Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, A Treatise on Human Nature (Oxford: The first small step on the long path to seeing the emptiness of the self involves recognizing human interdependence. Each person is dependent on and fundamentally connected to other people and to a particular communi- ty. Confucian ethics, with its focus on family and social relationships, is in this respect similar to Buddhist ethics. Buddhism and Confucianism in- volve a similar worldview, but Buddhism goes further. Buddhism extends relational thinking to all other persons and indeed, to all living things, and to the natural world. As a result, individualism, often considered the central insight of modern Western thought, is viewed as a fundamental delusion from the perspective of both Confucian and Buddhist thought. Confucian ethics focuses on our connection with our family and community. Budd- hism is based on a deeper and more pervasive connection between all things. Indeed, the conception of the interdependence of all beings, and an ideal of boundless compassion for all beings, replaces the relational re- sponsibilities of Confucian ethics.