Jump TO Article The article on the pages below is reprinted by permission from United Service (the journal of the Royal United Services Institute of New South Wales), which seeks to inform the defence and security debate in Australia and to bring an Australian perspective to that debate internationally. The Royal United Services Institute of New South Wales (RUSI NSW) has been promoting informed debate on defence and security issues since 1888. To receive quarterly copies of United Service and to obtain other significant benefits of RUSI NSW membership, please see our online Membership page: www.rusinsw.org.au/Membership Jump TO Article USI Vol61 No2 Jun10:USI Vol55 No4/2005 21/05/10 1:31 PM Page 24 CONTRIBUTED ESSAY Conflict in command during the Kokoda campaign of 1942: did General Blamey deserve the blame? Rowan Tracey General Sir Thomas Blamey was commander-in-chief of the Australian Military Forces during World War II. Tough and decisive, he did not resile from sacking ineffective senior commanders when the situation demanded. He has been widely criticised by more recent historians for his role in the sackings of Lieutenant-General S. F. Rowell, Major-General A. S. Allen and Brigadier A. W. Potts during the Kokoda Campaign of 1942. Rowan Tracey examines each sacking and concludes that Blameyʼs actions in each case were justified. On 16 September 1950, a small crowd assembled in High Command in Australia in 1942 the sunroom of the west wing of the Repatriation In September 1938, Blamey was appointed General Hospital at Heidelberg in Melbourne. The chairman of the Commonwealth’s Manpower group consisted of official military representatives, Committee and controller-general of recruiting on the wartime associates and personal guests of the central recommendation of Frederick Shedden, secretary of figure, who was wheelchair bound – Thomas Albert the Department of Defence, and with the assent of Blamey. Those present were concerned that Blamey’s ill Prime Minister Joseph Lyons. Menzies, who had health would not allow him to endure the ceremony that become prime minister after the death of Lyons, then was about to follow. Although the governor-general, Sir appointed Blamey as the Army’s national commander. William McKell, and the prime minister, Robert Blamey was promoted to lieutenant-general in October Menzies, were late in arriving from the airport to 1939. His selection caused discontent among aspiring present Blamey with the baton of a field marshal of the militia and regular senior officers. The decision was British Army, Blamey’s strength held out and he was based on the government’s view that Blamey would able to accept the baton from the governor-general. resolve the inherent political-military issues that would This minor but historic ceremony recognised Blamey’s arise in operating with the British better than any other service to Australia and he remains Australia’s highest officer (Dennis et al. 2008, 91). This was shown clearly ranking soldier. when he resisted pressure from his British superior Despite the recognition of Blamey by the Australian officers to disperse elements of the Australian force to Government, his reputation has suffered in recent meet their perceived needs; and he insisted that the years. Accompanying the increased interest in the battle weary 9th Division be rested after their fighting at Kokoda campaign in Australia, numerous books and Tobruk, which was opposed by the British. articles have been published on the subject. In Following the outbreak of war in the Pacific, Blamey otherwise balanced histories, Blamey has come under returned to Australia from the Middle East. Despite scathing criticism. On the other hand, the performance having few supporters in the governing Labor Party, of other key participants has received little or no Prime Minister John Curtin appointed him Commander- scrutiny. At the time of the withdrawal of the Australian in-Chief, Australian Military Forces, in March 1942. troops along the Kokoda Trail1 in New Guinea2, the Curtin knew that there was no other senior officer who senior commanders were Lieutenant-General Sydney could match Blamey in the position (Maitland 2005, 14). Rowell (1st Australian Corps), Major-General Arthur For months after the Japanese entered World War II, Allen (7th Division) and Brigadier Arnold Potts the Australian government clung to the view that its (Maroubra Force, 21st Brigade). All three officers were defence needs would be met by Great Britain and the relieved of their commands, but under different United States. When the government decided to return circumstances. troops from the Middle East to defend Australia, Curtin’s disagreement with the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, over the issue, led some observers to think 1“Kokoda Trail” is the official name. “Kokoda Track” is also used synonymously, both in published works and the Australian that Curtin was headed for another breakdown in health vernacular. (Day 2003, 287). The reputation of Curtin as a great 2This term is used throughout the essay to describe both the Territory wartime prime minister hinged on his insistence that 6th of Papua and the Mandated Territory of New Guinea which came and 7th Divisions return to Australia. However, when the under military authority on 14 February 1942 when the civil administration was suspended. United States moved General Douglas MacArthur to Page 24 United Service 61 (2) June 2010 USI Vol61 No2 Jun10:USI Vol55 No4/2005 21/05/10 1:31 PM Page 25 Australia in March 1942 to become the Commander-in- of action, MacArthur excluded Australians by saying Chief, South-West Pacific Area, he was given that there were no suitable senior officers available operational control of Australia’s armed forces and (Thompson 2008, 289). All eleven senior positions on control of the media. This directly undermined the headquarters were filled by United States officers, Australia’s national interest and sovereignty. The eight of whom came with MacArthur from the Australian government was only too aware of this Philippines. The ‘Bataan gang’, as they became known, important issue from its experience in the Great War controlled the war, but remained in profound ignorance and when Blamey deployed to the Middle East in 1940, of the conditions the Australian soldiers faced in New he was given a charter setting out his responsibilities to Guinea. MacArthur’s overriding concern was in his the government as well as to its allies. Also, Curtin set rivalry with the United States Navy in waging the war up the War Conference comprising himself, MacArthur against the Japanese in the Pacific. Through his control and Shedden. Despite being the Australian of the media, MacArthur ensured that Blamey and the government’s principal wartime advisor, Blamey was Australian forces received little credit for their fighting in excluded from these discussions. In consequence, he New Guinea and in the islands further north. The had to take a strong stand with Curtin to get direct Japanese landings on the north coast of New Guinea in access to the prime minister. In fact, Curtin had made it July 1942 and their subsequent advance south along plain to MacArthur that if high level war policy needed the Kokoda Trail placed the Australian government in a to be discussed in his absence, Shedden had his full state of panic. confidence. Blamey should be used on an ‘as needed’ basis (Gallaway 2000, 74). And what background did Lieutenant-General S. F. Rowell Shedden have to place him in a position above all the One of Curtin’s Ministers, service chiefs in matters of war policy in Curtin’s mind? John Beasley, told cabinet Shedden had spent six months in the Great War as a colleagues that if Port Moresby lieutenant in the pay corps and later he had attended was to fall, Blamey should be the Imperial Defence College. This was a government there and fall with it (Carlyon displaying the hallmarks of inexperience and lacking a 1980, 104). Curtin was a measured response to the Japanese threat. It made troubled man. During a meeting Blamey’s work even more difficult. with him on 17 September 1942, The lack of proficiency of the Australian government MacArthur expressed the view was mirrored in the behaviour of Australia’s senior that Blamey should go to New AWM - 026582 officers. Many writers have concentrated on the schism Guinea to ‘energise the situation’. Curtin did not between officers of the militia and officers of the staff question MacArthur’s advice and told Blamey of his corps as the basis for disagreement. But this is far too decision. Blamey reminded Curtin that he had recently simplistic. In the “generals’ plot” of March 1942 for visited New Guinea and that Rowell had the situation example, the officers who approached the Minister for under control. Further, it was not possible for him to the Army, Frank Forde, to change the Army’s senior carry out his wide span of responsibilities in Australia leadership, were a mixture of militia and staff corps. from Port Moresby. Curtin’s decision did not change and Differences between senior officers caused by on 22 September 1942 he telephoned Blamey to tell personality traits and varying social backgrounds had him that he should not remain in Brisbane for another already emerged in the campaigns fought in the Middle day (Day 2003, 395). East (e.g. Braga 2004, 91). These officers were Awaiting Blamey at Port Moresby’s Seven-Mile motivated by pursuing their own advancement and airfield was his corps commander, Lieutenant-General showed no reluctance in maligning their fellow officers, Sydney Rowell. Two days prior to his arrival in New whether militia or staff corps. Rivalries between senior Guinea, Blamey sent a letter to Rowell by safe hand, officers led some observers to comment on whether explaining the reasons for his return so soon after his their main efforts were being directed at the enemy or previous visit.