From Guardianship to Civilian Control: How did the Turkish Military get here Kutay, Acar Published in: Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law DOI: 10.23932/2542-0240 -2017-10-3-68-82 Publication date: 2017 Citation for published version (APA): Kutay, A. (2017). From Guardianship to Civilian Control: How did the Turkish Military get here. Outlines of Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, Law, 10(3), 68-82. https://doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240 -2017-10-3-68-82 Download date: 26. Sep. 2021 Outlines Of glObal transfOrmatiOns VOlume 10, number 3, 2017 Азия: вызовы и перспективы1 DOI: 10.23932/2542-0240 -2017-10-3-68-82 Acar KUTAY Eastern Mediterranean University 10, Mersin St, Famagusta, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 5000 [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0003-1403-9195 From Guardianship to Civilian Control: How Did the Turkish Military Get Here? ABSTRACT. This article examines how civil- that the Turkish government made to civilian- ian-military relations in Turkey have trans- military relations and to the organizational formed from a guardianship of the military structure of the armed forces after the recent to civilian control. To this end, it covers the failed coup attempt. following issues. It surveys the ways in which the military has instituted its influence over KEYWORDS: civil-military relations, mili- civilians from the 1960 military coup up until tary forces, guardianship, civilian control, coup the early 2000s. It elaborates major events and d’etat, Turkey processes that took place during the 2000s un- der the AKP governments. Then, the paper de- FOR CITATION: Kutay A� (2017 From scribes the reasons behind the failed coup at- Guardianship to Civilian Control: How did tempt of July 15, 2016, before concluding with the Turkish Military get here? Outlines of a discussion of the implications of the coup global transformations: politics, economics, attempt. There will be both immediate and law, 10 (3)� 68-82� DOI: 10�23932/2542-0240 long-term implications of the radical changes -2017-10-3-68-82 68 Контуры глобальных трансформаций том 10, номер 3, 2017 Азия: вызовы и перспективы1 DOI: 10.23932/2542-0240 -2017-10-3-68-82 Акар КУТАЙ Восточно-Средиземноморский Университет Мерсин ул., 10, Фамагуста, 5000, Турецкая Республика Северного Кипра [email protected] ORCID: 0000-0003-1403-9195 Oт опеки к гражданскому контролю: как изменилась роль турецкой армии? АННОТАЦИЯ. В статье рассматривает- изменилась роль турецкой армии? Кон- ся трансформация военно-гражданских от- туры глобальных трансформаций: поли- ношений в Турции на пути от опеки со сто- тика, экономика, право, 10 (3)� 68-82� DOI: роны армии к гражданскому контролю. Для 10�23932/2542-0240 -2017-10-3-68-82 того чтобы произвести подобный анализ, в статье рассмотрены следующие аспекты проблемы. Автор описывает пути, по ко- Introduction торым проходила институционализация военного влияния на граждан, начиная от The coup attempt on July 15, 2016, was военного переворота 1960 г. и заканчивая startling� For the first time in history, an ex- анализом событий начала 2000-х гг. В рабо- tension of a clandestine group, the Gulenists – те приведен ряд важнейших событий и про- officially described as the Fethullah Terrorist цессов, протекавших в 2000-х гг., во время Organization (FETO) – intended to stage правления Партии справедливости и раз- a coup� This event was shocking because no вития. Затем автор рассматривает при- one could estimate the power of a secret or- чины неудачи военного переворота 15 июля ganization within the army that has long been 2016 г., что позволило также сделать вывод reputed of holding and protecting secular о влиянии попытки переворота в целом. values� The failed coup attempt was not the Радикальные действия турецкого прави- first time in modern Turkish history that the тельства станут причиной как серьезных military had planned to take over political краткосрочных, так и долгосрочных изме- power� However, the recent failed coup at- нений в гражданско-военных отношениях tempt was remarkably different from previous Турции, равно как и в самой организацион- experiences� The military has intervened four ной структуре военных сил после недавней times since the commencement of democratic неудачной попытки переворота. elections so as to restore peace and maintain secular values� But these interventions were КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: военно-гражданские not plotted by a secret organization or faction� отношения, армия, опека, гражданский The presence of such factions has always been контроль, военный переворот, Турция inconceivable because Turkish officer corps have come to be trained in accordance with ДЛЯ ЦИТИРОВАНИЯ: Кутай А� (2017)� Kemalism and secular values (Jenkins, 2005)� От опеки к гражданскому контролю: как Soldiers have seen themselves as being above 69 Outlines Of glObal transfOrmatiOns VOlume 10, number 3, 2017 politics and political factions (Jacoby, 2003)� Janowitz (Janowitz, 1960) argued that Instead, they have embodied a guardianship Huntington’s approach could best capture role in order to protect the ethos of modern- the changes in the military identity� On his ization and secularism from domestic and account, the military could not be isolated external threats (Hale, 2011)� Officers have from the values and norms of the rest of not always followed the chain of command society� If society constantly changes, the in their interventions1� But the overall in- military must also adapt to such changes� tegrity and discipline of the army has never Because the military is a conservative in- been disrupted� So how has such a dramatic stitution, it might be difficult for the armed change occurred? How might the revolution- forces to follow the changes that take place in ary changes adopted by the government after society� The solution, then, is to narrow the the failed coup influence the military and gap between the military and armed forces� civilian-military relations? This paper aims to One way of achieving this, for example, is to shed some light on this question� break the monopoly of military academies To start with, civilian-military relations – by creating Reserve Training Officer Train- not merely in the Turkish case, but in gener- ing Corps at universities� al – represent a paradox� As Feaver suggests, Turkish armed forces gained autonomy in “The very institution created to protect the the 1950s after Turkey became a member of the polity is given sufficient power to become a NATO� Such autonomy strengthened the divi- threat to the polity” (Feaver, 1999, p� 214)� sion between the military and civilian spheres, Until recently, two fundamental works have as soldiers grew into an independent class, dominated civilian-military relations: Samuel separate from the rest of the society� Soldiers Huntington’s The Soldier and the State and could also have autonomy in controlling their Morris Janowitz’s (Janowitz, 1960) The Profes- own organizational structure� What is more, sional Soldier� Huntington was a political sci- the Turkish military intervened in politics and entist, and he focused on how it was possible exerted influence on the shape of governments� to establish civilian control over the military� That is, professionalism did not bring about Janowitz was a sociologist; he studied cultural objective control of the military (Stepan, 1988)� aspects affecting the military identity and the Since 2002, Turkey has tended to control relationship between soldiers and civilians� the military by following remedies addressed in Huntington (Huntington, 1957) stated the literature (Feaver, 1999, p� 225–230)� In line that there could be two methods of controlling with Turkey’s bid for EU membership, the AKP the military: subjective or objective control� governments accepted several constitutional Subjective control refers to civilian command and administrative restraints to curtail the legal over the details of the organizational struc- grounds of the military power� However, these ture� Such control intends to make the armed were not sufficient to prevent word of mouth forces more like a civilian agency, as it eradi- spreading about the military discontent with cates the autonomy of the military by making the AKP governments during the 2000s and promotions reliant on political contacts with the onset of the July 15 coup attempt� There- the governing political party� In contrast, ob- fore, the government adopted new methods� It jective control aims to keep the civilian and deployed the military away from the political military spheres separate by giving autonomy centres and cities� Civilians took measures to to the military in terms of steering their own divide loyalties in the army by creating parallel organizational and bureaucratic structure� chains of command� They removed the coast Such autonomy would be best achieved by guard and gendarmerie from the military and professionalization in the army� included them as countervailing institutions to 1 in 1960, the military did not follow the chain of command. 70 Контуры глобальных трансформаций том 10, номер 3, 2017 the interior ministry� In addition to these ef- its guardianship (Demirel, 2004)� The Turkish forts that focus on reducing the ability of the Republic was proclaimed after a war of inde- military, the government also intends to reduce pendence and the victorious Turkish military the disposition of the military to intervene� acquired substantial prestige in the eyes of This is to be achieved by recruiting personnel the people since the early days of the republic who