Notes Introduction 1. Cooper (1979, 152–53). 2. In the vast literature that emerged in response to September 11, 2001, the gendering of both terrorist practice and terrorist subjectivity has gone largely ignored, reflecting a more generalized neglect of the study of the gendering of terrorism. The small number of feminist and queer analyses of terrorism include, for example, Hawthorne and Winter, eds. (2002); Morgan (2001); and Puar (2007). 3. Cooper (1979, 152–53). 4. I Shot Andy Warhol, directed by Mary Harron (Los Angeles: Orion Pictures/Samuel Goldwyn Company, 1996), 35mm film. 5. Soliah’s sentence was passed down amid the human rights scandal concerning the extraterritorial detention center at Guantanamo Bay. 6. Guerrilla: The Taking of Patty Hearst, directed by Robert Stone (New York: Magnolia Pictures/New Video Group, 2003) 35mm film;The Weather Underground, directed by Sam Green and Bill Siegel (Sausalito, CA: Roco Films, 2002), 35mm film. Guerrilla represents Patricia Hearst’s terrorist metamorphosis, which is discussed in detail later in this book. 7. Berendse and Cornils (2008, 7). 8. Berendse and Cornils (2008, 14). 9. I have placed “radically unfamiliar” in quotation marks here because, although the events of September 11 were most often encoded in dominant cultural representa- tions as “extra-ordinary” and “unfamiliar,” part of terrorism’s ability to generate affect lies in its invocation of the “familiar” Western imagining of the end of society (see Chapter Four). 10. For example, Cronin and Ludes, eds. (2004) collate the views of “some of the world’s finest experts, people who have made the study of this rising menace their life’s work” (“Attacking Terrorism,” Georgetown University Press online, accessed 28 March 2014, http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/attacking- terrorism); and Rapoport, ed. (2005), is a four-volume set that reprints historical literature on terrorism. For further examples, see also: Jenkins (2003); Hoffman (2006); Laqueur (2001, 2004a, and 2004b); Cooper and Redlinger (2006); Rapoport, ed. (2001); Rapoport and Weinberg, eds. (2001); Wilkinson (2006); and Nye et al. (2003). 11. Zwerman (1992, 140). 174 ● Notes 12. Herman and O’Sullivan (1989). 13. In many places in his work, Bauman theorizes modernity as a project of constructing order. See, for example, Bauman (2001c). 1 Conceptualizing Terrorism 1. Johnson (1978, 268). 2. Horowitz (1983, 38–39). Horowitz here refers to “external guerrilla power”: acts of terrorism “from below” that are “external” and therefore threatening to the institu- tions of the state. 3. Quainton (1983, 53). 4. Laqueur (1977); Freedman and Alexander, eds. (1983); Crenshaw, ed. (1983b). 5. See, for example, Barnhurst (1991); Jenkins (2003); and Crenshaw (1983a, 1–37). 6. Jenkins (2003, 18). 7. Jenkins (2003, 18). 8. Jenkins (2003, 18). 9. Jenkins (2003, 18). 10. Jenkins (2003, 17). 11. Laqueur (1978, 262). 12. Laqueur (1978, 262). 13. Hage (2003, 126). 14. Jenkins (2003, 18). 15. Jenkins (2003, 18). 16. Borradori (2003c, xiii). 17. This approach is informed by Jacques Derrida’s observation that “the most pow- erful and destructive appropriation of terrorism is precisely its use as a self- evident concept by all the parties involved” (Borradori, 2003b, 152). As Borradori suggests, “the deconstruction of the notion of terrorism is the only politically responsible course of action because the public use of it, as if it were a self-evident notion, perversely helps the terrorist cause” (Borradori, 2003c, xiii). 18. Freedman (1983, 3) (my emphasis). See also Tuman (2003, 5) and Schmid and de Graaf (1982, 15). 19. See, for example, Tuman (2003); Alexander and Picard, eds. (1991); Nacos (1994); Combs (2003); and Alali and Eke, eds. (1991). 20. Schmid and de Graaf (1982, 9). 21. Schmid and de Graaf (1982, 14). 22. Schmid and de Graaf (1982, 15). 23. Schmid and de Graaf (1982, 15). 24. See, for example, McQuail (2000, 52–53), for a description of this model as the “transmission model”; and Schirato and Yell (1996, 1–21), for a discussion of this model as the “process model.” 25. This model of communication has been a useful ally of the media effects tradi- tion, which has historically sought to draw conclusions about audience responses to messages based on content analyses of media texts. Notes ● 175 26. McQuail (1982, ii). 27. See, for example, Ang (1991) and Seiter (1999). 28. Schmid and de Graaf (1982, 15). 29. While Schmid and de Graaf conceptualize the audience as the “public” in the quotation above, I am referring to both terrorism’s popular and its “official” audiences. 30. Gupta (2002, 14–15). 31. Gupta (2002, 15) (my emphasis). 32. Baudrillard (2002, 30). See also Debord (1994). 33. Baudrillard (2002, 6). 34. Cooper (1979, 150). 35. Derrida in Borradori (2003a, 107). 36. Borradori (2003b, 139). 37. Derrida in Borradori (2003a, 91). 38. All forms of “violence” and “criminality” can be understood as forms of commu- nication. See, for example, Bardsley (1987). However, in the case of terrorism, the communicative dimension is explicitly foregrounded. 39. Baudrillard (2002, 5). 40. Baudrillard (2002, 5). 41. Borradori (2003b, 148). 42. Terdiman (1985, 57). 43. Foucault (1977a, 27). See also Hall (1997). 44. O’Sullivan et al. (1994, 93). 45. Hall (1997, 44). 46. Foucault (1977b, 200). 47. Said (1986, 153). 48. Throughout this book, when I refer to “dominant discourse,” I draw upon Terdiman’s definition. 49. Terdiman (1985, 93). 50. Terdiman (1985, 92–93). 51. Hall (1997, 50). 52. Terdiman (1985, 78). 53. Terdiman (1985, 87). 54. For example, Laqueur, perhaps the preeminent scholar on terrorism, whose 1977 text, Terrorism, has been a touchstone for many analyses of terrorism, has recently published The New Terrorism (Laqueur, 1999), History of Terrorism (Laqueur, 2001), No End to War (Laqueur, 2004a), and Voices of Terror (Laqueur, 2004b). See also Jenkins (2003) and Hoffman (2006). 55. Here I distinguish between the “traditional political economy” approach and the “critical political economy” approach. For an elaboration of the differences, see Golding and Murdock (1991). 56. Herman and O’Sullivan (1989, 55). 57. Herman and O’Sullivan (1989, 55). 58. Zwerman (1992, 136). 176 ● Notes 59. Zwerman (1992, 136). 60. Herman and O’Sullivan (1989, 8). 61. Zwerman (1992, 136). 62. Zwerman (1992, 134). 63. Jenkins (2003, 139). 64. Jenkins (2003, 150). 65. Jenkins (2003, 18). 66. MacDonald (1991, 2). 67. Townshend (2002, 2). 68. Hage (2003, 126). 69. That is, disproportionate given that terrorism has historically directly affected very small numbers of victims. As Charles Townshend notes, “something about terrorism makes its threat inflate, genie-like, way beyond its actual physical scale . [However] the physical threat posed by terrorism [is] dwarfed by other more quotidian dangers” (2002, 2). See also Laqueur (1978, 5). 70. Jenkins (2003, 27). 71. Laqueur (1977, 79). 72. Cruise O’Brien (1983, 91). 73. Jenkins (2003, 25) (my emphasis). 74. Hage (2003, 127). 75. Giddens (1985, 121). 76. Herman and O’Sullivan (1989, 44) (my emphasis). 77. Dror (1983, 68) (my emphasis). 78. Horowitz (1983, 49). 79. Herman and O’Sullivan (1989, 38). 80. Laqueur (1977, 7). 81. This idea echoes Rubenstein’s claim that terrorism results from “a widening gap between a group’s ‘value expectations’ and the political system’s ‘value capabili- ties.’” (1989, 308–09). 82. Laqueur (1977, 11) (my emphasis). 83. See also Herman and O’Sullivan (1989). When this literature refers to “democ- racy,” it does not typically distinguish between the different forms of democracy that exist globally. 84. Herman and O’Sullivan (1989, 42). 85. Herman and O’Sullivan (1989, 39). 86. Even where scholars acknowledge that terrorism is not necessarily the sole preserve of nonstate actors, it is nonetheless conceptualized in relation to the political institution of the state. See, for example, Bassiouni (1983, 178). 87. Jenkins (2003, 28). 88. Jenkins (2003, 28). 89. Jenkins (2003, 28). 90. Crenshaw (1983a, 1–37). 91. However, it needs to be acknowledged that not all states are understood as beyond terrorism. Indeed, Western terrorism studies has often emphasized the terroristic Notes ● 177 tendencies of communist and fascist nation-states. However, democratic states are usually positioned as the expression of popular political will, and hence outside the potential to be labeled “terrorist.” 92. Terdiman (1985, 63) (my emphasis). 93. Terdiman (1985, 78). 94. Terdiman (1985, 58). 95. Terdiman (1985, 79). 2 Constructing the Terrorist: The Threat from Within 1. Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit (1999, 4–5). 2. See, for example, MacDonald (1991); Zwerman (1992); and Greenhalgh (1990). 3. Elshtain (1987, 169). 4. Wilkinson (1978, 241–42). 5. As Hall has noted, “discourse itself produces ‘subjects’—figures who personify the particular forms of knowledge which the discourse produces” (1997, 56). 6. For this definition, see Jenkins (2003, 28). 7. Laqueur (1977). 8. Hage (2003, 126). 9. Wilkinson (1978, 241). 10. Johnson (1978, 274). 11. Freedman (1983, 3) (my emphasis). 12. Laqueur (1978, 256–57). 13. Laqueur (1978, 257). 14. Laqueur (1977, 125). 15. Zwerman (1992, 134). 16. Zwerman (1992, 134). 17. Jenkins (2003, 151) (my emphasis). 18. Hozic (1990, 73). 19. Hozic (1990, 73). 20. Hozic (1990, 73). 21. Hozic (1990, 78). The kidnapping of Aldo Moro by the Italian Brigate Rosse in 1978 is one example of the ways this plays out. See Wagner-Pacifici (1986). 22. Rubenstein (1989, 310). 23. Hocking (1988, 94). 24.