INTERNATIONAL LUXEMBOURG FORUM ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE THE LIMITS OF SECURE NUCLEAR TOLERANCE EDITED BY DR. VIATCHESLAV KANTOR PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LUXEMBOURG FORUM ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE MOSCOW 2014 1 THE LIMITS OF SECURE NUCLEAR TOLERANCE 2 3 INTERNATIONAL LUXEMBOURG FORUM ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE THE LIMITS OF SECURE NUCLEAR TOLERANCE EDITED BY DR. VIATCHESLAV KANTOR PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LUXEMBOURG FORUM ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE MOSCOW 2014 THE LIMITS OF SECURE NUCLEAR TOLERANCE ON SECURE NUCLEAR TOLERANCE . TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 9. I. GENERAL CHALLENGES OF SECURE NUCLEAR TOLERANCE...................11 1.1..Constructing.a.Secure.Nuclear.Tolerance.System.(V..Kantor).........12 The Limits of Secure Nuclear Tolerance/Ed..by.V..Kantor..National.Institute. of.Corporate.Reform..M,.2014..160.pages. 1.2..The.Role.of.the.Security.Council.and.the.IAEA.. ISBN.978-5-906532-05-3 in.the.Strengthening.of.Nuclear.Nonproliferation.(R..Ekeus)..........21 . In.this.book.world.renowned.experts.from.different.countries.analyze.the.important.issue. of.secure.nuclear.tolerance..They.propose.a.set.of.criteria.to.identify.the.non-declared.activ- 1.3..Criteria.for.the.Assessment.of.Undeclared.Nuclear.Weapons. ity.of.states.aimed.at.developing.nuclear.weapons..Those.criteria.may.be.potentially.applied. Development.(A..Levite).......................................................................29 by.the.IAEA.and.the.UN.Security.Council.to.determine.the.real.nature.and.purposes.of.NPT. Member.States’.nuclear.programs..The.expert.study.was.initiated.and.conducted.under.the. 1.4..Assessing.and.Minimizing.Proliferation.Risk.(J..Carlson).................34 auspices.of.the.International.Luxembourg.Forum.on.Preventing.Nuclear.Catastrophe. The.book.is.intended.for.specialists.in.international.relations,.arms.control.and.security. 1.5..Nuclear.Latency.and.Indicators.of.Nuclear.Weaponization.. issues. (T..Rauf)..................................................................................................50 ..................................................... II. TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT.............63 The official website of the International Luxembourg Forum: www.luxembourgforum.org 2.1..Nuclear.Weapons.and.Delivery.Vehicles.(V..Dvorkin).....................64 . 2.2..Problems.of.Monitoring.Nuclear.Power.Energetics.. ISBN.978-5-906532-05-3 in.Non-Nuclear-Weapon.States.(A..Diakov)......................................70 2.3..Technological.and.Industrial.Potential.as.a.Precondition.for.the. Creation.of.Nuclear.Weapons.(A..Khlopkov).....................................82 2.4..Scientific,.Technical,.and.Industrial.Potential.as.a.Precondition.. ©.International.Luxembourg.Forum.. for.Nuclear.Weapons.Development.(J..Carlson)................................88 on.Preventing.Nuclear.Catastrophe,.2014 2 3 THE LIMITS OF SECURE NUCLEAR TOLERANCE ON SECURE NUCLEAR TOLERANCE III. AnalyzING THE EXPERIENCE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL NUCLEAR PROGRAMS.............................................................93 ON SECURE 3.1..North.Korea’s.Special.Path.to.Nuclear.Weapons.(A..Diakov)..........94 NUCLEAR TOLERANCE 3.2..Iran’s.Growing.Nuclear.Weapons.Capability.(M..Fitzpatrick).......102 3.3..The.Experience.of.India.and.Pakistan.Creating.Nuclear.Weapons.. Views of the Members of the Supervisory Board (P..Topychkanov)................................................................................112 of the International Luxembourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe IV. ADDITIONAL MEASURES to SUPPORT SECURE NUCLEAR TOLERANCE ................................................. 123 4.1..Clarifying.the.Right.to.Withdraw.from.the.NPT.(A..Arbatov).........124 ROLF EKEUS . Ambassador.Rolf.Ekeus. Member of the Supervisory presented.the.Chapter. 4.2..Improving.Nuclear.Weapons.Delivery.Vehicle.Nonproliferation. Board, International Luxem­ “The.Role.of.the.Security. Council.and.the.IAEA. Regimes.(S..Oznobishchev)................................................................139 bourg Forum on Preventing Nuclear Catastrophe; in.the.Strengthening.of. Ambassador (former High Nuclear.Nonproliferation”. CONCLUSION..................................................................................................149 Commissioner on National for.this.book. Minorities at the OSCE; Chairman of the Governing ABOUT THE International LUXEMBOURG FORUM Board, SIPRI; Sweden). ON PREVENTING NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE................................................155. the.question.of.how.tolerant. The.issues.here.are.quite. the.international.commu- complex..It.is.not.difficult. nity.can.afford.to.be.when.it. to.identify.a.set.of.objec- comes.to.non-nuclear.coun- tive.criteria.as.to.whether. tries.developing.capabilities. a.given.country.has,.or.is. that,.while.they.may.be.ca- acquiring,.the.capability. pable.of.peaceful.explana- to.make.a.nuclear.weapon.. tion,.can.all.too.readily.be. Crucial.factors.here.are. applied.to.building.nuclear. a.capacity.to.produce.or. weapons.and.delivery.sys- acquire.fissile.material,. tems..There.is.no.question. and.evidence.of.certain. GARETH Evans.. that.this.risk.was.not.fully. research.and.development. Member of the Supervisory appreciated.at.the.time. activities.consistent.with.a. Board, International of.the.negotiation.of.the. nuclear.weapons.program.. Luxembourg Forum Nuclear.Non-Proliferation. But,.given.the.extent.to. on Preventing Nuclear Treaty..Although.there.is.a. which.so.much.material,.so. Catastrophe; Chancellor good.argument.that.there. many.items,.and.so.much. of the Australian National is.a.“right.to.enrich”.under. research.activity.is.dual. University (former that.Treaty,.that.does.not. use—consistent.with.other. Australian Senator and conclude.the.argument.as. objectives.than.manufac- Member of Parliament, to.whether.there.should.be. turing.nuclear.weapons—it. Minister of Foreign Affairs, now.an.unrestricted.right. is.very.much.harder.to.be. Australia). to.enrich,.or.the.extent.to. confident.on.the.question. which.the.wider.interna- of.intent. tional.community.should.be. The.Iran.case.has.raised.in. tolerant.of.such.claims.and. That.remains.the.case.no. the.starkest.possible.way. take.no.countermeasures. matter.how.many.further. 4 5 THE LIMITS OF SECURE NUCLEAR TOLERANCE ON SECURE NUCLEAR TOLERANCE objective.criteria.or.warn- the.absence.of.internation- That.said,.if.the.Permanent. regime.in.general..Some. communications.and.infor- the.peaceful.use.of.nuclear. ing.signs.one.adds.to.the. al.pushback.other.states. Five.members.of.the. of.the.book’s.assessments. mation.technology..These. energy.through.interna- list.(for.example,.volatile. will.be.provoked.to.seek. Security.Council,.in.their. and.proposals.require.more. changes.imply.adequate. tional.cooperation,.while. strategic.environment,. equivalent.capability. capacity.as.the.five.NPT. research.and.thinking.. adaptations.of.the.NPT. precluding.the.prolifera- perception.of.external. nuclear-weapon.States,. However,.the.goal.of.this. institutions.and.regimes:. tion.of.nuclear.weapons.in. threat,.history.of.confronta- The.most.difficult.ques- were.to.demonstrate.real. intellectual.effort.is.right. some.have.been.made,.but. the.world..“Secure.nuclear. tion,.absence.of.protecting. tion.of.all.in.this.area.is. commitment.to.disarma- and.important. more.are.needed.to.cope. tolerance”.implies.the.free. ally)..There.are.three.basic. how.to.translate.analysis— ment.by.further.rolling. with.the.new.developments. realization.of.states’.and. kinds.of.nuclear.latency.. that.a.state.is.at,.or.has. back.(or,.in.the.case.of. During.the.almost.half.a. and.threats..This.has.to.be. businesses’.rights.to.the. First,.it.may.be.inadvertent,. passed,.some.threshold. China,.at.least.capping). century.that.has.elapsed. achieved.without.revising. former.but.stringent.prohi- when.a.state.may.have.the. that.justifies.alarm.bells. their.own.nuclear.arsenals,. since.the.signing.of.the. the.principal.provisions. bition.of.the.latter,.taking.a. basic.capability.to.make. being.rung—into.effective. their.authority.to.impose. NPT.in.1968,.the.world. of.the.Treaty,.but.by.the. step.beyond.existing.IAEA. nuclear.weapons.but.have. international.action..While. nonproliferation.obliga- has.changed.dramatically. joint.and.well.thought. safeguards.and.nuclear. no.intention.to.do.so,.or. others.like.the.Nuclear. tions.on.others.would.be. due.to.tectonic.geopoliti- through.elaboration.of. suppliers’.lists..This.book. to.persuade.anyone.else. Suppliers.Group.or.IAEA. strengthened.. cal.and.ideological.shifts,. additional.norms,.institu- is.a.first.but.valuable.mul- that.it.has.that.capacity.. might.have.important. dynamic.economic.and. tions,.and.practical.steps. tinational.experts’.attempt. Second,.it.may.be.deliber­ roles.in.determining. These.various.difficul- technical.developments,. for.enhancing.the.goals.of. to.formalize.this.important. ate.but limited—when.a. whether.various.criteria. ties.should.not,.however,. and.a.revolution.in.mass. the.Treaty:.encouraging. purpose. state.consciously.develops. were.satisfied,.ultimately. inhibit.debate.on.how.best. a.demonstrable.break-out. the.responsibility.for. in.the.future.to.strengthen. capability.but.has.no.actual. taking.or.authorizing. a.nonproliferation.system. intent,.at.least.for.the.fore- appropriate.countermeas- that.badly.needs.such. nuclear.weapons,.hamper- reinforce.nonproliferation. seeable.future,.to.weap-