Communications Tradition welcomes and encourages letters to the editor. Letters, which should be brief and to the point, should not ordinarily exceed 1000 words. They should be e-mailed to [email protected]. Letters may be edited. ORTHODOXY AND THE PUBLIC SQUARE TO THE EDITOR: In his contribution to Tradition’s symposium “Orthodoxy and the Public Square” (38:1, Spring 2004), Rabbi Chaim Dovid Zwiebel presented what seemed to be a compelling argument for Agudath Israel’s unique view. For example, in reference to Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a famous abortion case from 1989, he put forward that Agudath Israel’s brief—under the direction of its Moetzes Gedolei HaTorah—presented an Orthodox Jewish voice [which] articulates an authentic Jewish per- spective on an issue that had elicited numerous representations by non- Orthodox groups that totally distorted the Torah position. As read by the Moetzes Gedolei Hatorah . public statements that various Jewish groups were making in their own submissions to the Supreme Court and in the media misleadingly converted the narrow halakhic exception that authorized abortions under certain exceptional circum- stances into a general rule endorsing unlimited reproductive choice as an affirmative Jewish value—a classical case of ziyyuf ha-Torah and hillul Hashem that demanded a clear public refutation. This does not seem to be an accurate representation of the brief Agudath Israel submitted. The brief makes exactly one reference to Jewish law (less than 100 words), and it certainly does not explore or explain the underlining Jewish law, nor does it note that others are dis- torting Jewish law. Instead, it argues the exact opposite of the classical pro-life position and contends that American constitutional law ought not be allowed to determine that life begins at conception. Instead, it focuses on federalism issues and religious freedom problems. “Like the court below,” it wrote, “Agudath Israel of America believes that the Missouri legislature exceeded its constitutional authority in finding that human life begins at conception” (Agudath Israel Brief, p. 5). Indeed, Agudath Israel explicitly wants the Supreme Court to “prohibit legisla- tive bodies from conferring human status—personhood—upon fetuses” (ibid., p. 6). TRADITION 39:2 / © 2005 103 Rabbinical Council of America TRADITION R. Zwiebel and Agudath Israel devoted the whole brief to the proposition that even though abortion is not a form of murder as a matter of American law, American constitutional law ought to allow those states that wish to restrict abortion the right to do so in all cases except “when abortion is necessary to preserve the mother’s life, or when it is mandated under the mother’s religious beliefs.” Thus, Agudath Israel’s Supreme Court brief was neither a faithful recounting of the Jewish law as it governs Jews, nor a faithful recount- ing of Jewish law as it governs gentiles (who have greater restraints than Jews in issues of abortion). So too, it was not an argument that refutes those who speak unau- thentically in the name of Judaism—indeed, it would grant the latter group heightened protection, as it seeks to protect religiously motivated decisions of all strands of Judaism—and every other faith as well. If the Agudath Israel brief were to be adopted as American law, it would provide exactly the kind of constitutional protection of Reform and Conservative pronouncements in the name of Jewish law in the area of abortion that R. Zwiebel claims the Moetzes told him to challenge since R. Zwiebel fully recognizes that religious freedoms granted to one faith must be granted to all. Consider that if the argument of R. Zwiebel were accepted as Amer- ican law, the assertion by a liberal rabbi that “it is religiously wrong to have more than two children and abortions in such cases are mandatory” would be protected as a matter of American law even if Roe v. Wade were over- turned and abortions could be restricted by the different states. Rather, Agudath Israel’s brief was written to protect narrow Orthodox Jewish interests. The question it seeks to answer is, “If Roe is struck down, will religious Jews be able to have abortions when halakha mandates such abortion,” and it crafts a solution to that narrow problem without becom- ing generally pro-choice. It does nothing more and nothing less. Agudath Israel is prepared to accept as legal abortions that Jewish law would label as violations of Jewish law as a price to pay for religious freedom, so long as Jews are granted their freedom. Of course, it is important and laudable to protect the rights of Orthodox Jews to exercise options allowed by halakha. Nevertheless, it is disingenuous to portray this brief as involvement in the broad public debate when in truth there is no such involvement. R. Zwiebel’s charac- terization of the position of Agudath Israel in his article in Tradition in this case (as providing “an Orthodox Jewish voice [which] articulates an authentic Jewish perspective”) is just false. Nothing in the brief addresses the issues that he claims it does. 104 Communications It is a rare author who can be accused of mischaracterizing his own work, but that is what has happened here—R. Zwiebel directly mischar- acterized something he himself wrote in a way designed to make it more appealing to the audience for which he was writing, even though on examination his characterization of his own work is absolutely false in substance. I fear this violates the first value in Torah scholarship: truth. (RABBI) HERSHEL GOLDWASSER Jerusalem, Israel CHAIM DOVID ZWIEBEL RESPONDS: Rabbi Goldwasser confuses two distinct points: (1) the reason Agudath Israel decided to submit an amicus curiae brief in the Webster case, and (2) the substantive content of the brief itself. With respect to the former, which was the subject of my essay in Tradition, it was the decision of our Moetzes Gedolei HaTorah that we should enter the legal fray at the Supreme Court level precisely for the reason discussed in my essay: to dispel the notion, conveyed by various non-Orthodox and secular Jewish groups, that unfettered reproductive freedom (i.e., abortion on demand) was consonant with Jewish values. Had the broader Jewish community not been such a vocal proponent of Roe v. Wade (often speaking in the name of Judaism, no less!) we would not have found it necessary to invest the energy and resources to pres- ent a contrary view in the Supreme Court (and, through the media attention generated by the legal brief, to American society at large). With respect to the latter, which was decidedly not the subject of my essay, the brief was what a brief is supposed to be: an attempt to advo- cate a particular point of view within the specific context of the case under consideration. The point of view—as per the guidance we received from our Moetzes Gedolei HaTorah—was that abortion on demand should not be deemed a fundamental constitutional right, but that abortion where halakha would require it should retain its protection. (Yes, it’s true, Agudath Israel’s advocacy on the issue of abortion seeks “to pro- tect narrow Orthodox Jewish interests.” Imagine!) The specific context in which that point of view was to be articulated was the Supreme Court’s review in Webster of a Missouri statute that imposed certain restrictions on the performance of abortions and that further “found” that human life begins at the moment of conception; and in which the 105 TRADITION Court had indicated that one of the questions presented for its consider- ation was whether Roe v. Wade should be reconsidered. Without going into the full detail of the argument we presented in the brief (anyone interested in reading it may write me at Agudath Israel of America, 42 Broadway, New York, NY 10004, and I will be glad to send a copy) we advanced three major points: (1) that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided and should be overturned; (2) that the right to abortion should nonetheless be preserved in the extraordinary case when the pregnancy threatens the mother’s life or where her religious beliefs require that the pregnancy be terminated; and (3) that Missouri’s legislative finding that the fetus is a human being from the moment of conception, which could jeopardize the right to abortion in situations where halakha would demand it, should be struck down as an unconsti- tutional establishment of religion. R. Goldwasser is right that protection of the right to abortion where pregnancy threatens the mother’s life or where her religious beliefs mandate terminating her pregnancy could result in abortions in cases where halakha would not permit them: for non-Jewish women, for whom halakha recognizes no “life of the mother” exception to the prohibition against abortion, or for Jewish women who are guided by the type of “liberal rabbis” fancifully conjured up in R. Goldwasser’s letter. However, under the American system of law, as R. Goldwasser correctly notes, “religious freedoms granted to one faith must be grant- ed to all,” and sometimes the only way to ensure that our halakhic rights are legally protected is to extend such protection beyond the pre- cise parameters of halakha. That is one of the realities of the imperfect world we inhabit as we await the arrival of Mashi’ah. R. Goldwasser is also right that the Agudath Israel brief does not provide a detailed analysis of halakha as it relates to abortion. That is not what the Webster case was about, and that is not what legal briefs are supposed to do. But no one who read the brief would have mistak- en Agudath Israel’s position for that of the pro-Roe v.