unaustralia strangeness and value1 JOHN FROW I begin with a story. This one happened to a friend of friends. Similar things are happening to friends of your friends, right across Australia. A Sydney businessman—I’ll call him K., but don’t confuse him with the hero of a novel by Kafka or Coetzee, he’s a real person—is defrauded by his accountant. The Federal Police are called in, and they in turn—presumably because the possibility of money-laundering is involved—call in ASIO. K. is told that if he is to recover his money he will have to sign a confidentiality agreement—something like the British Official Secrets Act—which he does. At around this time he is approached by a man who says he too has been defrauded by the accountant. They talk about it, and K. arranges to meet him a second time. When he arrives the man is in police uniform and arrests him for having breached the confidential- ity agreement by speaking to him. K. is taken to court; after three days of hearings the charge against him is dismissed on the grounds that he was not informed of his rights at the time he signed the agreement. ASIO then applies for a control order against him—the same order that was served on Jack Thomas after his acquittal on terrorism charges, and which confines him to his home between midnight and 5 am, requires him to seek written approval to make phone calls, and confiscates his passport. The evidence in the ASIO dossier all goes to the point of K.’s being politically ‘connected’—that is, having made acquaintance in the course of his business with members of Amnesty, the ACTU, and the Labor Party. The dossier contains photographs of politicians and trade unionists leaving K.’s office, and extensive information about his past. His neighbours and friends are repeatedly photographed and their phones are tapped. K. is never informed of the grounds for the control order, other than his being politically ‘connected’. At this point in time K. is waiting for the adjudication of 38 VOLUME13 NUMBER2 SEP2007 the control order. His lawyer has been told that he too will be served with a control order, and assumes that unless he complies his other clients will be subject to investigation. K. says two things about this web of unexplained actions against him and his lawyer: ‘they knew everything about me’; and ‘it’s enough to drive you mad’. The story I have told is one that I cannot tell. In order to make it public I have to cast it in a form that makes it unrecognisable. I have altered some of the details of K.’s identity, and details of the story itself, in order to protect him from further charges of breach of the con- fidentiality agreement, and to protect myself from charges of breaching section 105.41 of the Anti-Terrorism Act by telling this story. I cannot go to the newspapers with it because they are prohibited from publicising details of control orders, and in any case publicity would further endanger K. In a very real sense, we are silenced. Part of my concern in this lecture is a puzzle about what politics has become at a time when traditional concerns with open government and the rule of law have been devalued as, it seems, never before, and yet when this devaluation is conveyed in the very language of truth and justice which is denied at the level of actions. I call this politics ‘postmodern’, in the sense in which Bill Brown uses that word: to describe a post-Enlightenment and anti- pluralist politics, whether it be that of neoliberalism or of the new religious fundamentalisms, characterised by the invocation of a state of permanent exception and by the authoritarian consequences that flow from it.2 And I use the metaphor—one I take from the conference to which this talk is a coda—of a place called UnAustralia, not in order to describe a national ethos, nor to accuse others of breaching some putative core of national values, but rather as a way of describing the logic of negation by means of which this shadowy realm of counter- terror, together with its corresponding politics, is conjured into being. That logic of negation is different from a simple incompatibility between one order of being and another. Let me try to clarify what I mean by invoking Kant’s distinction between real and logical forms of contradiction. ‘Real’ contradiction here is a relation of contrariety between incompatible states of being: a relation between A and B. ‘Logical’ contradiction, by contrast, is a relation of antinomy between internally differentiated aspects of the same state of being: a relation of A to non-A. It’s the second of these forms of negation that is implied by the term ‘UnAustralia’: not a simple contrary in which UnAustralia is merely different from Australia, but an internal and constitutive contradiction; not simply the absence of the thing negated, but its continuing presence as a ghostly or uncanny absence. UnAustralia is the negative image of its positive counterpart, brought into being by means of a magical exclusion of whatever does not fit, an expulsion of the extraneous, of whatever comes from and seems to belong to an outside, of the stranger without and within. The status of strangers is central to my argument. It is in terms of the interchangeability and interaction of inside and outside that Simmel understands the stranger in his essay of JOHN FROW—UNAUSTRALIA: STRANGENESS AND VALUE 39 that name. The stranger, he writes, is the synthetic unity of wandering and its conceptual opposite, fixation in space; the stranger is thus not one who arrives and leaves, but one who, coming to stay, nevertheless remains ‘a potential wanderer: although he has not moved on, he has not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going’.3 The stranger thus has ‘the specific character of mobility’, and if this mobility takes place within a closed group it ‘embodies that synthesis of nearness and distance which constitutes the formal position of the stranger’.4 The freedom of entry into and departure from the settled group enjoyed by the stranger has as its counterpart indifference toward him, and the price of his freedom is thus his solitude within the crowd.5 One has only an abstract relation to the stranger, since ‘with the stranger one has only certain more general qualities in common, whereas the relation to more organically connected persons is based on the commonness of specific differences from merely general features’.6 Strangeness is the opposite of a settled condition, defined only by its inside: the stranger is the one who disrupts settlement. Think of K. in Kafka’s The Castle, a stranger who arrives in the village seeking the employment he claims he has been offered. K. is a classic outsider, who is asked: ‘But what are you …? You are not from the Castle, you are not from the village, you aren’t anything. Or rather, unfortunately, you are something, a stranger, a man who isn’t wanted and is in everybody’s way, a man who’s always causing trouble…’.7 In this con- frontation a complex game is played by both sides. K. is by no means an innocent victim; rather, he is a man betting everything on his move to gain admission to the Castle, and beyond that something like recognition—one of the two modalities of justice in Nancy Fraser’s definition.8 On its side, the Castle plays a defensive game which is often apparently com- plicit with K.’s attack, as when it claims to recognise the good work he has been doing as a surveyor. Bureaucratic hierarchy and opacity are weapons in this conflict, but so, most power- fully, is the fact that the onus is on K. to prove what his standing is in this place that refuses him the recognition he desires. One way of reading this story, then, is as a parable of the quest for justice, and of its denial in systems which are opaque to outsiders. Like the man from the country who seeks admission to the Law and is told, at the moment of his death, that the door he has been waiting at was meant only for him, and that now it is being closed, K. comes to realise that ‘there is justice, no end of justice—only not for you’. The logic of uncanny reversal expressed in the notion of UnAustralia is most evident at its edges, where it deals with those who don’t belong and where the mechanisms that have been used to excise this unplace from the solid mainland of our Australian reality are most clearly displayed. For Australia in the years of the Howard government, refugee policy has been at the heart of our sense of the kind of political order we desire; a number of cases (the seizure of the Tampa, the children overboard affair, the drowning of 353 people on the SIEV- X) have dramatised the tension between, on the one hand, a dominant xenophobic 40 VOLUME13 NUMBER2 SEP2007 understanding of the stranger, generated and expressed in the rise of One Nation and in the adoption of this hostile and fearful vision by the Howard government in its display of tough- ness towards asylum-seekers, and on the other a xenophilic relation to strangers inscribed in the international covenants on the treatment of refugees to which Australia is a signatory, and in the widespread but politically futile criticism by the intelligentsia of refugee policy.