Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (2012) 88–91 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsc Introduction On nature and normativity: Normativity, teleology, and mechanism in biological explanation Lenny Moss a, Daniel J. Nicholson b a Department of Sociology and Philosophy, University of Exeter, Exeter EX44RJ, UK b Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research, Adolf Lorenz Gasse 2, Altenberg A-3422, Austria When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 1. Introduction of normativity to nature all the way down. Must our point of depar- ture always be at the level of normativity as a distinctively human There is a spectre haunting contemporary Anglophone philoso- phenomenon? Might it not be the case that it is just such a presup- phy ...and it is not teleology. The spectre is that of an intractable position that dooms the conciliatory enterprise to failure from the problem when it comes to reconciling two commitments that are start? each pervasively embraced by contemporary philosophers and Aristotle founded the systematic study of the living organism yet ostensibly irreconcilable, namely: (a) that there is no respect- upon an understanding of intrinsic purposiveness (or finality) as able alternative to some form of philosophical naturalism, and a natural phenomenon. In Aristotle’s hands, the fusion of form (b) that human life is saturated with norms in general and that phi- with finality as ‘end-in-it-selfness’ resulted in a highly fecund losophy itself is especially beholding to the norms of rationality in concept of the suitability (we would now say adaptability) of an particular. One need look no further, for ample confirmation, than organism’s form to a stable way of life that was the lynchpin the recent collection edited by Mario De Caro and David Macar- for elaborating a taxonomy, an anatomy and physiology, and a thur, entitled simply Naturalism and Normativity (2010). Featuring theory of generation (or, as we would now say, development). contributions by the likes of Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, T. M. To meld biological (including behavioral) form with the logos of Scanlon, Akeel Bilgrami, Huw Price, Paul Redding, Peter Godfrey- self-purpose is however to constitute a largely qualitative, i.e., Smith and others, the common aspiration is clear: to avoid the not easily quantifiable, system of understanding. Aristotle’s doc- Scylla of some form of reductive, normative eliminativism on the trine of the natural purposiveness of the living organism was of one side and the Charybdis of a dualistic non-naturalism on the course entirely consonant with the legacy of Greek cosmology other. Normativity, for these thinkers, is identified with the realm that cleaved to an organismic image of nature as a whole. It is lar- of the human, and the overarching strategy of the contributors is gely uncontroversial that the radical Renaissance shift from the that of finding a ‘naturalism’ that is neither too reductively restric- organismic cosmology of Greek physis to that of the mechanistic tive (to be able to countenance human normativity as natural) nor worldview that we call Modern Science brought with it important too permissively liberal (to be able to appear as natural in any pre- benefits. When formal features of nature were wholly, or even sumably relevant sense). The good news seems to be that humans partially, stripped of imputations of immanent finality they be- too are natural. The bad news seems to be that sailing this middle came amenable to mathematic and related logics of understand- course is easier said than done. Any brand of naturalism that is suf- ing and analysis that conferred predictive, systematizing, and ficiently capacious as to do justice to the strong normativity of hu- manipulative power. The cost of this benefit, however, was that man practice appears to suffer such a radical disconnect from of having to exile all that could not be denuded of immanent ‘scientific naturalism’ as to veer off into dualism, whereas any nat- finality into a putatively non-natural realm of being—and this uralism that stays faithful to the precepts of natural science ap- was not limited to the human domain. The phenomenon of life pears inevitably to find its way to some form of normative as a whole, having been constituted systematically by exactly that eliminativism. All the many deflationary moves by contributors which cannot be wholly stripped of intrinsic purposiveness, was notwithstanding, the path not taken, nor scarcely even considered, left in an equivocal position. Indeed, surely much of the history is that of a more radical re-thinking of just what is the relationship of biology since the seventeenth century could be reconstructed E-mail addresses: [email protected] (L. Moss), [email protected] (D.J. Nicholson) 1369-8486/$ - see front matter Crown Copyright Ó 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2011.05.007 Introduction / Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (2012) 88–91 89 as a kind of pas de deux between formal and finalistic (or func- Wayne Christensen advances a similar thesis in his article, in tional) modes of explanation that have striven, by different mea- which he argues that normativity ought to be grounded in the dis- sures and proportions, to somehow have it both ways: to retain tinctive organization of living systems, specifically in the form that the power of purely formalistic logics while still capturing the generates their unity and hence explains their existence. Taking minimal finalistic features of a ‘natural being’ that are the sine the concept of biological function as the point of departure for qua non of its being alive. Though the logic of natural selection developing his naturalistic account of normativity, Christensen re- has done much to reconstitute an understanding of the intimate jects the classic etiological theory that explains constituent ‘proper relationship between living form and the ends of life, yet all the functions’ in terms of the action of natural selection, and advocates while lacking an adequate theory of phenotypic (i.e., formal) var- instead an account of ‘functional normativity’ based on the organi- iation (and thus innovation) (Kirschner and Gerhart, 2005), it has zational autonomy of living systems. Christensen then proceeds to by no means eliminated the perception nor relevance of natural show through a series of thought experiments how his account can purposiveness from the domain of the living (nor would Darwin be extended to encompass key aspects of the normativity of prac- ever have imagined otherwise). While much of contemporary phi- tical reasons found at the human level. Implicit in this argumenta- losophy has long since been agonizing over the rigours of trying tive move is the recognition that normativity is not confined to the to reconcile the natural and the normative, the truly enabling realm of rational agency and personhood, but is rather already fun- work of elucidating the normative in nature has only just begun. damentally present in autonomous systems (i.e., organisms) as Drawing on a wide range of historical, philosophical, and empir- such. Overall, Christensen’s discussion provides a compelling case ical resources, the essays in this special issue consider the biolog- for taking seriously the claim, defended likewise by Barham, that ical roots of normativity through an examination of life’s organisms, by virtue of their nature, constitute appropriate anchor- ostensible purposiveness and accordingly reflect on the place of ing points for developing a general naturalistic understanding of teleological considerations in biological explanation. The nine con- normativity. tributions can be clustered together under three relatively distinct Georg Toepfer’s article picks up where Barham’s and Christen- thematic emphases—loosely described as theoretical, historical sen’s left off by reflecting on the implications of the normative nat- and critical (although each contribution expresses aspects of all ure of organisms for biology as a science. Like Barham and three). The first cluster of articles, drawing on the idea of an auton- Christensen, Toepfer considers living systems to be inherently tel- omous system, locates the place and source of normativity in nat- eological. Indeed, the very concept of ‘organism’, Toepfer notes, is ure and the warrant for teleological concepts within a strictly only truly comprehensible when it is understood in teleological physicalist vocabulary. The second cluster highlights the central terms. An organism is a cyclically organized system of interdepen- role played by teleological reasoning in thinking about life as ex- dent causal processes that collectively constitute the whole and pressed in Kant’s engagement with what became the origins of thereby contribute to its continued maintenance. The identity, modern biology, in Hegel’s attempt to go beyond a merely heuristic unity, and functional operation of such a system is only under- appropriation of Aristotle in grasping the impetus for an immanent standable through a teleological perspective. Toepfer argues that movement within nature, and in the fascinating yet still poorly teleology serves to identify and delimit organisms as the kind of understood set