UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN A STUDY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S NATIONAL PARTY PERCEPTIONS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980's WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SANCTIONS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACUL1Y OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES PROFESSOR DAVID WELSH, SUPERVISOR University of Cape Town BY CHRISTINE HUNSAKER RONDEBOSCH, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA SEPTEMBER 1991 The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No quotation from it or information derived from it is to be published without full acknowledgement of the source. The thesis is to be used for private study or non- commercial research purposes only. Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. University of Cape Town UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN A STUDY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S NATIONAL PARTY PERCEPTIONS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980's WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SANCTIONS A DISSERTATION SUBMITIED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF ' MASTER OF ARTS DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL STUDIES PROFESSOR DAVID WELSH, SUPERVISOR BY CHRISTINE HUNSAKER RONDEBOSCH, REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 1992 DECLARATION No portion of this work has been submitted by this writer in support of an application for another degree or qualification from this or any other University or other institution of learning. · 11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to offer my sincere thanks to several people who have made this dissertation possible by participating in this research process: Mr. Glenn Babb, M.P. and the other 34 National Party members; Mr. Andre' Jaquet of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and the other four Foreign Affairs individuals; and Mr. Koos van der Merwe, M.P. from the Conservative Party. Because of these individuals, I have gained significant insight into the South African political process. My thanks go to past U.S. Ambassador to South.Africa Herman W. Nickel, U.S. Embassy Minister-Counselor, Mr. Marshall F. McCallie, South African Ambassador's to the U.S., Donald Sole and Herbert Beukes, A.G.B. President, Mr. Robert L. Gale, Professor Ron J. Davies, and Vice President of Utah State University, Dr. William F. Lye for their generous input into this dissertation. Also, appreciation goes to Professor Robert Schrire for methodological assistance and to Julie A. Glidden editorial assistance. The specialized printing and binding of this dissertation would not have been possible without the professional help of Mr. Andy Scholtz of the Computer Room, for which I am grateful. My deepest gratitude goes to Professor David Welsh and Virginia van der Vliet, who have seen me through this project from start to finish. It was their unselfish giving of guidance, support and friendship that helped me endure to the end. Finally, I express my love, admiration, and thankfulness to Jess and Brigitte Hunsaker who have always believed in me and gave me the courage to keep going. lll TABLE OF CONTENTS DECLARATION .............................................. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . 11 TABLE OF CONTENTS . m LIST OF FIGURES ............................................. VI LIST OF TABLES .............................................. IX ABBREVIATIONS . x ABSTRACT .................................................. XI Chapter I INTRODUCTION . 1 1.1 PERCEPTION . 6 1.1.1 Perception: What it is Not . 7 1.1.2 Defining Perception . .. 8 1.1.3 Perception: The Problems of Image, Reality and Levels of Analysis . 9 1.2 THE NP IN ITS DOMESTIC CONTEXT . 16 1.3 NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE ............................ 20 Chapter 1\vo UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY . 22 2.1 UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY . 22 2.1.1 The Constitution ....... , . 23 i. The Power of Congress . 24 ii The Power of the President . 26 iii. The Power of the Judiciary . 28 iv. The Power of Public Opinion . 29 2.2 U.S. STRATEGIC INTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICA . 31 2.2.1 Strategic Importance . 32 2.3 BACKGROUND OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA . 35 2.3.1 The Truman Administration (1945 - 53) . 36 3.2.2 The Eisenhower Administration (1953 - 61) . 37 2.3.3 The Kennedy Administration (1961 - 1963) .......... : . 40 2.3.4 The Johnson Administration (1963 - 69) . 42 2.3.5 The Nixon Administration (1969 - 74) . 44 2.3.6 The Ford Administration (1974 - 77) . 47 2.3.7 The Carter Administration (1977 - 1981) . 49 iv 2.4 THE REAGAN YEARS - THE FIRST TERM AND CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT . 57 2.4.1 Constructive Engagement's Policy Success . 60 2.4.2 Analysis Outlining the Failure of Constructive Engagement . 64 2.4.3 Post-1986 Reagan Policy . 70 2.5 NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO . 71 Chapter 3 SANCTIONS AND SOUTH AFRICA . 78 3.1 UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TOOLS . 78 3.1.1 Defining Economic Sanctions . 82 3.1.2 The Assumptions Underlying Sanctions . 83 i. Limitations . 84 3.2 WHY SANCTIONS AS A FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE? . 85 3.3 MOVE TOWARD SOUTH AFRICAN SANCTIONS IN THE MID-1980'S . 88 3.3.1 Reagan Sanctions and Executive Action . 88 3.3.2 Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986. 90 3.4 THE ONGOING DEBATE ABOUT SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA . 92 3.4.1 The Economic Impact of Sanctions . 93 · 3.4.2 Disinvestment . 95 3.4.3 Trade Sanctions . 97 3.4.4 Financial Sanctions . 99 3.4.5 Political Impact . 101 3.5 NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE . 104 Chapter 4 NATIONAL PAR'IY PERCEPTIONS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980s .................................................. 109 4.1 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY . 109 4.2 PERSONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING RESPONDENTS . 110 4.3 PRESENTATION OF THE DATA - PART I: CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT . 112 4.4 PRESENTATION OF DATA- PART II: SANCTIONS ......... 125 4.5 DISCUSSION ........................................ 158 4.6 CONCLUSIONS . 162 4.7 NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR ............................ 163 Chapter 5 CONCLUSION . 164 5.1 NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE . 181 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 183 BOOKS ................................................ 183 JOURNALS & ARTICLES . 186 OFFICIAL SOURCES . 188 PUBLIC SPEECHES . 189 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Is your constituency mostly representative of: ............... 111 Figure 2: Level of Education. 111 Figure 3: Age .............................................. 112 Figure 4: Language . 112 Figure 5: Gender ........................................... 112 Figure 6: Do You Believe Constructive Engagement was effective United States foreign policy? . 115 Figure 7: What is your attitude toward the policy of Constructive Engagement? . 124 Figure 8: When you think about sanctions, do you feel that sooner or later South Africa will have to yield to press~re? ................ 130 Figure 9: · How important do you think pressure from the US business sector was influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions? .. 137 Figure 10: How important do you think a legacy of guilt from US human rights movements was in influencing the US decisions to introduce sanctions? ................................. 137 Figure 11: How important do you think a sincere effort by US policy makers to bring about change in SA was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions? . 137 Figure 12: How important do you think pressure from US blacks was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions? . 137 Figure 13: How important do you think pressure from US human rights activists was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions? . 137 Figure 14: Do you think US politicians saw SA as a vote catcher? How­ important was this view in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions? . 138 Figure 15: How important do you think the response to prominent black South Africans (eg. Tutu, ANC, etc.) was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions? . 138 vi Figure 16: How important do you think pressure from the UN was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions? . 138 Figure 17: How important do you think pressure from other Western nations was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions? . 138 Figure 18: How important do you think US response to concern displayed by the Front Line States was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions? . 138 Figure 19: How important do you think that failure/frustration with Constructive Engagement was in influencing the US decision to introduce sanctions? . 138 Figure 20: To send a message outlining US policy in disagreement with South African current political position. 143 Figure 21: Affect white political thinking ........................... 143 Figure 22: Affect white political morale. 143 Figure 23: · Promote black upliftment. ............................. 143 Figure 24: Wreck South African economy .......................... 143 Figure 25: Cause enough misery to start a revolution .................. 143 Figure 26: How much did the US sanctions influence the imposition of the State of Emergency? . 149 Figure 27: How much did US sanctions influence the attitude: 'Resentment of foreign meddling'? . 149 Figure 28: How much did US sanctions influence the attitude: 'Black resolution to lose jobs rather than give up sanctions'? . 149 Figure 29: How much did US sanctions influence the shift to the Conservative Party in the 1989 elections? . 149 Figure 30: How much did US sanctions influence slower economic growth? . 150 Figure 31: How much did US sanctions influence rising unemployment? ... 150 Figure 32: How much did US sanctions influence the re-evaluation on Homeland policies? .................... ; . 150 Vll Figure 33: How much did US sanctions influence the lifting of Influx Control? . 150 Figure 34: How much did US sanctions influence black impatience/ violence? . ..