View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2012-03 Role of Military in Post-Conflict Sri Lanka Herath, Ihalagedera Herath Mudiyanselage Nishantha Nandaji Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/6812 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS ROLE OF MILITARY IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN SRI LANKA by Ihalagedera Herath Mudiyanselage Nishantha Nandaji Herath March 2012 Thesis Advisor: Douglas Porch Second Reader: Arturo Sotomayor Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED March 2012 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Role of Military in Post-Conflict Sri Lanka 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 6. AUTHOR(S) Ihalagedera Herath Mudiyanselage Nishantha Nandaji Herath 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ______N/A______. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) Sri Lanka has suffered a violent conflict between the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for nearly three decades. By the time LTTE was crushed in 2009, over 80,000 had been killed, 11,656 Tamil Tigers were either arrested or surrendered, and 294,000 people had been internally displaced during the final phase of the conflict. Furthermore, almost all the infrastructure in formerly terrorist-held areas was damaged or destroyed. The GoSL recognized its obligation to provide humanitarian relief; essential services, rehabilitation, and development support to people in LTTE-controlled areas and began post-conflict reconstruction. The GoSL decision to house internally displaced persons (IDPs) prevented much-needed, international-community support during the initial stage of reconstruction. The drain of GoSL resources due to the prolonged conflict and reconstruction in the Eastern Province forced GoSL to use the military to fill gaps in the post-conflict reconstruction process. By doing so, the GOSL was able to resettle 97% of the total IDPs, providing them infrastructure facilities and livelihood opportunities, while reintegrating more than 90% of ex-combatants after their rehabilitation by the end of 2011. This study will examine the way in which the military used its capabilities to shape the reconstruction process. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Type Keywords Here 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 97 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ROLE OF MILITARY IN POST-CONFLICT SRI LANKA Ihalagedera Herath Mudiyanselage Nishantha Nandaji Herath Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Sri Lanka Army M.A. in Defence Studies, University of Kalaniya, 2001 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL March 2012 Author: Ihalagedera Herath Mudiyanselage Nishantha Nandaji Herath Approved by: Douglas Porch PhD Thesis Advisor Arturo Sotomayor PhD Second Reader Daniel Moran PhD Chair, Department of National Security Affair iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT Sri Lanka has suffered a violent conflict between the government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for nearly three decades. By the time LTTE was crushed in 2009, over 80,000 had been killed, 11,656 Tamil Tigers were either arrested or surrendered, and 294,000 people had been internally displaced during the final phase of the conflict. Furthermore, almost all the infrastructure in formerly terrorist-held areas was damaged or destroyed. The GoSL recognized its obligation to provide humanitarian relief; essential services, rehabilitation, and development support to people in LTTE-controlled areas and began post-conflict reconstruction. The GoSL decision to house internally displaced persons (IDPs) prevented much-needed, international- community support during the initial stage of reconstruction. The drain of GoSL resources due to the prolonged conflict and reconstruction in the Eastern Province forced GoSL to use the military to fill gaps in the post-conflict reconstruction process. By doing so, the GOSL was able to resettle 97% of the total IDPs, providing them infrastructure facilities and livelihood opportunities, while reintegrating more than 90% of ex- combatants after their rehabilitation by the end of 2011. This study will examine the way in which the military used its capabilities to shape the reconstruction process. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHETICAL ARGUMENT ...........2 B. BACKGROUD TO THE CONFLICT ...........................................................4 C. PROBLEMS OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION IN SRI LANKA ...........................................................................................................11 II. PLANNING FOR POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION—THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS .................15 A. THE GOSL’S RESETTLEMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION MECHANISM BEFORE THE END OF THE CONFLICT .....................16 B. HANDLING OF IDPS, RESETTLEMENT, AND RECONSTRUCTION ...................................................................................18 C. DEVASTATION IN NORTHERN PROVINCE ........................................26 D. REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION .........................................27 E. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS........................29 F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................34 III. THE ROLE OF THE SRI LANKAN MILITARY IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION ...............................................................................................37 A. SRI LANKAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, DISASTER RESPONSE, AND CIVIL ADMINISTRATION .....................................................................................37 B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ABSENCE OF A PEACE ACCORD ............39 C. ROLE PLAYED BY THE SRI LANKAN MILITARY IN POST- CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION .............................................................40 D. MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AFTER THE CONFLICT ......................48 E. WILL MILITARY CAPACITY UNDERMINE STATE CAPACITY? ..53 F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................57 IV. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................59 A. ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS ..........................................................................60 B. RETAINING CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES ...................................61 C. STRENGTHENING STATE CAPACITY ..................................................62 D. OVERVIEW AND IMPLICATION ON CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS ..................................................................................................63 E. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS ..........................................................................66 LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................71 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................83 vii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK viii LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ADB - Asian Development Bank ARTRAC- Army Training Command B.C.E - Before the Christian Era BCGR - Bureau of Commissioner General of Rehabilitation CAO - Civil Affairs Officers CBS - Central Bank of Sri Lanka CCHA - Consultative Committee of Human Assistance CEGS - Commissioner General of Essential Services DDR - Demobilization and Reintegration DS -