The Army’s Foreign Area Officer Program: To Wither or to Improve? By LTC Daniel E. Mouton guistic skills of its FAOs, the Army years, add to the time away from oper- will squander a strategic asset. ational units, making FAOs even less he U.S. Army has established an To be relevant to a senior staff or a relevant. T admirable foreign area officer foreign military, an Army FAO must Unfortunately, when they return (FAO) program with a commendable combine competencies in Army and from nonoperational assignments, goal: to create officers who “combine joint operations with cultural and lan- FAOs often lack the opportunity to professional military skills with re- guage skills suitable for diverse inter- bring skill-specific operational experi- gional expertise, language competency national environments. The reality of ence to U.S. Army units. Although and military-political awareness.” In the FAO program, however, is that it brigade-and-above deployed head- theory, these skilled officers would does not often produce officers who are quarters would benefit from a foreign serve the Army in a variety of impor- able to maintain these skills. Currently, area operations and planning officer, tant and sensitive positions on high- most officers recruited into the FAO there are no permanent positions level staffs, as attachés in U.S. Em- program lack operational experience in these headquarters. Instead, FAOs bassies and as advisors to foreign following company-level command at deploy in a haphazard manner as militaries. around the eighth year of service. After individual augmentees to deployed In support of the program’s goal, three to five years of FAO training, headquarters. Often, these augmentee the Army has made a number of im- these officers possess a basic level of officer assignments have been more a provements over the past few decades. language fluency, a civilian master’s matter of chance than a deliberative For example, it enables graduate edu- degree and travel/living experience in process of assigning the appropriately cation, language training and regional their assigned region. These same offi- skilled officer to a position. Moreover, immersion for FAOs. As a result, fully cers have now lost three to five years of many units receive FAOs whose skills trained FAOs—with balanced acade- important tactical and operational ex- are imperfectly relevant to the deploy- mic, linguistic and operational skills— perience, however. Furthermore, upon ment, such as the instances of non- have become essential staff members. completion of training, most FAOs re- Arabic-speaking FAOs serving in Iraq The lack of planning to sustain FAOs, port to mandated assignments in the on military transition teams or as staff however, causes a loss of capability in Pentagon, geographic combatant com- officers at a headquarters. A well- the population. Without attention to mands or U.S. Embassies. These assign- rounded Army officer with the appro- maintaining the operational and lin- ments, which typically last for three priate language and cultural skills March 2011 I ARMY 21 would serve as an essential enabler in munity. During the 2010 CSL board, is through communicating with a a deployed headquarters or on a tran- 381 FAOs were eligible to compete; af- speaker who both possesses greater sition team. Due to staffing shortfalls, ter eliminating noncompetitive candi- ability in that language and under- however, which persist more than dates, only three officers—less than 1 stands how to teach it. Thus with ex- nine years after 9/11, it is still easier to percent of the available pool—were se- tended assignments away from a re- get a non-Arabic (or non-Pashto or lected for MiTT command. Since the gion and without planned retraining non-Urdu) foreign language speaker Army CSL selection rate is exponen- through DLI or alternate language im- to Iraq or Afghanistan than an officer tially greater for non-FAOs, the board mersion programs, these officers will with the most appropriate skills. results suggest two conclusions: One is inevitably lose much of their baseline Notably, the Chief of Staff of the that the seasoned FAO population lacks language ability. [Editor’s note: In De- Army’s FAO assignment policy only the kind of operational experiences that cember, DLI stood up a language train- requires a 100 percent fill rate for vali- both pervade the post-9/11 Army and ing detachment in Stuttgart, Germany, dated FAO positions in certain head- are valued by selection boards; the sec- that will, in part, support follow-on quarters. The 100 percent fill rate does ond is that the selection board and the language training.] not require the exact FAO specialty, Army as a whole lack the appropriate To improve the FAO program, the however. Thus a 100 percent fill-rate guidance from the Chief of Staff of the Army should consider the following organization like U.S. Central Com- Army as to how the FAO career path recommendations. First, increase re- mand may receive 100 percent Middle can serve the Army’s requirements. gion-specific deployment opportunities East-experienced FAOs, but due to Consequently, the recent board results for FAOs with units conducting either staffing shortages, there may be few suggest that greater senior leader inter- exercises or operations. For instance, remaining officers to fill transition est and a more aggressive pairing of FAOs assigned to Pacific Command teams, augmentee taskings, or other FAOs with skill-specific deployments need to spend time supporting units in validated billets in Iraq or Afghanis- would inject a needed infusion of mis- either Korea or the Philippines, or units tan. Often, Latin America- or Asia- sion relevancy into the FAO corps. that deploy to major regional exercises specific FAOs support deployments Army officers who enter the FAO such as Exercise Cobra Gold in Thai- that are arguably more appropriate program receive tremendous initial land. This model is even easier to fol- for a Middle East specialist. language training. The training is good low for Middle East FAOs, who would In the meantime, the staffing situa- enough for these officer trainees to de- deploy to Iraq as part of Operation tion does not appear to be improving. ploy to their regions and actively take New Dawn, or South Asia FAOs, who For all of the officers between year part in negotiations or integrate into a would deploy to Operation Enduring groups 1996 and 2001, the FAO branch foreign military. Many FAOs, however, Freedom. If an FAO cannot deploy to is short approximately 260 officers. reach the height of their language abil- an operation within his region, he Furthermore, a recent staffing review ity when they complete this initial lan- needs meaningful staff assignments at of the numbers of accessed FAOs com- guage training at the Defense Lan- the division or corps level in support of pared with enduring requirements guage Institute (DLI). Since the Army Operation New Dawn or Operation (that is, those not connected to Iraq or lacks an institutional language-sustain- Enduring Freedom. Afghanistan deployments) revealed ment program for its FAOs, these offi- The second recommendation con- that many year groups were below 50 cers are unable to improve on, let alone cerns language sustainment. There are percent strength. As a further reminder maintain, the baseline language ability some successful models to follow. The that the Army is still adapting to the that they achieved during the six to 18 State Department, the Central Intelli- post-9/11 world, two of the most criti- months of language immersion at DLI. gence Agency and the Defense Intelli- cally short FAO regions are the Mid- Unless an FAO learns a commonly gence Agency fund regular language- dle East/North Africa and South Asia. spoken and easily practiced language, sustainment training for their career Arguably, both areas should have an such as Spanish, or works within the members. Thus FAOs could rotate excess of capacity, so that both perma- intelligence community, there is no through some of the preestablished nent positions and deployment op- easy path for further language training U.S. government training locations. portunities correlate with the Army’s after initial entry into the FAO pro- Another alternative is to allow FAOs officer talent pool as well as national gram. The service’s expectation is that to train at language facilities located security requirements. officers will conduct sustainment train- in the region. For example, Foreign Recently, the Chief of Staff of the ing and language advancement on Service officers assigned to U.S. Em- Army allowed midcareer FAOs to com- their own. bassies can study a language at a local pete on the annual command selection This practice misunderstands the language program. Scores of U.S. un- list (CSL) for command of military nature of language, however. Lan- dergraduate and graduate students transition teams (MiTTs)—advisors to guage, as a means of communication, master Arabic at Middle Eastern uni- Iraqi or Afghan units. This opportunity requires a two-way transfer of infor- versities every year; there do not ap- would grant great operational rele- mation. The most effective way to pear to be many compelling reasons vancy and experience to the FAO com- train, improve in and learn a language to prevent FAOs from following a 22 ARMY I March 2011 similar path. In addition, these loca- telligence collection, high-value target would assume an operational skill set, tions have a number of useful advan- selection, political-military estimates, which would be valued across the tages in that they are very low cost in policy work, security assistance in Army, or if they would continue to be- comparison with U.S. schools, and support of foreign internal defense, long to their basic branches.