Georgia Southern University Digital Commons@Georgia Southern Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies, Jack N. Averitt College of Spring 2017 Politics and Pragmatism: The United States and Israel Between Two Presidents Christopher J. Parker Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgiasouthern.edu/etd Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Parker, Christopher J. "Politics and Pragmatism: The United States and Israel Between Two Presidents." Master's Thesis. Georgia Southern University, 2017. This thesis (open access) is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies, Jack N. Averitt College of at Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Georgia Southern. For more information, please contact [email protected]. POLITICS AND PRAGMATISM: THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL BETWEEN TWO PRESIDENTS by CHRISTOPHER PARKER (Under the Direction of William Allison) ABSTRACT This thesis examines the United States’ relationship with Israel and the wider Middle East between the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. The United States’ relationship with Israel has reverberated across the Middle East and studying its impact is critical for understanding past and present issues in the region. It begins with an examination of the factors that impelled President Truman to act against the advice of his Department of State and recognize Israel only minutes after it declared statehood in May 1948; arguing that, above all else, domestic political considerations lay at the heart of his decision. It then assesses the impact of this decision on the Eisenhower administration’s efforts to develop a coherent Cold War foreign policy in the region. Here, it charts the evolution of a policy constructed around the belief that the United States’ relationship with Israel risked driving the resource rich Arab states into the arms of the Soviet Union. This concern grew from perception to reality between 1953 and 1956, resulting in a significant expenditure of diplomatic energy and foreign aid to combat perceived Soviet advances in the Middle East. In the end, it posits that President Truman’s decision to recognize Israel ran counter to the United States’ Cold War objectives, thereby indicating a conflict of interests in U.S. foreign policy. INDEX WORDS: Truman, Eisenhower, Cold War, Middle East. POLITICS AND PRAGMATISM: THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL BETWEEN TWO PRESIDENTS by CHRISTOPHER PARKER B.A., Kansas State University, 2007 M.A., Webster University, 2012 A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Georgia Southern University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS STATESBORO, GEORGIA © 2017 CHRISTOPHER PARKER All Rights Reserved 1 POLITICS AND PRAGMATISM: THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL BETWEEN TWO PRESIDENTS by CHRISTOPHER PARKER Major Professor: William Allison Committee: Ahmet Akturk Mao Lin Electronic Version Approved: May 2017 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………… 4 CHAPTER 1. PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN…………………………………… 16 CONTEXT…………………………………………………………………………… 17 HISTORIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………… 19 CONTROVERSY AND TRUMAN’S WORLDVIEW……………………………… 22 THE ZIONIST LOBBY……………………………………………………………… 27 POST-HOLOCAUST SYMPATHY………………………………………………… 32 DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE 1948 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION…………… 35 THE COLD WAR…………………………………………………………………… 44 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………… 48 CHAPTER 2. NEW LEADERS IN A NEW WORLD………………………………… 51 THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION………………………………………… 53 EISENHOWER’S WORLDVIEW: PRINCIPLED AND PRAGMATIC………… 56 THE MIDDLE EAST………………………………………………………………… 64 GAMAL ABDEL NASSER: AMBITION AND SUSPICION…………………… 69 ISRAEL: ANXIETY AND AGGRESSION……………………………………… 74 CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………… 83 CHAPTER 3. PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER……………………………. 86 HISTORIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………… 92 THE LOSS OF PRESTIGE AND THE JORDAN VALLEY PROJECT……………… 95 MIGS, MISSLES, AND SOVIET MEDDLING: OPERATION ALPHA……………… 107 3 CHAPTER 3. (CONT.) MONEY FOR NOTHING: SUEZ AND THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE……………. 123 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………… 143 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………… 146 REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………………. 152 4 INTRODUCTION Supporting the extreme objectives of political Zionism [would be] to the detriment of overall U.S. security objectives.1 George F. Kennan Director of Policy Planning U.S. Department of State, 1947-1949 On March 3, 2015, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a joint meeting of the United States Congress. On the surface this was far from an extraordinary event; more Israeli heads of state have addressed joint meetings of congress than any other foreign nation.2 However, the circumstances surrounding Netanyahu’s speech, and the purpose of it, proved unprecedented. Netanyahu was not invited by President Barack Obama to address congress, nor was the President consulted about his visit beforehand.3 Even more striking was the purpose behind his speech. Netanyahu sought to use the United States Congress to undermine the President’s foreign policy.4 Specifically, he was attempting to stop the United States from negotiating an end to Iranian economic sanctions in exchange for that country halting its nuclear program. David Axelrod, Senior Advisor to the President from 2009 to 2011, remarked that it was “extraordinary for a foreign leader to try and use congress to undermine U.S. foreign policy,” describing the move as “audacious.” 5 Separately, Speaker of the House John Boehner, who invited Netanyahu to speak to congress, received a standing ovation from the Republican 1 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 51. 2 Office of the Historian, United States House of Representatives, “Foreign Leaders and Dignitaries who have Addressed the U.S. Congress,” accessed January 23, 2015, http://history.h ouse.gov/Institution/Foreign-Leaders/Fast-Facts/. 3 Frontline, season 34, episode 1, “Netanyahu at War,” Produced by Michael Kirk, aired January 5, 2016, on PBS. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 5 caucus for standing up to the White House.6 David Remnick of The New Yorker described President Obama as “furious, this is an absolute humiliation for him in the midst of a very delicate negotiation with Iran.”7 Although it may have escalated to a new level, this most recent tension points to an underlying conflict that has been present since the beginning of America’s relationship with Israel. Specifically, it stands as a revealing footnote to a foreign policy that was forever altered when President Truman made the controversial decision to disregard his State Department’s counsel and recognize Israel only minutes after it declared statehood in 1948. The scope and purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to examine the initial disputes between President Truman and his advisors to determine why he acted against the State Department’s guidance and then, later, assess how this decision affected President Eisenhower’s efforts in the region. This is a relational study that seeks to shed light on the impact that one president’s policy choices had on those of his successor. It does not attempt to assess the efficacy of the foreign policy promulgated by either president; it simply examines the motives behind each administration’s respective approaches to the Middle East and posits basic conclusions about how these approaches aligned with the nation’s Cold War interests. To accomplish this, it is important to start by dissecting the various currents surrounding Truman’s decision to recognize Israel. This was a historically notable act, laden with ramifications that lasted well beyond Truman’s tenure in the White House. As such, it also reveals a great deal about the President and the forces weighing on him at the time, and it is 6 Frank Bruni, “Christians Loving Jews,” The New York Times, March 7, 2015, accessed January 21, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/opinion/sunday/frank-bruni-benjamin-netanyahu- john-boehner-and-americas-evangelicals.html?_r=0. 7 Frontline, “Netanyahu at War.” 6 imperative that proper emphasis be assigned to the circumstances that drove Truman to align the United States with Israel. This critical first step has yielded diverging verdicts by well-respected historians across the field. Some historians, such as Peter Hahn, have argued that this episode was one of the earliest examples of Christian Zionism influencing politics.8 Others, like Steven Spiegel, emphasize the role of the Zionist lobby and the internal discord between the White House and the State Department while playing down the role of domestic politics.9 Assigning the proper weight to these motives provides the context necessary to properly assess Truman’s decision and this is the focus of Chapter One. Chapter One explores the motives that drove President Truman to defy his Secretary of State and recognize Israel. It posits that Truman’s decision was motivated by a combination of pressures from the Zionist lobby, post-Holocaust sympathy towards European Jews, the nascent pangs of a burgeoning Cold War, and, most importantly, election year politics.10 While each of these factors influenced Truman, the issue of Israel in the 1948 presidential election presents the most tangible evidence for his decision. Not only was support for Israel an