Normativity and interaction: from ethics to semantics MSc Thesis (Afstudeerscriptie) written by Mar´ıa In´es Crespo (born December 11th, 1982 in C´ordoba, Argentina) under the supervision of Prof Dr Martin Stokhof, and submitted to the Board of Examiners in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MSc in Logic at the Universiteit van Amsterdam. Date of the public defense: Members of the Thesis Committee: July 2nd, 2009 Prof Dr Martin Stokhof Dr Paul Dekker Dr Catarina Dutilh-Novaes Prof Dr Frank Veltman Contents Acknowledgments v Abstract vii 1 Introduction 1 2 Priority of questions about the source 5 2.1 Drawing boundaries: normativity, linguistic meaning, semantic content . 6 2.2 Current debate on semantic normativity . 8 2.2.1 Normativity as Prescriptivism ................. 8 2.2.2 Anti-normativist objections . 10 2.2.3 Reactions to anti-normativism . 13 2.2.4 Unsettled conclusions . 14 2.3 A prior, unanswered, concrete and constrained question . 15 2.3.1 A prior and unanswered question . 15 2.3.2 A concrete question . 17 2.3.3 A constrained question . 23 2.4 Methodological statement . 26 2.4.1 Why look at ethics? . 26 2.4.2 Our planning ahead . 28 3 Ethics and justification 31 3.1 What is NQ for Korsgaard? . 31 3.1.1 General constraints . 32 3.1.2 Three conditions: perspective, accessibility, and identity . 34 3.2 Insufficient attempts . 36 3.2.1 Voluntarism . 36 3.2.2 Realism . 37 3.2.3 Humean reflective endorsement . 39 3.3 Laws for reflective success: the appeal to autonomy . 41 3.3.1 Laws for a free will . 41 3.3.2 Korsgaard's claim for the existence of obligations . 43 iii 3.3.3 Autonomy meets the conditions . 43 3.4 Conclusions and plans . 46 4 Linguistic meaning and justification 49 4.1 Three conditions for the normative question in semantics . 50 4.1.1 Three perspectives . 50 4.1.2 Accessibility to the source and its reasons . 53 4.1.3 The source, its reasons and our practical identity . 58 4.2 Alternative sources for semantic normativity . 62 4.2.1 Voluntarism . 62 4.2.2 Realism . 67 4.2.3 Humean reflective endorsement . 71 4.3 Laws for reflective success: the appeal to autonomy . 77 4.3.1 Failed attempts . 77 4.3.2 The role of the interlocutor . 80 4.3.3 Evaluation of this proposal . 83 4.4 Conclusion . 89 5 Assessment of our proposal 91 5.1 Importance for the debate . 91 5.1.1 Conclusions of the debate and the generality of Prescriptivism ......................... 92 5.1.2 (Anti)-naturalists, (anti) intrinsicalists, (contra) hypothetical norms . 98 5.2 Normative reasons in ethics and semantics . 101 5.2.1 Normative statements or judgments? . 101 5.2.2 A reduction of the sources? . 102 5.2.3 Normative reasons, ethics and semantics . 102 5.3 Importance for the formal semanticist . 103 5.3.1 Why Inquisitive Semantics and Pragmatics? . 104 5.3.2 Formal semantics and the source of semantic normativity . 107 5.3.3 The source of normativitity in ISP . 110 5.4 Delimiting justification: non-literal interpretation . 112 5.4.1 A very basic model for metaphors . 113 5.4.2 Expected metaphors are dead . 114 6 Conclusion 117 Bibliography 121 iv Acknowledgments The thoughts and arguments in this thesis address a tangible and urgent worry for myself, the epistemological question about the justification of judgments about se- mantic (in)correctness. Prof. Stokhof has given me patient and thorough guidance in order to unravel this worry, articulate it and give it a structured presentation. He has intensely helped me to realize several of my mistakes, to appreciate the value of some of my remarks, and mostly to become aware of their implications. My inquisitive stance has matured and I am deeply thankful for that. Prof. Urtubey, my teacher in C´ordoba,encouraged me to attend to my present urgencies. Studying logic has given me the training to try to express them clearly. His teaching still directs the lines of my arguments. His calm and constant ex- ample tutors my anxious curiosity. I thank the members of my thesis committee for having accepted to read this manuscript in such short time and to attend my defense session. I wish I could have spared them a few pages to assess but I really hope they will find reading them worthwhile. My academic experience at ILLC has been unique. I am very grateful to Dick de Jongh for his advice and generosity. I also want to praise my teachers for their passionate and illuminating instruction. Benedikt L¨owe has been open-handed with advice and opportunities, and I thank him for that. Tanja Kassenaar is the axis of this programme's efficient management, a role I praise as fundamental. I also thank Nuffic for financially supporting my studies. My human experience in Amsterdam has taken my relations to an unexpected degree of appreciation and concern. I am grateful to all of my friends, of whom I have learnt so much. I mention some of them here: Ivano, Pablo, Lisa, Vahid, Bjarni, Sara R., Michael, and Maarten. I would also like to mention 10 non-native and native English speakers who patiently read and proofread parts of this manuscript: Santiago, Silvia, Michael, Sara R., Gwendoline, St´ephane,Lisa, David, Sara U. and Rob. They have helped me to correct and to make more intelligible the expression of my reflection. I thank them for being my interlocutors. Needless to say, any mistakes which remain are entirely my own responsibility. v Geographical distance from my natural family gives me constant reasons for thinking of and needing them. Gracias en especial a mam´a,pap´a,Santiago, abuela, Silvia, Juan, Helena, Valentina, Magdalena y Lucrecia. My friends in Argentina are equally present here: Mariel, Cande F., Iva, Fabi, Diego, Alba, Vale, gracias por estar ac´a.I finally thank St´ephanefor letting me share my life with him: tu es dans mon cœur, grand merci pour ton soutien. Amsterdam, 19 June 2009 vi Abstract Judgments about semantic (in)correctness in natural language occur in our daily conversations. Regarding a speaker or interpreter, we can make an assessment of her use or interpretation of an expression with respect to that expression's linguistic meaning. Judgments about semantic (in)correctness steer our behaviour in conversations. An interpreter who considers that the speaker has made a semantic mistake, or who doubts whether she understands the speaker properly, can indicate her hesitation, make a polite comment or simply protest. The same can happen with a speaker who regards the interpreter's understanding of her utterance as faulty. A witness can also interrupt a conversation to warn the participants about the blunder. Judgments about semantic (in)correctness stand in need of justification. Any- one, witness or participant of the dialogue, has a right to ask for reasons support- ing the (dis)approval of the speaker's or the interpreter's behaviour. This thesis is motivated by the seeming unclarity of what can count as a good answer. A certain irresoluteness in the discussion of the subject in the recent academic literature leaves this worry unaddressed, and this fact motivates our interrogation. In this thesis we try to characterize what can provide reasons which ade- quately justify our judgments of semantic (in)correctness. For this, we follow this methodological strategy. First we present conditions of material adequacy; evidence of judgments of semantic (in)correctness constitute data that candidate sources should accommodate. Next, we give general conditions on the source of semantic normativity and its reasons. These broad constraints are central but they do not suffice to identify what can be such a source. Further requisites are obtained by looking at the possible sources for reasons in other normative judgments. In particular, we employ Korsgaard (1996)'s system- atic examination of the sources of ethical normativity as a scaffold to approach the normative question in semantics. We study the transposition of Korsgaard's re- quirements for ethical normativity onto the justification of semantic judgments, and we propose and discuss candidate sources for the normativity of meaning analogous to those she considers for ethics. The results of the discussion will allow us to re-focus on the recent literature with a sharper perspective on what can settle their debate. Moreover, they reveal a certain connection between between (meta)semantics and (meta)ethics. Finally, they raise certain issues to which disciplines within semantics, such as formal semantics, have to attend. vii Chapter 1 Introduction This thesis is concerned with the issue of the justification of judgments about semantic (in)correctness in natural language. When we use a word or expression and when we interpret an agent's (even our own) use of words or expressions in an utterance, our performance is liable to evaluations of many sorts, e.g., is the utterance or written piece audible/legible? Is the pronunciation/spelling correct? Is the tone or register adequate? We focus in this thesis on the justification of the following two forms of appraisal: a) Regarding a speaker, we can make an assessment of her use of an expression with respect to that expression's linguistic meaning. b) As to the interpreter, we can make an evaluation of her understanding of the speaker's use of that word or expression with respect to that expression's linguistic meaning. The assessments in (a) and (b) give a judgment or appreciation which affects the following moves of the agent who makes it. Semantic judgments are not always uttered but they certainly steer the behaviour of the speaker, the hearer or a witness of a conversation.