J.L. SHAW ¯ ¯ CAUSALITY: SAM. KHYA, BAUDDHA AND NYAYA INTRODUCTION Causality, in the context of Indian Philosophy, plays an important role not only in metaphysics, but also in epistemology, ethics, and all other branches of philosophy. It is presupposed in the discussion of almost any topic in philosophy. It is also used to define different sources of valid cognition, such as perception, inference, comparison, testimony, etc. The nature of ultimate reality is also dependent on a particular conception of causality. It is also used to determine the relationship between the different goals of life such as righteous activity (dharma), worldly possession (artha), pleasure (kama¯ ), and liberation (moks. a). In this paper I would like to discuss the following questions, amongst many others, from the standpoint of the Sam¯ . khya, the Bauddha and the Nyaya¯ philosophical systems of Indian philosophy: • Whether the cause or the material cause (upad¯ ana¯ karan¯ . a) contains the effect in any form prior to its production, • Whether causality (karan¯ . atva) can be defined in terms of efficacy or productivity (artha-kriyak¯ aritva¯ ), • How to define and classify causal conditions (karan¯ . as), • Whether the terms ‘effect’, ‘event’ and ‘action’ refer to the same thing or have the same meaning. In the first section I shall discuss the first question with reference to the controversy between the Sam¯ . khya and the Nyaya-Vai¯ ´ses.ika philosophers. The second question will be discussed in the second section with reference to the views of the Bauddha philosophers. The remaining questions will be discussed in the third section with reference On 27 January 2001, the 3rd Matilal Memorial Conference on Indian Philosophy was held at king’s College, London. The following paper was a keynote address to this conference and is dedicated to the memory of my teacher Professor B.K. Matilal. He was not only a great scholar but also a great organizer and the founding editor of the Journal of Indian Philosophy. Since he was a source of inspiration to the scholars of Indian and Comparative Philosophy, he will always be remembered with deep gratitude and admiration. Journal of Indian Philosophy 30: 213–270, 2002. c 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 214 J.L. SHAW to the views of the Nyaya¯ philosophers. The fourth section will deal with the application of causality to certain epistemological issues from the Nyaya¯ point of view. In the fifth section I shall point out that the different schools of Indian philosophy have focused on different aspects of causality. SECTION I The followers of the Nyaya-Vai¯ ´ses.ika and the M¯ımam¯ . sa¯ claim that there is an absolute difference (atyanta-bheda) between the cause and the effect. The effect cannot be said to be identical with its material cause (upad¯ ana¯ karan¯ . a). In this context it is to be noted that the upad¯ ana¯ karan¯ . a (material cause) of the Sam¯ . khya philosophers is not the same as the samavay¯ ık¯ aran¯ . a (inherent cause) of the Nyaya.¯ According to the Nyaya¯ an effect resides or inheres in its samavay¯ ık¯ aran¯ . a (inherent cause). Hence the latter exists as long as the effect exists. When milk is transformed into yoghurt, the milk does not exist. Hence the milk cannot be considered as the inherent cause of the yoghurt. When milk is transformed into yoghurt, there are chemical changes in the ultimate parts or the atoms of the milk. Therefore, the transformed atoms of the milk are in the yoghurt. Since the yoghurt resides in the parts by the relation of inherence, the latter would be the inherent cause according to the Nyaya.¯ But the Sam¯ . khya philosophers consider milk as the material cause, and the effect in its subtle form resides in its material cause. In other words, the effect in its unmanifest (avyakta) form is present in its material cause. Hence the sprout in its unmanifest form is also present in the seed. Similar is the case with oil or any other effect. But according to the Nyaya¯ philosophers an effect is not present in its cause or set of causes in any form. Moreover, milk is not the inherent cause but an instrumental cause of yoghurt. Similarly, the seed is the instrumental cause of the sprout and the oil seed is the instrumental cause of oil. From this difference between these two systems one should not conclude that the material cause of the Sam¯ . khya is always different from the inherent cause of the Nyaya.¯ For example, a pot resides in its parts which are inherent causal conditions of the Nyaya,¯ but they are material causes of the Sam¯ . khya. Similarly, the threads of a piece of cloth are inherent causes of the Nyaya,¯ but the material causes of the Sam¯ . khya. Hence these two types of condition are not totally different. From the above remark it follows that according to the Nyaya¯ the causal conditions do not contain the effect in any form prior to its production. Similarly, when a pot is destroyed or ceases to exist, the CAUSALITY 215 parts of the pot do not have the pot even in its subtle form. The theory of the Nyaya-Vai¯ ´ses.ika and the M¯ımam¯ . sa¯ philosophers is known as asatkaryav¯ ada¯ (the doctrine that the effect is non-existent prior to its production). The Sam¯ . khya philosophers claim that the effect in its subtle form is present in the cause or the set of causal conditions. In other words, the effect in its essence is not different (abheda) from its cause or causal conditions. In the Sam¯ . khya philosophy, the word ‘production’ does not mean ‘creation of a totally new object’. Similarly, ‘destruction’ does not mean ‘total cessation of an object’. Everything is a manifes- tation of Nature called ‘prakr. ti’. Instead of the word ‘production’ or ‘creation’ the Sam¯ . khya philosophers use the expression ‘manifestation’ or ‘appearance’. Similarly, instead of ‘destruction’ or ‘cessation’ they prefer the word ‘disappearance’. No one denies that causality involves change, but the Sam¯ . khya philosophers interpret change as a state from ¯ unmanifest to manifest or from manifest to unmanifest. I´svarakr.s.n. a in his Sam¯ . khyakarik¯ a¯ has put forward five arguments in favour of the view that the effect is real or exists (sat) in some form even before its production. Hence the word ‘appearance’ is more appropriate than ‘creation’. Let us discuss these arguments of the Sam¯ . khya philosophers. It is claimed that what is unreal cannot be subject to causal operation (karan¯ . avyap¯ ara¯ ), or cannot be produced by a set of causal conditions. If something is unreal, then nothing can produce it. For this reason the horn of a hare and the son of a barren woman are treated as unreal. An effect is not unreal in this sense. It is related to a particular cause or set of causal conditions. For this reason milk is transformed into yoghurt, a sprout comes out of a seed, oil can be extracted from oil seeds, a building can be constructed out of bricks, mortar, etc. All the five arguments of the Sam¯ . khya philosophers have the form modus tollens. Hence by using the rules of modus tollens and double negation they have tried to establish the existence of the effect prior to its production. 1. The first argument may be stated in the following way: • If the effect does not exist prior to its production, then its cause does not exist or it has no cause. In other words, if something is unreal, then nothing can make it an existent entity (or it has no cause). • But there are causes of an effect. • Therefore, the effect does exist prior to its production (or mani- festation). 216 J.L. SHAW Against this argument of the Sam¯ . khya, the opponents have claimed that the effect is not unreal or non-existent like the horn of a hare. If it were non-existent like the horn of a hare, then nothing can produce it or it does not come under causal operation (karn¯ . avyap¯ ara¯ ). When it is said that an effect is unreal or non-existent (asat)whatismeantisthat it has no being or existence prior to causal operation or the set of causal conditions (karan¯ . asamagr¯ ı¯). Since the opponents of the Sam¯ . khya have used a counter-probans (pratihetu) to establish the conclusion that the effect does not exist, the argument of the Sam¯ . khya involves the fallacy of satpratipaks.a (existence of counter-thesis). In other words, the Sam¯ . khya philosophers have proposed the following thesis: If the effect is non-existent like the horn of a hare, then it has no cause. In this thesis the locus of inference (paks. a) is the effect, the probans (hetu) is the property of being non-existent like the horn of a hare, and the probandum (sadhya¯ ) is having no cause. But the Nyaya¯ philosophers would propose the following counter-thesis: If the effect is not non-existent like the horn of a hare, then it has a cause. 2. The second argument of the Sam¯ . khya philosophers emphasizes the invariable relation between a material cause (upad¯ ana¯ karan¯ . a)and its effect. It may be formulated in the following way: • If the effect does not exist prior to its production, it cannot be related to its material cause. • But an effect is related to its material cause. Consider the relation between a seed and the sprout, between milk and yoghurt, between oil seeds and oil, or between the parts of a pot and the pot.