Current Launch System Industrial Base Ray F. Johnson Vice President Space Launch Operations Space Systems Group The Aerospace Corporation October 19, 2011 © The Aerospace Corporation 2011 Agenda • EELV Launch Systems and Industrial Base • Rocket Propulsion Industrial Base 2 Atlas V Evolution GTO Capability (klbs) Atlas II/III Family Atlas V Family 30 Stretched 5.4 m 5.4 m Payload Payload 25 Fairing Fairing 3.3m/4.2m Payload Fairing (PLF) Dual Engine 20 Centaur Single Common Avionics (DEC) Engine Centaur Upgrades (RL10A-4-1) Centaur RL10A-4-2 GSO Kits (SEC) 3.1m 3.8m 15 Interstage Common Assembly Core (ISA) Booster BoosterTM Core LOX (CCB) 3.1m Stretch Booster Core 10 (MA-5A Solid Booster & Rocket Sustainer CCB Boosters Engines) SRBs Liquid (SRBs) RD-180 Rocket 5 Engine Boosters Atlas V Atlas V Atlas V (4XX Series) (5XX Series) Atlas V Atlas IIA Atlas IIAS Atlas IIIA Atlas IIIB (401) (1-3 SRBs) (0-5 SRBs) (Heavy) IOC 6/92 12/93 5/00 2/02 8/02 7/03 3 Delta IV Evolution GTO Delta II/III Family Delta IV Family Capability (klbs) Stretched 4m Stretched Payload 5.1m 30 5.1m Fairing Payload Fairing Payload Fairing 2.9m/3m 25 Payload Fairing (PLF) Delta III 4m Upper Upper STAR 48/37FM Payload Stage Stage SRM Fairing Widened & Third Stage Stretched Stretched 20 Hyper Engine Second Stage Cryo (AJ10-118K ) Second 2.4m Stage 5.1m Interstage RL10B-2 15 Common 2.4m Booster Booster Core Core (RS-27A (CBC) Booster 10 Engine) CBC Liquid Castor IVA GEM 46 GEM 60 GEM 40 Rocket Solid Rocket (SRBs) (SRBs) (SRBs) Boosters Boosters CBC 5 RS-68 Engine Delta IV Delta IV Delta II Delta II Delta III Delta IV (Med+ 4 series) (Med+ 5 series) Delta IV (69XX) (79XX) (89XX) (Med) (2 SRBs) (2 or 4 SRBS) (Heavy) IOC 2/89 11/90 8/98 3/03 11/02 7/04 4 EELV Industrial Base • As EELV’s anchor tenant, NSS must provide a steady production rate, decoupled from launch manifest, to establish a healthy industrial base – Launch industrial base is shrinking due to decreased market; exacerbated by current USG buying practices • Solution: steady production rate provides long-term, focused, and well- defined commitment to industry – Removes uncertainty from program and retains capacity – Preserves capability for next generation space launch 5 EELV Industrial Base (Cont’d) • Rate is the key factor that keeps prime and sub production from going dark, increasing costs/risks – Detailed analysis with ULA, PWR, ATK, Aerojet – Restart / recertification cost and effort significant • Keystone of new EELV approach is annual minimum production rate of 8 cores – 4 Atlas, 4 Delta -- 5 USAF / 3 NRO / year commitment • Steady production achieved through Block Buys – “Block” = Annual Production Rate X Defined Duration Production Rate Commitment Critical To Industrial Base Health and EELV Program Stability 6 U.S. Rocket Engine Development 1945-2010 • Today, there are no new engine development programs in the U.S. 20 19 Post Space Space 18 Race EELV Ares WWII Shuttle 17 Dev. & COTS 16 15 EnginesNewNumberof inDevelopment Development 14 Period 13 12 11 10 9 EngineSystem 8 # of New 7 Engines 6 5 4 3 2 1 Year 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Reprinted with permission of CPIAC 7 U.S. Rocket Propulsion Industry Evolution • Since 1941, more than a dozen U.S. companies had been involved in rocket propulsion business • Only a few major U.S. companies are active today, however various new commercial space entities are emerging From 1941 Today Liquid Solid Rocketdyne Liquid Thiokol Solid Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne Pratt & Whitney Hercules TRW Aerojet Atlantic Research Corp Northrop Aerojet ATK General Electric Grand Central Rocket Co. Grumman American Pacific Corp Rocket Research Corp Rohm & Hass Co. Space-X Hamilton Standard Div. United Technology Center Reaction Motors Small Business Blue Origin, Busek, Exquadrum, Florida Turbine, Orbitec WASK, Williams International, XCOR & many more… 8 Liquid Rocket Engines “State of the Industry:” • Limited recent U.S. liquid rocket engine development – RS-68 and Merlin – Designed to focus on reducing production recurring costs – J-2X is completing development – RL10 (A-4-2, B-2) – multiple performance enhancements, reduced overall design margins • 50-year-old craftsman-based manufacturing • Limited growth opportunity without major redesign – RD-180 – Produced in Russia with insight from the US companies – AJ26 – Americanization of Russian NK33 – SSME – Last NASA funded development effort resulting in steady production – DoD Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology (IHPRPT), funded ~$200M over last 15 years -- technology focused only • New commercial space companies entering the market – SpaceX, OSC, Blue Origin, Virgin Galactic, Sierra Nevada, etc… – Potentially “disruptive” to current access to space cost model – Still building maturity required for critical high value payloads – Long term market demand is uncertain 9 Operational Liquid Engines in U.S. Today Atlas V Delta IV Space Shuttle Falcon Developer: Commercial (Space-X) RETIRED NEW ENTRANT RL10A-4-2 RL10B-2 (2011) (LOX/LH2, 22k lbf) (LOX/LH2, 25k lbf) Merlin (1X) • First flown in • First flown in 1963 (LOX/RP, 1963 • Currently flying at 2X • Currently flying at design Pc High Expansion 2X design Pc Nozzle) Kestrel (LOX/RP, 6k lbf) SSME (3X) (400 Series) (500 Series) (LOX/LH2, (1) (9) 408k lbf SL) RD-180 (Med) (Med+ 4m) (Med+ 5m) (Heavy) Merlin (1X/9X) (LOX/RP, 860k lbf SL) RS-68 • First flown in (LOX/RP, 1981 115-125k lbf SL) • First flown (LOX/LH2, 656k lbf SL) • Retired in 2011 in 2002 • First flown in 2002 • First successful • Russian • RS-68A upgrade flight in 2008 made design certification (Falcon 1) completed in 2011 Delta II retiring after 2 NASA missions Reprinted courtesy of U.S. Air Force 10 LOX/LH2 Upper Stage Engines World’s 1st Hydrogen Engine & Its Evolution Engine Qualification Year 1961 1963 1966 1967 1985 1991 1994 1998 1999 2000 Model A-1 A-3 A-3-1 A-3-3 A-3-3A A-4 A-4-1 B-2 A - 4 - 1A A-4-2 RL10A-1 RL10A-3 RL10A-3-3A RL10B-2 RL10A-4-2 • 15k lbf • 15k lbf • 16.5k lbf • 24.7k lbf • 22.3k lbf • Pc=300 psia • Pc=300 psia • Pc=475 psia • Pc=640 psia • Pc=610 psia • Isp = 422 s • Isp = 427 s • Isp = 444.4 s • Isp = 464 s • Isp = 451 s (Delta IV) (Atlas V) st st The World’s 1 The World’s 1 • Successive increases in performance over 50 years “Qualified” “Flown” (running at 2X design Pc) LOX/LH2 LOX/LH2 Engine Engine 11 Next Generation Engine (NGE) Overview • USAF considering an LOX/LH2 alternative engine to replace aging RL10 – Request for Information posted September 2010 • NGE Objectives Top-level Technical Requirements – Modern manufacturing techniques & materials Thrust (vacuum) 30klbfs – Increased designed-in reliability and performance margins Isp (vacuum) 465 seconds or greater – Sustainable and low cost Nozzle Fixed (preferred, but not • Creates interagency partnership opportunity required) Restartable Minimum of 4 flight starts – Incorporates NSS & NASA requirements Life expectancy 3000 seconds or greater – Captures emerging commercial needs Reusable Not required • Leverage advanced design tools & technologies Mixture Ratio Adjustable during matured by AFRL/NASA technology investment operation Length (gimbal to NTE 90 inches – e.g. AFRL Upper Stage Engine Technology (USET) nozzle exit) • Creates open competition Exit Diameter NTE 73 inches (desired) Threshold Reliability 0.9990 or greater – Bolster U.S. liquid propulsion industrial base capability NGE serves critical need for modern, reliable, cost effective engine, sustainment of industrial base and U.S. leadership in propulsion technology 12 Lessons Learned Launch Failures • In past 50 years, propulsion enabled ballistic and spacelift capabilities – Powered first US ICBMs – Evolved into space launch vehicle systems – Continuous improvements in performance, reliability, operability • Historically, more than 40% of all launch vehicle failures caused by propulsion subsystem malfunctions (#1 contributor)* Launch Vehicle Subsystem Failures (2010-9-30) by Tomei, E. J., & Chang, I.- Improving propulsion S., Aerospace subsystem reliability is critical to mitigating future launch failures • A launch failure incurs the loss of not only expensive hardware (launch vehicles/satellites), but extremely high recovery cost 13 .