PAKISTAN: NO END TO HUMANITARIAN CRISES Asia Report N°237 – 9 October 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. HUMANITARIAN CRISES AND STATE CAPACITY ............................................... 2 A. MILITANCY AND MILITARY OPERATIONS..................................................................................... 2 B. NATURAL DISASTERS .................................................................................................................. 3 C. STATE CAPACITY ......................................................................................................................... 4 1. Disaster Response ........................................................................................................................ 4 2. Shrinking humanitarian space ...................................................................................................... 7 III. RELIEF, REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION ....................................... 9 A. CASH ASSISTANCE ....................................................................................................................... 9 B. MISSED OPPORTUNITIES ............................................................................................................ 12 1. Sindh .......................................................................................................................................... 12 2. FATA and PATA ....................................................................................................................... 16 IV. THE COST OF INTERNATIONAL DIVISION ......................................................... 19 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 21 APPENDICES A. MAP OF PAKISTAN ........................................................................................................................... 23 B. GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................................................... 24 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 25 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2009 ......................................................... 26 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 29 Asia Report N°237 9 October 2012 PAKISTAN: NO END TO HUMANITARIAN CRISES EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS With three years of devastating floods putting the lives recurrent flooding. The 2012 monsoon season has already and livelihoods of at least four million citizens at risk, and caused massive devastation in upper Sindh, Punjab’s south- military operations against militants displacing thousands western districts of Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpur and more in the conflict zones of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) parts of eastern Balochistan. province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan’s humanitarian crises need urgent do- Conflict- and flood-induced displacement has brought mestic and international attention. Since the democratic economic hardships – and the state’s limited capacity for transition began in 2008, some progress has been made, development and service provision – into sharp relief. It but much more is needed to build the federal and provin- has also increased the potential for conflict, with radical cial governments’ disaster and early recovery response. Islamist groups gaining ample opportunities to recruit those Efforts to enhance civilian ownership and control have also most affected by humanitarian crises. In areas of displace- had mixed results, particularly in the conflict zones, where ment in KPK and FATA where the military still holds sway, the military remains the dominant actor. To effectively short-term security objectives often determine eligibility confront the challenges, the most urgent tasks remain to for state assistance. Additional restrictions have been placed strengthen the civilian government’s capacity to plan for on the activities and access of international and local NGOs and cope with humanitarian crises and to prioritise social and other humanitarian actors, particularly since the May sector and public infrastructure development. It is equally 2011 U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden near a major important that all assistance and support be non-discrimi- military academy in Abbottabad. While radical jihadi organ- natory and accompanied by credible mechanisms for citi- isations, such as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD) – the renamed zens to hold public officials accountable. Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) – are operating freely, using their charity fronts to win support, the state’s failure to provide The military’s suspicions of and animosity toward foreign adequate and timely assistance is aggravating public re- actors undermine efforts to improve the humanitarian com- sentment, undermining its credibility and that of its inter- munity’s coordination with government agencies, and alle- national partners. gations that humanitarian aid is a cover for foreign intel- ligence activity threatens staff and beneficiaries’ security. More than three years after the military declared victory Radical Islamist lobbies, including militant groups opposed over Swat-based militants, soldiers remain deployed in to donor involvement, exploit the gaps in assistance. Spo- KPK’s Malakand region. While their presence on the streets radic, selective, and heavy-handed military operations have, creates a semblance of security, the military’s dominant in 2012 alone, displaced hundreds of thousands, particu- role in maintaining order, reconstructing public infrastruc- larly in FATA’s Khyber Agency. While conflict-induced ture and determining the post-conflict agenda undermines displacement is now on a lesser scale in KPK’s Malakand civilian government capacity. The rule of law has also been region than in the spring of 2009, when a major military undermined, particularly by the Actions (in Aid of Civil offensive against Swat-based militants displaced 2.8 mil- Power) Regulations 2011 for both FATA and the Provin- lion, the army’s failure to root out militancy has resulted cially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), of which Swat in constant displacements. is a part. These regulations give the military the authority to detain militant suspects indefinitely, including in intern- In 2010, countrywide floods affected some twenty mil- ment centres that reportedly house over 1,100 detainees, lion, with massive destruction to infrastructure and liveli- thus violating constitutionally guaranteed fundamental hoods. Heavy monsoon rains in the following year further rights of fair trial and legal appeal. Similarly, the Nizam- weakened dams and irrigation infrastructure, flooding e-Adl Regulation 2009, imposing Sharia (Islamic law) in large parts of Sindh, particularly its southern districts, and PATA, undermines basic legal rights and excludes the re- Balochistan. A fragile infrastructure, combined with de- gion from the constitutional mainstream. forestation and climate change, has heightened the risk of Pakistan: No End To Humanitarian Crises Crisis Group Asia Report N°237, 9 October 2012 Page ii The social impact of flood- and conflict-induced displace- 5. Ensure inclusive humanitarian assistance by: ments is no less severe. In Sindh, economic deprivation a) demonstrating a strong commitment to the princi- resulting from recurrent floods has provoked a spike in pal of voluntary returns by continuing assistance crime that could spiral into a major law and order prob- to those who choose not to opt for state-sponsored lem, while creating opportunities for jihadi organisations return operations; to exploit public alienation. Tackling the causes and con- sequences of these humanitarian crises goes beyond hu- b) extending Watan card (cash card) provision to all manitarian action and will require state policies that pro- Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in- mote more equitable social and economic development ternally displaced persons (IDPs), within and out- and guarantee legal protections and political inclusion. side camps; c) using the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) RECOMMENDATIONS as a model for other cash assistance schemes countrywide; To the Federal and Provincial Governments d) extending assistance to residents fleeing militant of Pakistan: violence in parts of FATA where the military has not intervened and thus not designated a conflict- 1. Prioritise building provincial- and district-level state zone; and capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies, in- cluding by appointing permanent staff for all district e) delinking government assistance to reconstruct disaster management units and providing them with houses and restart livelihoods in the flood-affected the necessary training and technical and financial agricultural sector from proof of landownership resources. or tenure and instead developing trust-based alter- natives for proof of landownerhip or tenure where 2. Mitigate the effects of future monsoon floods by pri- natural disasters have destroyed documentation. oritising irrigation and flood control infrastructure reconstruction. 6. Ensure accountable humanitarian assistance