10 United States Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism Released August 2011 Country Reports on Terrorism 2010 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act. COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2010 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1. STRATEGIC AssEssMENT..............................................................9 CHAPTER 2. COUNTRY REPORTS ...................................................................12 AFRICA OVERVIEW ..........................................................................12 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership The Partnership for East African Regional Counterterrorism Burkina Faso Burundi Comoros Democratic Republic of the Congo Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Kenya Mali Mauritania Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Somalia South Africa Tanzania Uganda EAST AsIA AND PACIFIC OVERVIEW........................................................30 Australia Cambodia China • Hong Kong • Macau Indonesia Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) Japan Malaysia New Zealand Philippines Singapore Thailand EUROPE OVERVIEW .........................................................................47 Albania Armenia Austria Azerbaijan Belgium Bosnia and Herzegovina Cyprus Denmark France Georgia Germany Greece Ireland Italy Kosovo The Netherlands Norway Russia Serbia Spain Sweden Turkey Ukraine United Kingdom MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA OVERVIEW.............................................79 Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iraq Israel, West Bank, and Gaza • Palestinian Territories Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen SOUTH AND CENTRAL AsIA OVERVIEW...................................................109 Afghanistan Bangladesh India Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan WESTERN HEMISPHERE OVERVIEW .....................................................129 Argentina Bolivia Brazil Canada Caribbean Basin • Jamaica • Trinidad and Tobago Chile Colombia Ecuador Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Venezuela CHAPTER 3. STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM OVERVIEW ..................................................149 Cuba Iran Sudan Syria CHAPTER 4. THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE OF WMD TERRORISM................................................154 CHAPTER 5. TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS (7120 REPORT) ......................................................... 159 1a. Terrorist Safe Havens .................................................................... 159 1b. Strategies, Tactics, and Tools for Disrupting or Eliminating Safe Havens ........... 163 • International Conventions and Protocols Matrix .................................... 173 2. Support for Pakistan...................................................................... 180 3. Counterterrorism Coordination with Saudi Arabia ..................................... 180 4. Broadcasting Board of Governors Initiatives: Outreach to Foreign Muslim Audiences ............................................................ 181 5. Economic Reform ......................................................................... 187 6. Basic Education in Muslim Majority Countries ......................................... 191 CHAPTER 6. TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ............................................................. 198 Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) Al-Qa’ida (AQ) Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Al-Shabaab (AS) Ansar al-Islam Asbat al-Ansar Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG) Hamas Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) Hizballah Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) Jemaah Islamiya (JI) Jundallah Kahane Chai Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT) Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ) Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) Mujahadin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) National Liberation Army (ELN) Palestine Liberation Front – Abu Abbas Faction (PLF) Palestinian Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) Real IRA (RIRA) Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) Revolutionary Struggle (RS) Shining Path (SL) Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) CHAPTER 7. LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS AND KEY TERMS ....................................... 241 NCTC STATISTICAL ANNEX .............................................................................. 245 SUPPLEMENT ON TERRORISM DEATHS, INJURIES, KIDNAPPINGS OF PRIVATE U.S. CITIZENS ............................................................................... 252 8 CHAPTER 1. STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT Al-Qa’ida (AQ) remained the preeminent terrorist threat to the United States in 2010. Though the AQ core in Pakistan has become weaker, it retained the capability to conduct regional and transnational attacks. Cooperation between AQ and Afghanistan- and Pakistan-based militants was critical to the threat the group posed. In addition, the danger posed by Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LeT) and increased resource-sharing between AQ and its Pakistan-based allies and associates such as Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Haqqani Network meant the aggregate threat in South Asia remained high. In addition, the affiliates have grown stronger. While AQ senior leadership continued to call for strikes on the U.S. homeland and to arrange plots targeted at Europe, the diversity of these efforts demonstrated the fusion of interests and the sharing of capabilities among AQ groups with different geographical focuses. We saw TTP provide support to U.S. citizen Faisal Shahzad, who sought to carry out a car bombing in Times Square in May. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continued to demonstrate its growing ambitions and a strong desire to carry out attacks outside of its region. The group followed up its December 25, 2009 attempt to destroy an airliner bound for Detroit with an October 2010 effort to blow up several U.S.-bound airplanes by shipping bombs that were intended to detonate while in the planes’ cargo holds. Information about potential AQ plots in Europe prompted several European countries to raise their terror alerts toward the end of the year. On December 11, a car bomb device was detonated minutes before Sweden’s first ever suicide bomber carried out an attack in a crowded pedestrian area in Stockholm. Similarly, al-Shabaab in East Africa, some of whose senior leaders have declared adherence to the AQ brand of violent extremism, gained strength in 2010 and conducted its first major attack outside of Somalia in July when it claimed responsibility for twin suicide bombings that killed 76 people in Kampala, Uganda, during the World Cup. Al-Shabaab’s widening scope of operations, safe haven in Somalia, and ability to attract Western militants, made it a continuing threat to U.S. interests in the region. In addition to operations, AQ affiliates have taken on a greater share of the propaganda work. AQAP created AQ’s first English-language magazine, Inspire. Although the magazine failed to arouse sustained interest from Western media, it proved a platform for dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen, Anwar al-Aulaqi, who emerged as an operational and ideological leader in AQAP. In a troubling trend, English-speaking militants increasingly connected to each other through online venues like militant discussion forums and video-sharing platforms, which encouraged both violent behavior and individual action. Many participants in online communities have real-world relation- ships with extremists who bolster their radicalism and mobilize them toward violent action. Five Pakistani Americans contacted by a Taliban recruiter through YouTube encouraged one another to travel to Pakistan to train for warfare against the United States; they remained in Pakistani custody at year’s end. Several Somali Americans decided to go overseas to fight with al-Shabaab – a deci- sion that was likely shaped by a combination of online propaganda, face-to-face recruitment, and supportive real-world peer networks. 9 New York City: U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton speaks during a UN Security Council meeting on terrorism September 27, 2010. AFP PHOTO/Don Emmert Not all of AQ’s formal affiliates and informal allies presented as grave a threat to U.S. interests in 2010. No group has made a bigger name for itself in the kidnapping for ransom business than al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which relies on ransom payments to sustain and develop itself in the harsh Saharan environment. AQIM carried out several attacks and continued kidnapping foreigners for ransom but is not an existential threat to governments in the region. The U.S. govern- ment urged its allies to refuse to pay AQIM and other terrorist group’s ransoms, which have become a primary means of financial support for terrorist