Tob Control: first published as 10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2015-052582 on 28 September 2015. Downloaded from Research paper Tobacco industry interference with tobacco control policies in Poland: legal aspects and industry practices Łukasz Balwicki,1 Michał Stokłosa,2 Małgorzata Balwicka-Szczyrba,3 Wioleta Tomczak4 ▸ Additional material is ABSTRACT has had only moderate success in implementing its published online only. To view Background Since 2006, when Poland ratified the WHO provisions. Poland’s tobacco control law underwent please visit the journal online Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), there revision in 2010 and 2011 to extend smoke-free (http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/ 5 tobaccocontrol-2015-052582). have been efforts to improve tobacco control regulation in areas and improve point-of-purchase regulation; the country. At the same time, at the European Union however, the scope of the revision has been greatly 1Department of Public Health and Social Medicine, Medical level, Poland took part in discussions over revision of the reduced during the legislative process. Despite rati- University of Gdansk, Gdańsk, Tobacco Tax Directive and the Tobacco Products Directive. fying the WHO FCTC, many tobacco control regu- Poland This study aims to explore the tobacco industry’s tactics to lations still do not meet its requirements. For 2 Economic and Health Policy interfere with the creation of those policies. example, Poland still has partial smoke-free laws6 Research, American Cancer Methods Analysis of 257 documents obtained through and incomplete advertisement, promotion7 and Society, Atlanta, Georgia, USA 8 3Department of Civil Law, freedom of information request. sponsorship bans. At the European Union (EU) University of Gdansk, Gdańsk, Results We identified three means that the tobacco level, Poland actively opposed tobacco control mea- Poland 4 industry used to interfere with tobacco control policies: sures proposed during revision of the Tobacco Department of Oncological creating a positive attitude, expressing a will to be a part of Products Directive from 2010 to 2014.910 Propedeutics, Medical ’ University of Gdansk, Gdańsk, the policymaking process, and exerting pressure. We found Poland s limited progress in implementing Poland that those tactics have often been used unethically, with tobacco control measures has been shaped by the the industry providing the government with ready tobacco industry’sinfluence on government insti- Correspondence to legislation proposals, overstating its contribution to the tutions. Poland, the second-largest cigarette pro- Michal Stoklosa, Economic and 11 copyright. Health Policy Research, economy and the government revenues, misrepresenting ducer in the EU, is an important player in the American Cancer Society, the illicit cigarette problem and misusing scientific industry’s battle against tobacco control policies 250 Williams St Atlanta, evidence. The industry also used legal threats, including on the continent. No regulation constrains the GA 30303, USA; use of bilateral trade agreements, against implementation tobacco industry’slobbyinginPoland(seeonline [email protected] of tobacco control measures. The companies lobbied supplementary appendix 1 for a more legal Received 8 July 2015 together directly and through third parties, with the background). Accepted 4 September 2015 cigarette excise tax structure being the only area of Evidence suggests that the tobacco industry Published Online First disagreement among the companies. The industry also works aggressively to prevent or delay progress in – http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/ 28 September 2015 pushed the Polish government to challenge tobacco control tobacco control policies.10 12 16 The industry uses policies in countries with stronger public policy standards, the same tactics and arguments over time and including UK display bans and the Australian plain- across jurisdictions, including presenting highly packaging law. misleading economic arguments, using corporate Conclusions From an object of regulation, the tobacco social responsibility to gain governments’ favour, industry in Poland became a partner with the government using litigation or threat of litigation17 and manipu- in legislative work. Implementation of provisions of Article lating science.18 It also uses countries with weaker 5.3 of the WHO FCTC could prevent further industry political processes to interfere with tobacco control interference. policies in countries with stronger public policy standards.17 In 2012, the issue of the tobacco industry’s interference was the theme of the WHO on September 28, 2021 by guest. Protected INTRODUCTION World No Tobacco Day.19 Poland is among the countries with the highest death Literature on the tobacco industry’sinfluence rate due to cigarette smoking, with 74 000 Poles over policymakers and the public in Poland is dying annually from tobacco use.1 Additionally, mil- scarce. One study evaluated the tobacco industry’s lions of Poles suffer disability due to smoking-related public relations and corporate social responsibility chronic diseases, such as chronic obstructive pulmon- efforts to create a positive attitude towards the ary disease (with over 2 million people suffering from industry.20 Two other studies exposed the tobacco this disease in Poland).2 These premature deaths and industry’s practices of exaggerating and misrepre- disability cause tremendous economic costs and con- senting the cigarette smuggling problem.21 22 strain economic development potential.3 However, no study has analysed directly the Those deaths and suffering could be largely pre- tobacco industry’s interference with Polish tobacco fi To cite: Balwicki Ł, vented, and the socioeconomic costs avoided, by control policies. This study is the rst to systemat- Stokłosa M, Balwicka- introduction of tobacco control measures. In 2006, ically catalogue and examine the tobacco indus- Szczyrba M, et al. Tob Poland ratified the WHO Framework Convention try’s intrusion in the policymaking process in – Control 2016;25:521 526. on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC),4 but since then Poland. Balwicki Ł, et al. Tob Control 2016;25:521–526. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2015-052582 521 Tob Control: first published as 10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2015-052582 on 28 September 2015. Downloaded from Research paper Table 1 Time frame for the documents received through the Freedom of Information requests Number of documents provided Ministry Note 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 25 25 36 18 23 67 20 Ministry of Economy Forwarded documents from the years 2009–2012 only 0 0 0 1 7 17 14 Ministry of Finance 15 5 9 14 11 6 10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Failed to respond to our official request 0 0 00000 Ministry of Health Sent only sample documents 0 0 0 0 0 10 2 Ministry of the Interior 0000032 Ministry of Labor and Social Policy 0 0 00582 Ministry of Regional Development Did not receive any documents from the tobacco industry 0 0 00000 (now Ministry of Infrastructure and Development) The industry lobbying activities cannot be measured by the number of documents submitted to the government, but rather by the impact that those documents had on the policymaking. METHODS Becoming part of the policymaking process To examine the transnational tobacco industry’sinfluence over Another type of approach is to become a part of the policy- Polish tobacco control policy in Poland, we analysed correspond- making process. Industry lobbyists invited government officials – ence between the industry, its associations and government agen- for meetings,31 33 35 and expressed their willingness to actively cies. In April 2012, we submitted requests for access to public participate in policymaking.36 37 In the Ministry of Finance information to eight Polish Ministers using the Act on Access to alone, there were at least 30 meetings between government offi- Public Information (Poland’s Freedom of Information Act).23 We cials and industry representatives between 2006 and 2012.38 requested any document concerning tobacco control laws received The industry claimed that they were a necessary party in the since 2006 (the date of Poland’sWHOFCTCratification). policymaking process.39 Industry representatives provided the In response, we received copies of 355 documents via mail or government with numerous reports presenting their viewpoint – email (table 1). After examining these documents, we identified on proposed new legislation,40 44 and even provided the gov- 257 relevant documents containing messages aimed at delaying, ernment with prewritten legislative proposals.34 preventing or influencing the content of tobacco control policies From an object of regulation, the industry successfully trans- copyright. in Poland. The messages were categorised into three groups: (1) formed into being the government’s partner in legislative work. creating positive attitudes towards entities representing the inter- ests of the tobacco industry and building trust in those entities; (2) expressing lobbyists’ interest in being engaged in and aiding the creation of tobacco control policies; (3) exerting pressure on Box 1 Tobacco companies and business associations public institutions.24 lobbying to delay, prevent or influence the content of tobacco control policies in Poland from 2006 to 2012 RESULTS http://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/ The collected documents show that between 2006 and 2012 Tobacco companies there was extensive tobacco industry interference with health ▸ Altadis Polska S.A. (acquired