CHAPTER SIX THE POSITIVE METHOD: THE AUGUSTINIAN LINE 1. Transcendental Th omism and Dialectical Th eology As it is shown earlier, this kind of Derridean double movement that aspires to transcend the dichotomies of rigid relativism and subjectiv- ism, on the one hand, and objectivism, on the other, seems to survive in the face of reductio ad absurdum critique of relativism. A second criticism of Derrida, also addressed earlier, is the political paralysis of deconstructionism; deconstructionism is in no position to give an account of reasonable persuasion for action. Th is criticism seems to be turning deconstructionism against itself in terms of its ability to pro- vide positive alternative global ethics. However, deconstructionism survives even here as the dismantling of any political alternative what- soever, albeit this is a defeat insofar as poststructuralism has political ambitions. Th e situation is slightly diff erent when it comes to Ricoeur’s and MacIntyre’s view of language and interpretation; both are seen as inevitably imperfect with regard to objectivity, but, as opposed to Derrida, still capable of approaching objectivity to some degree. Th is is a controversy that seems to be very diffi cult to resolve philosophically and is the reason why, on the one hand, the rational method should be taken seriously in the face of deconstructionist critique, but also con- versely: there is no clear way to persuade a deconstructionist to adopt the principles of rational dialectics and truth-aspiring narrativity given the former’s radical emphasis on the Heideggerian idea of the fi nitude of human inference and communication. Hence, it would seem better to counter the charge of deconstructionism through addressing the problem of fi nitude in a more radical way than within the framework of the inductive type of rational method. Some Heideggerian paths opened up by recent interpretations in the Th omist tradition seem to lead in directions not in line with the classi- cal Th omist version presented through MacIntyre. For instance, so- called transcendental Th omism, in line with Küng, acknowledges the dimension of unconditionality, as the ground of ethics more than does the MacIntyrean dialectical model indebted to Aristotle. Indeed, it is the positive method: the augustinian line 349 telling to juxtapose the idea of ‘basic trust’ in PWE with Bernard Lonergan’s and Karl Rahner’s Th omism, which, in signifi cant respects, is more akin to what I call the positive method as opposed to the ratio- nal method. Earlier I took up Küng’s focal concept ‘fundamental trust’ as echoing existentialism – both Kant’s existentialist elements and then more fully those of Bultmann. Within Catholic theology there has been a more general shift to Biblical themes, such as revelation and conversion. Within that paradigm, the corresponding conception related to Küng’s idea of ‘fundamental trust’ is a ‘fundamental option’. Th is is related to the general Th omist understanding that the ultimate end defi nes the choices and ideals an agent follows in the subordinate questions. Now, in transcendental Th omism the adoption of this ultimate and all- decisive end is seen, in light of the New Testament proclamation, as an all-or-nothing conversion to God, where God is viewed not as an object for the subject of the conversion, but rather as a horizon of meaningful reality and transcendental freedom. Of course, what these Heideg- gerian concepts, such as ‘conversion’, ‘revelation’, ‘horizon’, and ‘tran- scendental freedom’ amount to here is that human choice is ultimately not categorically free, but guided either by mundane nature or God as the realm of opening up transcendental freedom, much in the same way as Jaspers claims faith as an existential commitment to the guid- ance of ‘Being’ to be a necessary tool to subvert the Kantian antinomy of freedom.1 Th e added value of Karl Rahner to Heidegger is the former’s distinc- tion between God as infi nite being and Heidegger’s ‘Being’ as fi nite event; it is Rahner who gives a full explication of what all fi nite human horizons of meaning anticipate in divine revelation.2 Rahner’s inclusiv- istic rendering of the relationship between Christian revelation and fi nite revelation of ‘Being’ in natural theology heavily emphasizes the positive role of natural theology and thus has some affi nities with the inductive model of the rational method above, but the decisive diff er- ence is Heideggerian phenomenology set against Aristotelian dialec- tics: one cannot reason toward divine truth. It is also important that any inclusivistic rendering of Heidegger is necessarily strongly exclu- sivistic. Th is becomes evident when Rahner’s Protestant ally, Heinrich 1 Curran, 1986, 391. 2 Wilson 2007, 263–264..