COMMENTARY They did not want the state to own the means of production (socialism), and just as importantly, they did not want rIS THIS REALLY the means of production to own the state. This "separate public government" is the most precious of all the checks in NECESSARY? the American system-a neutral generic state represents the general populace. The framers of the Constitution were experientially aware of the abuses of An Open Letter to Our Colleagues unless the issue is one with which the unbridled government, but were also in the Media legislator is well familiar. cognizant that private power could ac- And any neutral observer is bound cumulate, and that the marketplace Money and political power: here is to conclude that in many cases the effect could be dominated by economic tyrants the preeminent political issue of our is more than access. Legislators do not without state sanction. An important time. Cash influence no longer occurs want to offend anyone. They are people, role of government is to represent broad- by blank envelope payoffs. With private gregarious people, who try (usually mad- er interests to assure the prerequisites of funding of insatiable political campaigns, deningly and to a fault) to achieve total a free marketplace and to intervene it doesn't have to. And campaign con- consensus-unanimous agreement be- where needed for the common good. tribution use by incumbents to preclude tween interested parties on public issues. This need for public check of private meaningful challenge has become so Add to this the fact that the critical power is necessarily most needed where successful that electoral democracy is in votes in Sacramento occur in committees private parties are most powerful and jeopardy. The statistics are stark. In where all one has to do is "take a walk" most organized-for as with government, 1986, 139 incumbents ran for reelection and not vote to kill a measure. A bill here Acton's dictum retains its validity for state and national office California. requires a majority vote not of a quorum without abridgment. The state performs All 139 were reelected. All. of the committee, but a majority of the this check by responding to the elector- More important, the average margin total membership of the committee. ate in the broadest sense, balancing the was much more than LBJ's vaunted land- Since committee meetings occur all over intensity of interest of those who may slide over Goldwater in 1964; in fact, it the Capitol and members are commonly be powerful against the interests of the was well over 2-1. Sure, part of it is required to be in more than one place at consumer, the taxpayer, future genera- gerrymandering and a political scientist any given point in time, it is relatively tions, the diffuse general public. The de will tell you the incumbent has a 10% easy not to be there to provide a vote minimis expectation: a government that natural advantage. But what we have is necessary to pass needed legislation. The cannot be bought or overly influenced far more than that. Perhaps the fact confluence of these facts with campaign by any narrow group, that considers that incumbents on the average raise contributions means that those who are matters on the merits, and is responsive more than thirty times the campaign organized in Sacramento can, at the to the broad electorate. funds as their nearest challengers has very least, stop almost any legislation Much of what the legislature is called something to do with it. In 1987, a non- they oppose. Special interests have more upon to do involves opposing the narrow election year, over $25 million was meaningful item veto power over the and short-run interests of those organ- raised for state legislative races alone, legislature than ever enjoyed by an ized around a profit stake for the benefit $24.6 million by incumbents; that's over elected governor. of these broader interests. That is its 98% for you mathematicians. That's also The extent of special interest control basic job. And it has been given awesome a quarter million dollars for each race- is difficult to overstate. It is not a ques- authority in our constitutional structure few of them seriously contested-and tion of degree; it has reached a level of to accomplish that task. For the state, election year fundraising has not even qualitative impact. Special interest con- through its legislature, is our sovereign started yet. The campaign costs of in- trol has surpassed negative control and authority: our basic repository of public cumbents, notwithstanding their impreg- approaches total determinability. power and including, lest we forget, the nability, will be more than ten times the The significance of special interest authority to impose taxes, rules of liabili- annual salary for the job. capture of the legislature is momentous ty so some of us may take by force the Who is paying? Special interests. beyond easy description. Our political property of others, and rules of behavior Not just part of it-almost all of it. system relies for its integrity on checks enforced through penal sanction. The Over 90% is raised not in the incum- and balances. The dictum of Lord state can and does tell us what we can bents' districts but in Sacramento, and Acton-"power corrupts, and absolute and cannot do with our cars, our land, almost all is in contributions of over power corrupts absolutely"-was as and our occupations, and indirectly deter- $1,000. Those organized around a profit much a cliche of truth in the eighteenth mines the basic conditions of our lives. stake in public policy now control that century as in our own, and was certainly We have reached the point where public policy. This is not to say that a basis for the imposition of those checks vested interests are well organized. Our every legislator simply calculates the by our prescient forefathers. But they world has become increasingly "horizon- campaign contribution impact of every did more than create separate judicial, talized." Those who are structured for vote-but at the very least, the contri- executive and legislative branches. They peer group organization have done so butions buy access, and anyone who has created an underlying check more im- with a vengeance. We relate more and worked in Sacramento knows what that portant even than that critical tripartite more to those in our same occupations means. The ability to meet privately and structure: they created a "political state" and less and less vertically to our make your case is usually determinative independent from private interests. patients, clients, and customers. And we The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 1988) COMMENTARY fund powerful organizations to protect a serious supporter of democracy. The than $1 per Californian? Let's not be our interests. But the balance of advo- financing system should require some silly about "taxpayer subsidy of cam- cacy and monied organization in Sacra- private contributions to filter out those paigns." It is ironic that those who claim mento and other political locales bear who seek public finance without at least to be so concerned about taxpayer inter- little relationship to the broader interests some local support. But once that ability ests oppose even the use of voluntary of the electorate which government is to garner minimal support is demon- funds designated by taxpayers, while intended to represent. The weak, the strated, public funds should be given at often supporting tax credits for cam- future, and broad unorganizable interests a high ratio (e.g., 5-1) to match and paign contributions. are intrinsically absent from private pol- encourage small contributions from with- The three-part system of public fi- itical organization. We conducted a in the candidate's district. This makes it nance and spending and contribution survey some time ago of the lobbyists in easy for those who want to run to do so limits is not simply a model for reform. Sacramento representing broad environ- without servility to Sacramento's special It is the sine qua non to the integrity of mental or future interests in land use interests. To qualify, one should be re- our body politic. Certainly there are few policies versus those with direct eco- quired to raise $20,000 to $30,000; but issues which can ever justify a violent nomic profit stake in those policies. The once a threshold of local support is revolution. The taking up of arms in- number of lobbyists in Sacramento repre- demonstrated, it would match to stimu- volves death and tragedy beyond meas- senting the former were 3; the latter late local and small contributions. ure. But this question is one which rises were 235. The notion of "representatives" from to that pinnacled level. We fought the The imbalance in a Sacramento ad- districts has become a neglected principle British because the government imposed vocate count is also reflected in the in the legislature in lieu of a very differ- upon us was not ours. We disavowed campaign contribution levels from those ent system of legislator identification: the authority of any state not meaning- with a direct stake in state public policies the committee memberships and chair- fully reposing the consent of the gov- versus more general interests. Nor is the manships which are held, and their re- erned. It is a sad truth that we now legislature the only branch of state gov- spective attraction to special interest approach such a state; those committed ernment where this campaign finance financial campaign resources. Such a to the reform of our recently-corrupted disparity can be translated into corrupt- distortion of representative government model laudably and patiently strive for ive influence.