By Peter Grier 34 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2015 he Iran nuclear deal is fi nished. “Over the next 20 to 25 years, if imple- National Nuclear Security Administration photo Yet work on the Iran nuclear deal mented effectively, the agreement could has just begun. succeed in permanently ending Iran’s T This is how both these statements pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Alternately, can be true: The sweeping agreement itself if implementation fails, the JCPOA could is signed and dotted, wrapped up during pave the way for an Iranian bomb in 15 months of exhausting fi nal negotiations years or sooner.” in Switzerland and Austria. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Ac- Eating was one way the US delega- tion struck by the P5+1 (the permanent tion dealt with the stress of the talks, as members of the UN Security Council plus diplomats chomped their way through Germany) and Iran is a historic accord pounds of strawberry Twizzlers, string that aims to block Iran’s pathways to a cheese, and mixed nuts. nuclear weapon in return for the lifting Shouting was another relief valve—at of longtime international sanctions and one point Secretary of State John F. Kerry access to piles of Iranian cash now frozen and Energy Secretary Ernest J. Moniz were in world banks. yelling so loudly at Iranian counterparts For the US, one of the most important that aides rushed into their hotel confer- goals of the agreement was to stretch ence room to tell them to keep it down, Iran’s so-called breakout time—the time it lest random guests hear their secrets. would take if Tehran dropped all pretense But the deal—aimed at limiting Iran’s of a peaceful nuclear program and raced nuclear program in return for lifting to produce enough fi ssile material for a international sanctions—has yet to be single bomb. actually implemented. That is because Before the beginning of nuclear ne- it requires further actions by all parties gotiations, breakout would have taken before its provisions take full effect. Iran Iran about two months, said Kerry at a must now greatly reduce its stockpile Council on Foreign Rela- of low-enriched uranium, for instance, tions meeting in late July. and dismantle or alter much of its fi ssile “We’ve now pushed An agreement is in enrichment infrastructure. the breakout time up to Then, and only then, will the US and its maybe six months or so. European Union ease existing restrictions And with this agreement place, and the devil on business and fi nancial interaction with for 10 years the breakout Iranian parties. time will be one year or is in the details. The US fi gures that “Implementation more,” said Kerry. Day,” as this moment is called in deal Here are key aspects of documents, will not arrive until the middle the agreement, according to the White or end of 2016. House: In addition, the agreement will require Uranium Limits. If Iran ever decided constant vigilance on the part of the US, to break out and build a nuclear weapon, its allies, and the international community. highly enriched uranium might well be International Atomic Energy Agency its fi ssile material of choice. Prior to the inspectors will be crucial to effective signing of the deal, Iran had developed enforcement of curbs on Iran’s nuclear an extensive uranium-enrichment in- materials production and research. frastructure that it has long insisted is It is not an end in itself. The deal is necessary for a nascent domestic nuclear term-limited and most of its important power network. Its stockpile of enriched provisions expire after 15 years. That uranium reached eight tons—some of it means the US has gained only a period enriched to 20 percent U-235, the isotope of time in which to convince Iran that necessary for a nuclear reaction. (Bomb a permanent abstention from nuclear grade HEU is 90 percent U-235.) weapons is in its best interest. Under the JCPOA, much of Iran’s “Now comes the hard part” is a standard current enriching machinery will be dis- pundit line after diplomatic breakthroughs. mantled. Of the 19,000 existing Iranian In the case of the Iran agreement, known centrifuges—thin metal tubes that spin offi cially as the Joint Comprehensive Plan at fantastic speed to separate uranium’s of Action (JCPOA), this truism might be natural isotopes—5,060 will continue to particularly apt. operate with uranium feedstock. All will “Success will depend heavily on the be IR-1s, fi rst generation centrifuges that policies the United States and its partners are relatively ineffi cient. A nuclear device, detonated during a pursue in the aftermath of the agreement,” This provision will remain in effect for test shot on April 18, 1953, at this Ne- concludes a Center for a New American 10 years. Beginning in year 11, Iran will vada Proving Ground tower, yielded the Security report on the Iran agreement and be able to replace the IR-1s, one-for-one, equivalent of 23 kilotons of TNT. what comes next. with more advanced models. AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2015 35 Google Earth image Google Earth Above: A satellite captured this image of Natanz nuclear facility in Isfahan province, Iran. Right: Anti-aircraft guns are poised to defend the hardened nuclear facility from air strikes. Photo by Hamed Saber Hamed by Photo All of these uranium-enrichment cen- trifuges will be located at Iran’s Natanz Nuclear Facility. About 1,000 centrifuges at the deeply buried Fordow site, built in secret and discovered by Western intel- ligence before Iran disclosed it to the IAEA, will remain in operation but be converted to non-nuclear research. As to the level of enrichment, Iran has agreed to produce uranium with a concentration of U-235 no greater than 3.67 percent for at least 15 years. Iran’s existing low-enriched uranium stockpile will similarly be sharply cur- tailed for the next decade-and-a-half. Tehran will reduce it to no more than 300 kilograms, all of it enriched only to the 3.67 percent level. Iran can either ship its surplus stock out of the country, or it can blend it down so that it contains the same levels of U-235 found in natural uranium. Plutonium Limits. The vast major- ity of existing nuclear weapons have a plutonium fi ssile core. Plutonium con- tains more explosive power than highly 36 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2015 enriched uranium, ounce for ounce, and theoretically have somewhat better access within a few days. The total time elapsed for advanced nations is easier and less ex- to declared Iranian nuclear sites, because for the process might reach 24 days. pensive to produce since it is a byproduct under the pact Tehran has agreed to the Critics say that would provide Iran of certain nuclear power reactors. tighter inspection strictures contained in plenty of time to scrub away signs of covert That is why the US and its allies have the so-called Additional Protocol to the work. Supporters say that it is virtually long been worried about the heavy water Nonproliferation Treaty that it signed impossible to clean up all indications of reactor Iran has been building near the in 1968. radioactive material, and that in any case city of Arak. Iran has said it exists to The new Iran agreement specifi es the provision refl ects a necessary com- create radioisotopes for medical purposes that IAEA teams will have regular ac- promise. Iran had long insisted it would but it is the type of reactor that can also cess to relevant buildings at the Natanz never allow the IAEA into non-nuclear produce weapons-grade plutonium. It is centrifuge site. military bases. ringed with anti-aircraft defenses and was For 15 years the UN agency will also “Ultimately, the robustness of the entire perhaps a sign that Iran was hedging its be able to check up on dismantled and verifi cation regime depends on all the bets and intended to experiment with an stored centrifuge equipment. For 20 working parts: information, technology, alternative path for production of bomb years, it will have access to centrifuge and access,” writes Sharon Squassoni, material. component manufacturing plants. For director of the Proliferation Prevention Under the agreement, Iran has promised 25 years, it will have access to Iran’s Program at the Center for Strategic and to address that concern. It will redesign uranium mines and mills and its heavy International Studies, in an assessment and rebuild Arak so that it will not produce water plant. of the Iran agreement. weapons-grade plutonium, and it has Sites that Iran hasn’t declared part of Past Activities. Some years ago the agreed to remove the reactor’s original its nuclear infrastructure are a different IAEA obtained a sheaf of intelligence core and render it inoperable. It further matter. Under the agreement, the IAEA that indicated Iran had carried out a promises to not build any new heavy water would be able to check almost any location wide variety of activities related to the reactors for at least 15 years. where it suspects covert nuclear activi- development of a nuclear warhead. These Verifi cation. Iran is a big country ties are taking place—but only after a activities, or possible military dimensions with diffi cult, mountainous terrain. It has process that would render the inspections (PMD), allegedly ranged from work on concealed some of its past nuclear activi- something less than snap assessments. high-voltage detonators to a study of ties from the rest of the world, including First, the IAEA would have to ask how to fi t a nuclear bomb in a missile the construction of nuclear infrastructure.