The Metaphysics of Grounding A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities 2012 Michael John Clark School of Social Sciences Contents Contents 2 Abstract 5 1 Preliminaries 9 1.1 Introduction . 9 1.2 The core concept . 10 1.3 Contrasts . 13 1.3.1 Explanatory vs. evidential uses of ‘grounds’ . 13 1.3.2 Contrast with causation . 14 1.3.3 Contrast with conceptual priority . 15 1.3.4 Contrast with modal concepts . 15 1.4 A brief history of grounding . 18 1.5 Enthusiasm . 19 1.6 Questions . 22 1.6.1 Technical or ordinary? . 22 1.6.2 How should grounding claims be regimented? . 22 1.6.3 What is the logic of grounding? . 23 1.6.4 Is there a relation of grounding? . 25 1.6.5 What are the relata of grounding? . 25 1.6.6 Is grounding grounded? . 26 1.6.7 One or many? . 27 1.6.8 How does grounding stand to explanation? . 28 1.7 Summary and Prospectus . 29 2 Scepticism 30 2.1 Introduction . 30 2.2 A sceptical analysis of ‘grounds’ . 31 2.3 Varieties of scepticism . 33 2.4 Supporting scepticism . 34 2.4.1 Paradox . 34 2.4.2 Supporting meaning scepticism . 37 2.5 Replying to scepticism . 39 2 CONTENTS 3 2.5.1 Analogy . 40 2.5.2 Functional definition . 42 2.6 Summary and conclusion . 44 3 Roles 45 3.1 Introduction . 45 3.2 Explanatory realism . 45 3.2.1 Underpinning explanations . 45 3.2.2 Explaining explanatory asymmetries . 47 3.3 The determination relations . 49 3.4 Explaining supervenience . 54 3.5 Summary and conclusion . 57 4 Ontological free lunch 58 4.1 Introduction . 58 4.2 The truthmaker approach . 60 4.3 The concept of an ontological free lunch . 61 4.4 Against restricting Occam’s razor . 63 4.5 Explanatory unification . 65 4.6 The bang for the buck principle . 66 4.7 Summary and conclusion . 68 5 Relata 69 5.1 Introduction . 69 5.2 The Fact theory . 70 5.3 The fact theory and the determination relations . 71 5.4 The fact theory and explanatory realism . 73 5.5 Problems for the dimensioned theory . 78 5.6 Summary and conclusion . 80 6 A Lewisian fix 81 6.1 Introduction . 81 6.2 Counterpart theory . 82 6.3 Qua terms . 84 6.4 Terminology . 86 6.5 Explanation and necessity . 89 6.6 Referential opacity . 90 6.7 Regimentation and reflective equilibrium . 92 6.8 Property grounding . 94 6.9 Variably polyadic on both sides . 95 6.10 A cheat? . 95 6.11 Summary and conclusion . 96 CONTENTS 4 7 Structural principles 97 7.1 Introduction . 97 7.2 Describing the grounding predicate . 98 7.3 Describing the grounding relation . 100 7.4 Partial grounding . 101 7.5 Transitivity . 102 7.5.1 Predicate transitivity . 103 7.5.2 Relation transitivity . 104 7.5.3 Macro-reductions . 105 7.6 Irreflexivity . 106 7.6.1 Predicate irreflexivity . 107 7.6.2 Relation irreflexivity . 107 7.7 Asymmetry . 109 7.8 Summary and conclusion . 111 Wrapping up 112 Bibliography 114 Word count: 61607 Abstract The University of Manchester Michael John Clark Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) The Metaphysics of Grounding 28 September 2012 The phrase ‘in virtue of’ is a mainstay of metaphysical discourse. In recent years, many philosophers have argued that we should understand this phrase, as metaphysicians use it, in terms of a concept of metaphysical dependence called ‘grounding’. This dissertation explores a range of central issues in the theory of grounding. Chapter 1 introduces the intuitive concept of grounding and discusses some compulsory questions in the theory of grounding. Chapter 2 focusses on scep- ticism on grounding, according to which the recent philosophical interest in the topic is misguided. In chapter 3 I discuss grounding’s explanatory roles. Chapter 4 focusses on the claim that if an entity is grounded then it is an on- tological free lunch. Chapter 5 discusses and rejects the claim that grounding is a relation between facts. This conclusion raises a problem: if grounding is not a relation between facts it becomes difficult to specify the connections between grounding and expla- nation and grounding and necessity. But not only is it desirable to specify these relations, it is essential for establishing that grounding is able to play the explanatory roles that are discussed in chapter 3. Chapter 6 responds to this problem by outlining an approach to grounding based on David Lewis’s (2003) theory of truthmaking. Against this backdrop I discuss, in chapter 7, some issues in the logic of grounding. 5 Declaration No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning. 6 Copyright Statement i) The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes. ii) Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made. iii) The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and other intel- lectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions. iv) Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and com- mercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://www.campus.manchester.ac.uk/medialibrary/policies/intellectual property.pdf), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the Uni- versity Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.manchester.ac. uk/library/aboutus/regulations) and in The University’s policy on presentation of Theses 7 Acknowledgements I am deeply grateful to my supervisory team: Chris Daly, Julian Dodd and David Liggins. All three have provided me with an enormous amount of guidance and support over the years. I particularly want to thank Chris, who was my primary supervisor for the latter part of my PhD. He has been incredibly supportive and generous with his time – more so than any graduate student has a right to expect. Thanks also to the my mum and dad for their constant encouragement and to Elena for putting up with me. I gratefully acknowledge funding provided by the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the Jacobsen Trust. 8 Chapter 1 Preliminaries 1.1 Introduction The phrase ‘in virtue of’ is widely used in metaphysical discourse. So are similar ex- pressions, including ‘depends on’, ‘determines’, ‘makes’ and ‘grounds’. To see the sort of metaphysical claim that these expressions are used to make, imagine a metaphysician making the following speech: Fundamentally there are only atoms in the void. Macroscopic objects exist but they are derivative – they exist and have their features ultimately in virtue of the existence and features of the atoms. The atoms are responsible for everything else; they make the rest of reality the way it is. To adapt a metaphor of Saul Kripke’s (Kripke 1980: 153-4), if God wanted to create a duplicate of the actual world at time t, She only needs to duplicate the atoms and their arrangement at t. Having done this the rest would automatically follow, because the fundamental determines the non-fundamental. The claims expressed by our imaginary metaphysician are of a familiar kind. How should they be understood? In particular, how should the italicised expressions be interpreted? According to an approach that has become prominent recently, metaphysical usage of these expressions should be understood in terms of a distinctive concept of metaphysical determination called ‘grounding’. Grounding has been the subject of intense philosophical discussion in recent years (see Audi forthcoming a; forthcoming b; Correia 2005: ch. 3; 2010; Fine 2001; forthcoming a; Rosen 2010; Schaffer 2009; forthcoming). The debate is mostly very recent. Nonetheless, the theory of grounding is now established as a major concern of metaphysics. The following two claims are popular among grounding theorists: • The concept of grounding is distinctive, in that it resists analysis in terms of more familiar and better understood philosophical concepts (for example, grounding can- not be analysed in terms of supervenience). • The concept of grounding is philosophically important, in that it plays serious ex- planatory roles in our theories (it is not a ‘mere placeholder’ or a ‘mere heuristic’). Jonathan Schaffer succinctly articulates these claims by saying that “[g]rounding is an unanalyzable but needed notion – it is the primitive structuring conception of meta- physics” (Schaffer 2009: 364). Together they capture an enthusiastic view of grounding that many grounding theorists have, according to which grounding is both genuinely new and philosophically important. 9 CHAPTER 1. PRELIMINARIES 10 I have two broad aims in this dissertation.