Dretske on self-knowledge and contrastive focus: How to understand Dretske’s theory, and why it matters Michael Roche* and William Roche† * Department of Philosophy, Mississippi State University, MS, USA, e-mail: [email protected] † Department of Philosophy, Texas Christian University, TX, USA, e-mail: [email protected] ABSTRACT: Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is interesting but peculiar and can seem implausible. He denies that we can know by introspection that we have thoughts, feelings, and experiences. But he allows that we can know by introspection what we think, feel, and experience. We consider two puzzles. The first puzzle, PUZZLE 1, is interpretive. Is there a way of understanding Dretske’s theory on which the (potential) knowledge affirmed by its positive side is different than the (potential) knowledge denied by its negative side? The second puzzle, PUZZLE 2, is substantive. Each of the following theses has some prima facie plausibility: (a) there is introspective knowledge of thoughts, (b) knowledge requires evidence, and (c) there are no experiences of thoughts. It is unclear, though, that these claims form a consistent set. These puzzles are not unrelated. Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge is a potential solution to PUZZLE 2 in that if Dretske’s theory is correct, then (a), (b), and (c) are all true. We provide a solution to PUZZLE 1 by appeal to Dretske’s early work in the philosophy of language on contrastive focus. We then distinguish between “Closure” and “Transmissibility”, and raise and answer a worry to the effect that Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge runs counter to Transmissibility. These results help to secure Dretske’s theory as a viable solution to PUZZLE 2. KEYWORDS: closure; contrastive focus; contrastivist theories of knowledge; Dretske; introspection; introspective knowledge; self-knowledge; transmissibility 2 1 Introduction Dretske’s theory of self-knowledge (2012a) is interesting but peculiar and can seem implausible.1 Dretske admits that he himself many years ago would have thought the theory implausible: I have lately … been advancing a view about self-knowledge that forty years ago I would have thought implausible. … I defend it because over these years I have developed commitments—all of which seem reasonable to me—that lead, irresistibly, to the conclusion that although we have direct awareness of and, therefore, a unique authority about what is in our mind and about what we think, feel, and experience, we enjoy no special access to or authority about the fact that we have a mind—to the fact that we actually have thoughts, feelings, and experiences. (2012a, p. 49, emphasis original) He denies that we can know by introspection—an essentially first-personal way (a way not available to others)—that we have thoughts, feelings, and experiences.2 But he allows that we can know by introspection what we think, feel, and experience. He calls his theory “conciliatory skepticism”.3 There is mention of experiences and feelings in the passage above. But Dretske later restricts attention to (current conscious) thoughts understood as non-factive propositional attitudes where the propositions involved are accepted as true. Beliefs and judgments count as thoughts in this sense whereas hopes and rememberings do not.4 Our focus in what follows will likewise be on thoughts (so understood). It will help in discussing Dretske’s theory to formulate it in terms of a schematic case: 1 Dretske’s writings on self-knowledge are numerous. See Dretske (1994, 1995, 1999, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2006b, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). Dretske (2012a) is representative of Dretske’s later writings on self-knowledge and, in part because of this, is our main focus in explaining his theory. 2 Dretske allows that we can know non-introspectively that we have thoughts, feelings, and experiences. 3 The extant literature on introspection and self-knowledge is vast. See Gertler (2014) and Schwitzgebel (2014) for helpful overviews (and for references). See also Smithies and Stoljar (2012). 4 Dretske claims that he limits the discussion to thoughts only for expository purposes and that his arguments concerning thoughts can be generalized (with some complication) to non-thoughts. Dretske refers readers to Dretske (2003b) for details. 3 Dretske on Self-Knowledge (DSK): Let S be some subject and P be some proposition such that S thinks that P. Then S knows, or at least can know, by introspection what she thinks, but does not know, and cannot know, by introspection that she thinks it. Note that there is no mention of “P” in the second sentence of DSK. The reason why is that there is no straightforward and charitable way to flesh out that sentence in terms of “P”. It might be thought, for example, that since P is what S thinks, the second sentence of DSK should read: Then S knows, or at least can know, by introspection [that P], but does not know, and cannot know, by introspection that she thinks [that P]. But this interpretation is widly uncharitable, for there are numerous substitutions for P (e.g., the Earth revolves around the Sun) such that S cannot know by introspection that P. A main task in the remainder of the paper is to make clear how exactly DSK is to be understood. Hereafter we shall omit the expression “or at least can know” and suppose that the details of the case are such that Dretske would claim that S knows by introspection what she thinks. This is merely a matter of presentation. What, for Dretske, is the source of S’s introspective knowledge of what she thinks? Dretske’s answer is that the source is S’s awareness of what she thinks. S’s awareness is a non-epistemic awareness of an object (albeit an abstract object), viz., the proposition that P, as opposed to an epistemic awareness of a fact, i.e., a piece of propositional knowledge. That is, the source of S’s introspective knowledge of what she thinks is an “o-awareness” (“object-awareness”) as opposed to an “f-awareness” (“fact-awareness”).5 It is crucial here to distinguish between the source of S’s introspective knowledge and the content of S’s introspective knowledge. The source of the introspective knowledge allowed by DSK is not in question—it is S’s o-awareness of P. Dretske is clear on this point. The content of that knowledge is a different story (to say the least!) and, as explained below, is the subject of an interpretive puzzle. Dretske gives an analogy meant to make clear the structure of self-knowledge on his thoery: The Philosophical Gazette, smitten with my deep thoughts, arranges to publish everything I write. They give me oral assurances of this, and (let us assume) their word is gold. On the basis of their assurances, then, I know they publish everything I write. I now write [P]. The Gazette promptly publishes it. Given what I have been told, I know they are publishing [P]. Yet the way I know what they are publishing is not the way I know they are publishing it. (2012a, p. 54, emphasis original) 5 See Dretske (2012b) for more on the distinction between o-awareness and f-awareness. 4 The source of Dretske’s knowledge of what PG (the Philosophical Gazette) is publishing is not the source of his knowledge that PG is publishing it. The source of the former is Dretske’s o-awareness of what he wrote; the source of the latter is (Dretske’s knowledge of) PG’s promise. Similarly, the idea goes, S’s o-awareness of what she thinks (viz., the proposition that P) is the source of her knowledge of what she thinks but is not the source of her knowledge that she thinks it. It might seem that there is a relevant disanalogy between the two cases. When Dretske is o-aware of what he wrote, he is not also o-aware of PG’s publishing it. It might seem that, in contrast, when S is o-aware of the proposition that P, she is also o- aware of her thinking it. If so, then, it might seem, S cannot know by introspection what she thinks without also knowing (or at least being able to know) by introspection that she thinks it. Dretske (2012b) explicitly considers this line of thought. He rejects it in part on the grounds that, as far as he can tell, there are no o-awarenesses of thoughts (or, thus, of thinkings).6 He also argues that even if S were o-aware of her thought that P, this by itself would not be enough. She would also need to be o-aware of a property of her thought indicating that it is a thought.7 Given Dretske’s rejection of o-awarenesses of thoughts, there is a clear sense in which, if Dretske is right, introspective knowledge of thoughts is a species of “displaced perception” broadly understood. S knows by introspection what she thinks, not by way of an o-awareness of her thought that P, but by way of an o-awareness of something else entirely.8 There is a puzzle, though, as hinted at above, concerning how exactly to understand DSK. It is widely held in epistemology (and elsewhere) that knowledge-what reduces to knowledge-that.9 Consider: 6 Dretske (2003b) also holds that there are no o-awarenesses of experiences and refers readers to Shoemaker (1994) for details as to why. 7 This requirement is far from trivial if certain externalist theories are correct. See Lau and Deutsch (2014) and Parent (2013) for relevant discussion. 8 Dretske writes in terms of “displaced perception” in his early work on self-knowledge (Dretske 1994; 1995, Ch.